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# ECONOMICS and SOCIOLOGY

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# The AMERICAN JOURNAL of ECONOMICS and SOCIOLOGY

Published QUARTERLY under grant from the Robert Schalkenbach  
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WILL LISSNER  
Editor

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## Policies for Full Post-War Employment

By HARRY GUNNISON BROWN

### I

THE QUESTION is sometimes asked: "If we can have prosperity when there is a war on, why can we not have prosperity during the years of peace?" And yet, at the same time, there appears to be a widespread idea that war must be followed by business depression or, at least, that to prevent such an aftermath, there must be careful and detailed "planning" for after-war production and jobs.

No solution of this problem is possible without a careful analysis of the forces that tend to prosperity and to depression. In such analysis it will appear that especial attention must be devoted to monetary influences or, more broadly, to the effects which may be produced on prices and on business activity by fluctuations in money and in the checking accounts of commercial banks. And it may appear that without intelligent monetary policy no amount of "planning," whether by government administrators or business "leaders," can save us from recurring depressions.

An increase of spending means an increased demand for goods and for labor. This is what we have had during World War II and what we had in World War I. Indeed, we seem to have it in every war.

In war time a much larger proportion of the spending than at other times is by government. But there does not appear to be the slightest reason to believe that \$1,000 spent for goods or for labor by government will have any greater stimulating effect than \$1,000 similarly spent by private corporations or by individuals. If the spending of money is what we need for prosperity, it would seem that we ought to be able to do as well with individual spending as with government spending.

The total volume of spending during any period, such as a year, depends on *how much* circulating medium there is to spend and on the *rapidity* with which it is spent, i.e., on its "velocity" of circulation.

A given number of dollars would make possible a much greater amount of total spending if only each person would *immediately* spend for goods, for labor or for the use of land or capital the money he receives in his own business or for his own work. But hardly anybody wants to spend instantly all the money he receives. He prefers, rather, to have some on hand for emergencies. Household gadgets that are now, apparently, all right, may break or unexpectedly wear out and need to be replaced. Clothes may become badly torn. There may be unexpected occasion to go to a distant city by airplane, bus or train. Exceptionally good shows may come to town before the next salary check is received. And even apart from such considerations as these, the average person likes to have time to decide at his leisure between the various things for which he may spend his money. He likes to have time to "shop around."

It is not desirable that people should be put under great pressure to spend their money more rapidly than their own convenience dictates. For such pressure would appreciably limit their freedom of choice in the purchase of goods and services and in investment. But when, because of monetary

inflation, prices are rising rapidly, there is such pressure. Recipients of money, whether as wages or otherwise, feel obliged to spend it at the earliest possible moment, even though they have not the time to decide carefully and wisely for what to spend it, because the money will buy so much less if it is kept for some time unspent.

But if, on the other hand, prices in general are falling at a noticeable rate and further decline is expected, there will be some tendency for recipients of money to delay purchases, because of their anticipation that their money will purchase more at a later date than at or near the date of receiving it. Likewise a merchant, if he anticipates either declining prices or generally dull business, will be more likely to hold his money or bank deposit account unused for a relatively long period than if his anticipation were otherwise. And a manufacturer will be more hesitant to spend current funds buying raw material and hiring labor if he believes *either* that the prices of finished goods will greatly decline *or* that he is likely to find difficulty in selling them. These two contingencies come to the same thing. For there is almost always *some* price at which goods can be sold; and to say that they may have to be sold at a low price amounts to saying that they may not be salable at all at a higher price.

Despite the possible importance of velocity of circulation as a *derivative* factor, I believe we shall do well not to assume that it has any especial importance in initiating either rising prices or falling prices. And I believe we ought not to expect to find in velocity of circulation of money and bank credit an important influence in the initiation of business depression.

The greater velocity with which money is spent when prices are rising is, as has been indicated above, a *consequence* of the fact that the money will buy less—or is expected to buy less—if spending is deferred. It is true that this in-

creased velocity of spending still further increases the demand for goods and tends to accentuate the rapidity with which the prices of goods and services are rising. But unless some other cause—presumably an increase of the *volume* of circulating medium—gives the initial push to prices, it is altogether unlikely that the increase of velocity of circulation will occur at all.

And likewise when prices fall and velocity declines. The decrease of the velocity of spending of money does not come arbitrarily. It is *because* of the expectation of falling prices—or of unsalableness of goods *except* at lower prices—that men spend their money more reluctantly, i.e., at a slower rate. And we cannot reasonably assume this expectation to be self-causing or to be the consequence of dire predictions made without basis in existing economic fact and yet so widely believed as to bring about a fall in prices that would not otherwise have occurred! On the contrary, it is much more likely that any great decrease in velocity of spending will manifest itself only when and as some other influence—presumably a decrease of circulating medium which might be brought about through restriction of commercial bank credit—decreases the demand for goods and makes prices tend downward.

This does not mean, of course, that velocity of circulation may not change for other reasons. As specialization increases, as more people—or less—live in cities, as credit institutions develop, as habits of other kinds change, the velocity of circulation of money may gradually change, entirely apart from the influence of rising and falling prices. But that such changes would be rapid enough to make the general price level rise or fall greatly and quickly does not seem very likely.

When, therefore, the demand for goods in general increases or decreases, the initiatory influence would appear to be an

increase or a decrease of the total volume of circulating medium. The question may still arise, of course, why the volume of circulating medium changes. But, in most countries, this is either directly controlled or is obviously subject to control by government. Velocity of circulation, on the other hand, is a matter of individual choice. Government can influence it only by giving its citizens a motive to spend money more or less rapidly. In general, government influences velocity of circulation only as it determines the volume of money and so causes prices, on the average, to rise or fall.

## II

WHAT, THEN, is the reason for war prosperity and why can we not have as great prosperity continuously?

We do have very active business—"prosperity"—at times when we are not at war. The year 1919 was a year of very active business. The year 1926 has been regarded as a year of high prosperity. And so of various years and periods of years. Yet there are recurring depressions and some of them are severe and protracted. What is the explanation?

There have been many and complicated explanations of the alternation of prosperity and depression. But the one fundamental influence—the influence that must be especially emphasized in any explanation that is even approximately correct—is to be found in changes in the volume of circulating medium.

In general, increase of circulating medium (money, and bank deposits subject to check) tends to increase prices. Here we are using the word "prices" in a broad sense, in which it includes rentals and wages. But if business is dull, an increase of circulating medium may show its effect partly in stimulus of business activity. When more is being spent, there must obviously be *either* more transactions (more goods sold, labor hired, etc.) *or*, if there are no more transactions,



the fact of more being spent can mean only that prices (including wages and rentals) are higher. When there is full employment and the annual output of goods cannot be appreciably increased, any greatly increased volume of circulating medium and correspondingly increased spending *must bid up prices*. But an increase of spending when there is *not* full employment may aid in putting the unemployed to work. May it not be that the business activity of war-time is to be explained in terms of greater spending and, mostly, in terms of their being *a larger volume of circulating medium to spend*?

An increase of spending promotes business activity *because* prices, including wages, rentals, etc., do not ordinarily increase as rapidly as spending increases. If, with the volume of circulating medium doubled and the number of dollars annually spent also doubled, prices, including wages, rentals and other payments, instantly doubled, the doubled spending would then be barely sufficient to take care of the same total of transactions. There would be required, for example, a doubled spending for wages to employ the same number of workers as before. Such increased spending could then have no stimulating effect on business activity or on employment. If the consequent rise of prices and possible anticipation of still further rise stimulated a still greater spending, nevertheless even this still greater spending could have no stimulating effect on business and employment if prices, including wages, etc., instantly increased again in like proportion.

Are we not likely to find war-time a period when spending is greatly increased and when, though wages, rentals and prices in general rise, nevertheless this rise *fails to keep pace with the increase of spending*? Indeed, is it not a fact that during war there is often or usually an effort to hold down prices, including rentals and even wages, by administrative

regulation, to a lower level than they would almost certainly reach if the greatly increased spending were allowed to reach its full unregulated effect? Under such circumstances, it could scarcely be anticipated that business would be dull. High activity is by all means to be expected.

Whence come the means for increased war-time spending? Government takes the initiative. The increase of demand for goods and services, the increased demand for labor, come first from government. And this increase of demand from government becomes effective on business activity and on prices through an increase of circulating medium. Many times this has meant a large issue by government of paper money. The Continental currency of the American Revolutionary War and the Greenbacks issued by the Union in the Civil War are familiar examples.

But at other times, and more especially in the twentieth century, the increase of circulating medium has been chiefly in the form of bank deposits subject to check and has resulted mainly because of government borrowing from banks.

In this connection we must note that the borrowing which tends particularly to increase demand is borrowing from banks. If government borrows from an individual, his means of purchasing goods or labor are reduced by the amount he lends to his government. The government has more to spend. The citizen in his individual capacity has less to spend. *Unless* the money borrowed from the citizen *would have been hoarded* longer by him than by the government, there is here no increase of spending at all, no special stimulus to business activity and no tendency to bid up the general average of prices.

But *if* the government borrows from the banks and *if* the banks, having sufficiently large reserves, thus *lend more* to government without correspondingly reducing their loans to individuals, then there is a clear and definite increase of cir-

culating medium and of spending. At the beginning of World War I and again at the beginning of World War II the reserves of the banking system of the United States and, especially, of the Federal Reserve banks were such as to permit a great increase of checking accounts. And these deposits subject to check soon became substantially larger than they had been previously.

Business activity rather than business depression is certainly to be desired. General and widespread employment of wage earners is, obviously, vastly preferable to unemployment. And, therefore, an increase of circulating medium and consequent increase of spending is clearly beneficial if and in so far as it promotes employment and business activity. Especially in the midst of desperate war when every effort must be made to produce sufficient guns, planes, tanks and ships, is it undesirable that we should suffer the waste of widespread unemployment.

But this does not mean that we want to go on increasing the circulating medium rapidly and indefinitely. Indeed, even during the progress of war such an increase is a frequent cause of trouble. As soon as any lingering dullness of business has been overcome, further increase of money and checking accounts operates definitely and solely in the direction of price increases. And a general increase of prices, if it does occur, involves unfairness to holders of money, since they find it buys less and less the longer it is held. It involves unfairness to lenders, since the money owed to them decreases in purchasing power from month to month and from year to year. It involves unfairness to—and deception of—investors in government bonds. For the money paid them when the bonds are due will buy a smaller amount—unless the upward trend of prices is reversed—than when the bonds were purchased. The incomes of many workers, too, change but slowly in adjustment to changes in the cost of living. Yet

to reverse the upward trend of prices by decreasing the volume of circulating medium, e.g., by sharp restriction of bank credit, may bring business depression.

On the other hand, the attempt to hold prices down by law while simultaneously increasing the volume of circulating medium is also likely to be attended with serious difficulties. There is rationing with all its complications and its nuisance to the public. There are "black markets." There are evasions through deteriorations in quality. There are the demands of various blocs, such as the "farm bloc," that the prices of what they have to sell shall not be regulated on the same basis as prices of other commodities. There are demands that wages shall be raised for this and that group of workers. And experience shows that, in fact, the average of prices does rise and may rise considerably.

Although, all things considered, a stable general level of commodity prices is probably desirable, it is also probably true that, with it, business activity is not quite as great as it sometimes is during a period of rising prices. For our economic system, even though in large degree competitive, is by no means completely so and, indeed, is definitely less fully competitive than it ought to be in the interest of the general well-being. And each monopolistic group has a tendency to push its prices to the most profitable height, thereby somewhat decreasing sales. Labor groups endeavor to put wage scales as high as possible even though employment is thus somewhat diminished,—trying, of course, to keep what employment there is for their own members. Spokesmen for farmers may attempt to secure legislation limiting the output of various agricultural products, thereby tending to decrease the opportunities for employment in agriculture. Producers in other lines may attempt, through agreements or combinations, to raise the prices of the goods they have to sell. In these and other ways, we may be prevented from

enjoying the possible maximum of production and employment.

But when the volume of circulating medium is being greatly and rapidly increased, the chances are that, for a time, these various groups or interests will not raise their prices, wages and rentals in proportion. The increase of circulating medium "steals a march" on them. They do not at once realize that, compared to the new economic possibilities, they are receiving smaller gains than they have been receiving. And so their ordinarily more or less chronic retardation of business activity and employment is temporarily somewhat in abeyance!

But it is doubtful whether even continuous inflation with its otherwise objectionable features, would remedy this evil for very long. For if such inflation came to be thought of by the various monopolistic and quasi-monopolistic groups as normal and as to be expected continuously, they would be likely to begin pushing up their own prices rapidly enough to prevent the fullest possible business activity. The increase of circulating medium would then not be "stealing a march" on them.

Furthermore, even if it were possible, by means of continuous and progressive increase of money and bank credit, to keep always one jump ahead of the monopolistic groups, this *would not be the logical or the right solution*. The right solution would be to carry out a consistently anti-monopoly policy and thereby to be able to maintain both steadily active business and a stable general level of prices.

### III

IT HAS BECOME the custom in certain quarters to hold war responsible for depressions that come in later days of peace. Indeed, in the political campaign of 1932, in the United States, it was argued, on one side, that the depression of 1929 and following years was really due to the war of 1914-1918!



The year 1919, following directly after the war, was a year of continued and rapid increase of circulating medium. Bank credit and Federal Reserve notes in circulation expanded greatly. Business was at a peak of activity. In 1920 Federal Reserve policy was one of bank credit restriction and the crisis of late 1920 was followed by a two-year depression. Business was active again in 1923 and remained generally active, though with a mild recession in 1927, until the latter part of 1929. But in 1929, again, Federal Reserve policy was one of bank credit restriction and in 1929, as in 1920, we experienced the beginning of business depression.

If war, besides being debited with its own obvious evils, is to be the scapegoat for business depressions occurring ten or twelve years after peace is restored, one wonders whether it may be made the scapegoat for depressions occurring twenty and thirty years after. Perhaps the Civil War was responsible not only for the depression of 1873-1879 but even for that of 1893-1897! Perhaps World War II will be blamed for all the depressions of the next hundred years!

The truth is that sharp and persistent restriction of circulating medium brings business depression equally after wars or before them and would presumably bring depression—were there any serious likelihood of monetary restriction at such a time—in the very midst of war. If there is anything in the idea that depression is to be looked for as an aftermath of war, this can be only because and to the extent that sharp and persistent restriction of circulating medium is more likely to occur after a war than at other times. We have just seen that, during war, there is likely to be great and rapid expansion of currency as a means (but not a desirable means) of financing the war. And after such expansion there is likely to be—has frequently been—some attempt to get back, through restriction, to the pre-war basis. In the United States, for example, the boom of 1919-1920, following al-

most at once after the cessation of hostilities, involved further expansion of bank credit beyond that of the war years and, finally, a greatly reduced per cent of reserves of the Federal Reserve banks to deposits and outstanding Federal Reserve notes. This may very well have been a principal reason why the Federal Reserve Board adopted its policy of sharply restricting credit in 1920 and a reason, therefore, why we experienced the depression of 1921-1922. But to say this is far from saying that the war of 1914-1918 *caused* the depression of 1921-1922. And to say that the war of 1914-1918 caused the depression of 1929 and the years following is still more far fetched.

In Great Britain, steps were taken, in the years following World War I, to decrease the circulating medium and bring the price level down to something like its former level—to get back to the former relation of the currency to gold—with a like consequence of business depression. It was not the war, as such, but monetary restriction, that should be held responsible for the succeeding dull business.

What, therefore, can we reasonably expect if, shortly after the end of World War II, there should be sharp and persistent restriction of bank credit (and so of the volume of circulating medium) both in Great Britain and the United States? Should this occur, no amount of preliminary "planning" by business men's committees, of new and old lines of production and of new construction, would suffice to prevent widespread unemployment.

#### IV

BUT WHY SHOULD DECREASE of circulating medium bring business depression?

Clearly, if restriction of bank credit—or decrease of the circulating medium through direct government action—involves any substantial decrease of spending, it must involve *either* lower prices in at least the same proportion as spending

is reduced *or* decreased business. And prices are not likely to decrease both as far and as fast as does spending. As I have expressed the matter in my "Basic Principles of Economics":<sup>1</sup>

Producers and dealers will not see why they should accept greatly reduced prices for their output and for the goods which they have bought to sell. They will lower their prices only with reluctance. Artisans and laborers will not easily be convinced that there is any adequate reason why they should take lower wages. Persons who have land and buildings to rent or to sell will not readily understand why they should accept lower rents or prices than those which they have come to look upon as reasonable. Speculative holders of vacant land will, in many or most cases, continue to ask the prices they have been asking. But with less money and credit being spent, unless prices in general fall in proportion, the volume of business must decline. Continued lack of demand for goods and labor, with unsalability of the goods and diminished employment for laborers, will force a readjusting reduction in prices and wages. The will to maintain prosperity prices and wages is broken by the compulsion of circumstances.

And further, from the same book:<sup>2</sup>

Curtailement of credit certainly must make for business depression if prices fall, unless and until production expenses such as wages and rentals also fall. But credit restriction must bring business depression no less surely if prices do not fall. For the resulting decrease of circulating medium must certainly decrease the demand for goods and, unless prices do fall proportionately, sales and, therefore, production and employment, must obviously decline.<sup>3</sup>

It may be said that this slowness of adjustment of prices and wages means lack of competition,—that there is, in it, a certain element of monopoly. But this does not mean that most prices and wages were, prior to the decrease of circulating medium, above a normal competitive level, although

<sup>1</sup> Columbia, Mo., Lucas Brothers, 1942, pp. 108-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 111.

<sup>3</sup> It would lead away from the main thesis of this paper to discuss here all the phenomena that mark the downward path from prosperity to the bottom of depression. This downward path may manifest itself as a "vicious spiral of decreased circulating medium, dull business, falling prices, bank failures and further decrease of circulating medium" (*ib.*, p. 112), including a derivative psychology that affects both the amount of borrowing and the rapidity (velocity) of spending.

some of them probably were so. What it means is that there is a certain inertia in readjustment; some of the prices and wages are "sticky." There is an economic "friction" not quickly overcome. And indeed, where there is clear monopoly and a more or less deliberate monopolistic resistance to reduction of specific prices or incomes, the depression is likely to be worse. For if demand for the monopolized goods does not appreciably decline, so causing decrease of employment in the monopolized line, the decrease of total spending must involve a more than proportionate decrease of demand for the products of other industries.

In any case, we may properly insist that depressions are not caused by war as such and that, granting intelligent and careful monetary policy they are not at all an inevitable aftermath of war. War may and does involve vast destruction of manpower and of capital. It may, therefore, appreciably reduce the productive efficiency of our economic society. But this does not mean that it must or will cause decrease of productive *activity* among the workers who survive it or decreased use of whatever capital is still available.

And as regards the extreme industrial activity or "prosperity" of war time, we have seen that this, too, is largely a monetary phenomenon. We have seen that such activity manifests itself in periods of peace. We have seen that, however, rapid and continuous inflation as a means of producing and maintaining such activity is hardly to be desired even if there were assurance that such inflation would indefinitely succeed in its purpose. A monetary policy calculated to maintain a substantially stable price level, and a general governmental policy of maintaining competition and preventing all kinds of monopolistic extortion, offer the best prospect of worth-while and abiding productive activity and employment.

# The Integration of the Detroit Mexican Colony

By NORMAN DAYMOND HUMPHREY

THE INFORMAL CONTROLS of gossip and censure of the Mexican folk community have been replaced to some degree in Detroit's colony of 6,000 Mexicans by the restraints exercised on members by formal clubs and societies. The primary function of these societies from the point of view of their individual members is that of social expression. Another function of membership in a society, of course, is that of subjecting the individual to group control. In the case of such societies, however, control over members has been loosely exercised, largely because of the acquisition by Mexicans of meanings and accompanying sanctions which lie outside the realm of these agencies. Though once numerous, the number and effectiveness of societies has declined in recent years. The societies, theoretically, could be a means of cultural expression for the whole colony, and provide an area for total group participation. Actually, each society attracts but a small segment of the total group.

## I

THE FOREMOST ACTIVITIES for providing cultural expression in the colony are festivals. These are of two kinds: dances or celebrations given by local societies for their own financial benefit, and for the enjoyment of their constituents and the colony generally; and the formal expression of patriotism by the colony on the occasion of Mexican holidays. While the former type of fiesta never results in great gatherings of people, it is the proud boast of colony leaders that the national holiday festivals are "attended by everyone in the colony." In form and content these activities represent distinctive



manifestations of the transplanted culture functioning in a new environment.

There has never been in Detroit a group-owned hall for Mexicans, nor a Mexican society-owned hall. In 1928, the societies, after collective discussion, created a small fund for the erection of a building, but none ever materialized. Several halls were rented at that time, and in Dearborn (then Fordson) a single rented hall served as "a center for many."<sup>1</sup> Since 1928, a number of buildings, none of which was owned by Mexicans, have been used by societies for their activities.<sup>2</sup> During the 1930's, *fiestas* were held nearly every Saturday night in the winter at one or several of the halls sponsored singly or jointly by societies. If a single society rented a building for such an occasion, it undertook alone the financial risk involved, and profits accrued only to the society. This prosaic fact assumes importance when it is realized that a centralizing body in which societies were represented existed in the colony, and was maintained by joint contributions from member societies. With the beginning of the depression, this federative organization, known as the Patriotic Committee, on several occasions ended its fiscal year with a deficit which had to be made up by means of contributions from component organizations. In view of these financial facts alone, it becomes understandable why most Mexican society members felt that the goal of a Mexican-owned meet-

<sup>1</sup> Several dance halls had been rented along Michigan Avenue at this time "and on certain nights only Mexicans are admitted."—"Annual Report," Detroit International Center, 1928.

<sup>2</sup> The I. A. S. hall at Michigan and 24th Streets has long been a meeting place for *Obreros Unidos* and *Chibabuensis Unidos*. San José Hall (a structure known as Baker Hall and used by Irish Societies and newsboy gatherings in the 1890's) in the middle thirties was used exclusively by Mexican societies, for dances, club meetings, and gatherings of representatives of the Patriotic Committee. This is at Bagley and 19th Streets, and is at the present writing a C. I. O. Packers' Union Hall.

The hall in Dearborn is no longer functioning, although the rented halls in Detroit are still being used. The Monterrey Cafe, at 12th and Michigan, served in 1940 as a meeting place for *Obreros Unidos*. The Mexican office of the insurance brotherhood, the Woodmen of the World, has recently come into existence as a meeting place. The organization by Father Lopez of two Catholic societies when they existed, resulted in the occasional rental of an I. O. O. F. Hall at Vinewood and Bagley.

ing hall was one impossible to achieve.<sup>3</sup> With the return of prosperity, a fund of some size has been built up by the Patriotic Committee, and is used, as it has been in the past, in the celebration of Mexican national holidays, the *Fiestas Civicas* or *Fiestas Patrias*.

The first recorded festival of Mexicans in Detroit occurred in 1920, on the Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe, which ostensibly celebrated 72 years of peace between the United States and Mexico.<sup>4</sup> Thereafter, from 1926 onward, two occasions have been regularly celebrated, the 5th of May, and the 16th of September. These constitute the so-called *Actos Civicos*. The latter date commemorates the proclamation of Hidalgo in 1810, while *Cinco de Maio* is in memory of that date in 1862 when the forces of the Republic of Mexico defeated those of Maximilian under French military support. All members of the colony who are able, tend to participate in the ceremonies, usually a thousand persons swarming into an auditorium for the occasion.<sup>5</sup>

While in Mexico programs for the celebration of these holidays are organized by local officials (much as our Fourth of July celebrations are), in Detroit national holidays are celebrated through the organizational activity of the *Comité Patriótico Mexicano*, the history and composition of which will be discussed subsequently. The content of the program

<sup>3</sup> Ignacio Vasquez, in 1936, had plans for a nationality hall which would house all society activities, and which would furnish facilities where distinctly Mexican cultural activities, in the form of the manufacture of pottery, weaving, and painting, might occur. He regarded such a goal as one which would provide an objective criterion of unity of the colony, a thing which he felt it so badly lacked. In 1940, he founded an association of five members for the achievement of these goals. The visionary character of this society is evidenced by Mr. Vasquez' statements of its aims: to establish a newspaper for the Mexican group; to build a school for Mexican children in Detroit; to build a community house for the use of all Mexicans living in Detroit, with such common meeting place functioning to bring the various societies and groups together, thus tending to make for an eradication of those differences of opinion which now function to keep them apart. Mr. Vasquez felt, however, that the "inherent fanaticism" of the older generation could not be overcome, and that the younger people would have to be trained to carry out the program.

<sup>4</sup> *The Detroit News*, Dec. 11, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> Cass Technical High School, Kronk Community House, and recently Western High School have been the loci for the celebrations.

is much the same on both of the holidays. It consists of an opening march by societies represented in the committees, followed by musical numbers, songs, dances and speeches.<sup>6</sup>

In the past, a highlight of a festival was the crowning of a "Queen of Beauty and Patriotism." When local newspapers have been in existence, the selection of the Queen has been by means of votes cast through the press. This technique has functioned both to increase newspaper circulation and arouse colony interests and antagonisms.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the celebration of national holidays actually affords an occasion during which some semblance of colony unity finds expression. The historic growth in the methods of celebrating the *Fiestas Civicas* indicates the changing inter-relationships between organizations in the colony, and reflects changed meanings and understandings occurring in the group consequent to its need to adjust and integrate in Detroit.

## II

SHORTLY AFTER THE BEGINNING of formal celebration of the *Fiestas Patrias*, the Honorary Commission came into existence and functioned to plan and carry through semi-annual celebrations. The Commission became active in 1926, under the stimulus of Consul Terrazas, and was composed of men

<sup>6</sup> In a representative program for the celebration, that of September 16, 1936, the functional relationship between the societies and the Patriotic Committee is seen in the opening march by members of societies. Programs of several of these celebrations are on file at the Detroit International Center.

<sup>7</sup> *The Detroit News*, May 6, 1926; *ibid.*, May 7, 1926.

In 1933, Carmen Gutierrez was crowned "Queen" at the fiesta of Sept. 15th, but the crown was claimed by Antonia Haro. The election of the queen was supervised by the Patriotic Committee. Votes were sold for a penny to pay for her wardrobe. A rebel faction, led by Simon Muñoz of *Sociedad de San José*, claimed irregularities in counting. When a recount confirmed Carmen, Antonia withdrew her money and backing, and on Oct. 1, 1933, crowned herself. While Carmen belonged to the Club Chapultepec, Antonia did not. (*The Detroit News*, October 1, 1933; also interviews with I. Vasquez.) The dispute aroused considerable controversy within the colony, San José Society getting out some mimeographed handbills to explain their side of the matter, to be opposed by a printed "throw away" published by the newspaper *El Atomo* addressed "A La Colonia Mexicana." In actuality, this dispute was merely a reflection of the factions in societies involved in the Patriotic Committee and reflected the lack of integration in society ends within the colony. Subsequently, Vasquez ran further contests for the determination of a "colony queen."

elected by societies, but under the direct supervision and control of the Consul.<sup>8</sup> The Consul's decision in any controversy was final, and no appeal could be made above it. Hence, the decisive rôle of the Consul made his authority in the body more or less autocratic.

The Commission held regular weekly meetings for the discussion of colony affairs, and by 1929, a fund had been built up through celebrations sufficient to make the Commission feel the time was opportune for the creation of a Mexican temple or colony hall. The actions of the official then serving as Consul in this connection precipitated disruption of the Commission into factions, with the result that the Consul, Ignacio Batista, ruled the Commission dissolved and refused to appoint a new one.<sup>9</sup>

With the dissolution of the Honorary Commission, the promotion of the *Fiestas Patrias*, which, in pre-depression days, had been financially successful, became uncertain in the colony. Many groups and small local societies conflicted over promoting the celebrations for their own financial ends. This chaotic situation was shortlived, however, for controversy was transformed into discussion and a more democratically organized body came into existence.<sup>10</sup>

In 1930, the federative principle was invoked for the celebration of the *Fiestas Civicas* through the formation of the

<sup>8</sup> When Ignacio Batista became Consul in July, 1929, the Honorary Commission through the promotion of successful Civic Acts had accumulated \$1,000.00. Batista, an energetic man, but a poor administrator, drew up plans for a "*Casa del Mexicano*." He presented his plans to the membership of the Honorary Commission, and, after accepting it for study, the group turned over to Batista a sum of \$800.00 to be held in trust, pending the approval of his plan. Batista, however, immediately appointed one Salvador Allende, who, so commissioned by the Consul, drew six dollars a day compensation and expenses for the promotion of the plan. The money placed in trust rapidly dwindled, as did funds of the *Cruz Azul*, a woman's organization, also under the direct control of the Consul.

<sup>9</sup> After consideration of the Plan by the Honorary Commission, Ignazio Vasquez wrote an editorial in the local weekly *Prensa Libre*, but the publisher, Gasca, edited the criticism, thus destroying its original efficacy. Vasquez then published a similar editorial in *La Prensa*, the San Antonio daily sold in the colony, attacking the plan. As a result, Batista dissolved both the Honorary Commission and *Cruz Azul*.

<sup>10</sup> In part, this was accomplished through the efforts of Flores, a member of *Sociedad de Emilio Carranza*, who, armed with speeches prepared by Ignacio Vasquez, promoted the idea of a democratically federated organization.

Mexican Patriotic Committee. This form of organization placed the celebrations more responsibly within the colony, and made the Consul's hand in the affair less important. Any Mexican society could participate in the organization of the Committee, which was reconstituted annually, and in which society representation varied from year to year. Each component society contributed to the committee for the expenses involved in renting a hall, and, if a deficit was incurred after the celebration, responsibility was collective. Although efforts were constantly made to build up a fund for operation beforehand, until recently this has been accomplished but rarely.

The yearly formation of the Committee, and discussion of its finances, involves controversy and machinations between persons within it for control. Many personal animosities arise, and are used "politically" to oppose or prevent movements in otherwise desirable directions. Thus many opposing factions exist within the colony, and co-operation on any large scale has been impossible. Educated members of the colony are frequently disheartened by what they conceive to be the suspiciousness arising from the ignorance of the mass of society members, and the sentiment expressed by this segment of the colony has a counterpart in the less fortunate, but numerically larger element, which feels that its own interests will be subordinated to those of the "élite."

Dissension between clubs usually has hinged on such nominal issues as programs for building a colony center, educational policies, the election of a "colony queen," and the extent to which rigid conceptions of religious or governmental policies were upheld. Lying behind these ostensible issues are more fundamental reasons for the lack of colony unity, most of which hinge on unconscious criteria of what makes for status, and on the efforts of persons either to main-



tain, or to attain, status in the eyes of others. Dissension within and between clubs is explained in part by the fact that clubs attract to membership those active personalities who share in common the notion that colony and personal goals can be accomplished through organization.

At any one time, only a small proportion of Mexicans belong to societies, although interviews bring out the fact that most individuals have at some time participated in the various clubs. It is estimated that not more than 500 persons in the colony are members of societies, and with estimates of between 6,000 and 8,000 persons in the colony, eligible for membership (including native-born persons of Mexican derivation), the society membership cannot be considered representative of the whole ethnic colony.<sup>11</sup> The societies do represent, however, the sole autochthonous formal organizations within the colony.

The societies of a purely Mexican character in the colony, have stemmed largely from the parent club, *Circulo Mutualista Mexicana*, which came into existence in 1923 and which exists today. Its meeting place is at the International Center. Circulo's membership is the "élite" of the colony. From Circulo, through dissenting membership, a number of colony societies have been formed. None of these lineal descendants continue to exist today, but others have sprung up to take their places. Several girls' clubs have been formed, but these, too, have disappeared, ordinarily with the marriage of their members.

Assimilation is reflected in the fraternal associations in several ways. The major development has been that of an individualism which prevents joint action within a society or between societies. Some of this growth is a result of the taking on of the American concept of "rugged individual-

<sup>11</sup> Ignacio Vasquez kept a card file and mailing list of society members and the estimates are his.

ism" and part of it is a consequence of the urban situation in which persons ordinarily have contractual, and hence tangential, relations with each other. The changed means by which the central organization came to form its representation may reflect a shift in the carried culture from the relatively autocratic formal government of the peasant village or *hacienda*, to the more democratic methods current in American life. No consensus was possible in activities of the committee save on the patriotic feature of the celebration of holidays, which fact itself reflects the atomization of individual ends and understandings. A more subtle evidence of acculturation is reflected in the failure of the group sufficiently to desire a nationality hall actually to organize and obtain it; for, it may be inferred from the failure to take this seemingly desirable action, that American interests over-shadowed the need to preserve and publicly maintain Mexican culture.

### III

THE LACK OF UNITY in the colony is due to the combination of a number of factors. One of these is the differential assimilation of American conceptions of pecuniary valuation. On first settling in Detroit, the peasant retains the folk goal of immediately obtained satisfaction and consequently is improvident, and a "free spender." Gradually, however, he comes to aspire to worldly wealth, some manifestations of which appear grotesque to an American observer. As an example the following rather amusing case may be cited. After considerable saving a Mexican barber made a down payment on a twelve cylinder, seven-passenger Cadillac motor car. Every morning he parked this car on Michigan Avenue in front of his three-chair barber shop, and each night after closing he drove it the three blocks to his home. Finally he couldn't meet the notes on the car and consequently lost his "life savings." Wealth is differentially ac-

quired in the colony, and conflicts arise between the *nouveaux riches* who have come to occupy niches in the industrial hierarchy which are relatively well-paying, and persons who, because of previous Mexican education and status, continue to consider themselves superior.<sup>12</sup> This is illustrated in the following interview material:

Miss M., (whose father, a secretary and bookkeeper in Mexico, left for political reasons in 1915 before she was born), considers herself and her family of a higher social class than most Mexicans in the United States, since most of them came for economic reasons and usually belong to the peasant class. She is friends with them because they are her people, but probably if they had remained in Mexico, her friends would be of a different class.

Class and caste lines thus erect barriers to a thoroughgoing organization of the colony. Successful persons do not wish to be identified with those whom they deem inferior. This is shown in the social activities of members of the "élite" colony club. Of the fifty or so families which constitute the membership of *Circulo Mutualista Mexicana*, about twelve of these are a small upper clique who entertain each other at their respective homes, give dinners at the Hotel Statler, and otherwise act as a wealth-possessing status group within a larger group of culturally superior persons. Religious tenets also act as deterrents to the formal organization of the colony. The antagonisms generated by adherence to religious dogmas and practices carry over into the club life, and prevent integration within and between these organizations. Mrs. Alvizar, President of *Damas Católicas*, advocated two major societies—one for men, and the other for women—to promote unity in the colony. But the difficulties involved in obtaining agreement on who would be eligible is evident in her statement that there were no restrictions on membership

<sup>12</sup> Mrs. T., while talking about their lack of Mexican friends, said that most of them in Detroit are chiefly Indian, whereas she and her husband are "Spanish." Mrs. T. was born in Guadalajara.

in *Damas Católicas*. Members of that club needed only to be "good Catholics who are allowed in Church, and who are allowed to take communion." This is a requirement which actually would eliminate a considerable segment of working-class women in Detroit.

Religion acts as a barrier to cultural expression and integration on still another ground; namely, the present policy of Archbishop Mooney with reference to the Americanization of Mexicans:

The bishop wishes that no racial or nationality distinction be made toward the Mexican. He absolutely forbids the priests giving any encouragement to the idea of a church especially for Mexicans, and this applies also to organizations, religious or otherwise.

Three of the four priests interviewed disagreed with the bishop, because they believed that the Mexicans could work better as a unit, and that this would make for greater adaptation to American life and Catholicism. The bishop, however, feels that more value is to be found in denationalizing Mexicans and in encouraging Americanization.<sup>13</sup>

The second generation tends to accentuate the lack of unity by not participating in clubs, by its much less regular church attendance, by its greater use of English speech, and by its differential association with young persons of other nationality derivations, who functionally are young Americans and who tend to possess American interests. The assimilation of American culture by second generation persons is recognized by immigrants as a deterrent to unity. As a Mexican said:

It is the second generation of American Mexicans who forget the land of their ancestors. These young people hate being called Mexicans. Passing as Americans pleases them mightily. Why, right here in Detroit I have good reason to believe that there are one thousand people of Mexican extraction, who are scattered throughout the city and who make no efforts to contact other Mexicans. They are completely Americanized. But those Mexicans who were born in Texas and states in the Southwest, and who

<sup>13</sup> Obviously, both Archbishop Mooney and the parish priests are concerned with promoting the process of assimilation.

encountered the prejudices and handicaps imposed on them in those localities will never, of their own inclination or desire, become American citizens. The Mexican, in this country, is a pathetic creature who is not understood by Americans because they are not interested in him.

The atomizing of understandings and the corresponding growth of individualism roughly reflects differential assimilation and divergent development of individual conceptions of self. The cumulative effect of the growth of individualism makes for an absence of cultural cohesiveness and organization.

#### IV

ORDINARILY, THE MEXICANS consciously wish for greater unity in the colony, but they are here faced with a dilemma. Desirous of recapturing the friendship and intimacy of the village, and with the sole instrument of societies to attain this goal, they are also aware of the conflicting interests in the colony which will prevent any semblance of regeneration of folk culture and society. The epitome of this conflict is evidenced in the following interview summary:

Mr. Mendoza, sometime president of *Obreros Unidos* Society, thinks that Detroit Mexicans should have but one club. His daughter, a Western High School senior, believes that this is a good idea which will never occur because of the differences among the clubs. Not only are there religious differences, but there are also political differences which preclude the formation of one club to serve the interests or needs of the Mexican population. "Then too," she stated, "there are those people who were better off socially and economically in Mexico than many of their compatriots who came here with them, and over whom they continue to attempt to lord. The heretofore lower class Mexicans resent this attitude because some of them are now in better circumstances than the would-be aristocrats who sneer at them." Such petty jealousies, she felt, were detrimental to the organization of all Mexicans into one group.

When the old consensus disappears, unless assimilation takes place at similar rates for the component members of the colony (which by the nature of contact in a contractual,

urban milieu is highly unlikely), there can be little agreement or means and ends for the group as a whole. Thus such factors as pecuniary valuation, caste and class conceptions, and religious and political definitions, have ceased to exist on the unconscious level which was rooted in Mexican custom, and have come, in Detroit, to be consciously and, in a sense, rationally considered.

While in Mexico there existed few alternatives for action by the group, in Detroit many divergent and perhaps contradictory ends are possible. In view of the differential character of assimilation, the personal construction of new patterns of meanings and understandings, and the wealth of choices for conduct, agreement can be attained only in the most superficial areas of living. Consequently, no real coherence or unity exists in the group as a whole. One of the few common ends lies in the shared love for Mexico. Hence, Mexican national holidays can be celebrated. But the federal committee which maintains this function performs no others, for in no other areas can such complete agreement as to ends occur. Disparity of views toward means and ends in voluntary associations which are non-economic in purpose is perhaps also characteristic of American culture. In a special sense, then, this lack of unity may indicate the fusion of this congeries of American cultural symbols with the carried Mexican culture of the immigrants. American culture is notorious for the utilitarian level on which organization takes place. Really durable organization requires that duties and obligations become values for the participants therein. Superficial organization is evident in commercial establishments in the colony, and to a large extent in the fraternal associations. A more profound personal affiliation is seen in the religious organization, but even here the old core of values has been affected by the divergent usages of American culture.



# The Natural Law of Justice

By FRANCIS NEILSON

THE STUDY OF JUSTICE, which inspired the greatest minds of the classical period and also those of the early Middle Ages, is sadly neglected by our economists and philosophers today. This is strange, for at no other time have the politicians been so ready with the term and so loud in their demands to seek justice and to inaugurate a new world based upon this fundamental. The sociologists, too, in their works employ the term as if they were sure it would act as a talisman to protect man from the evils he engenders—to his own suffering. Yet, neither politician nor sociologist seems to think it worth while to tell us what is meant by the term justice, nor do they make an attempt at defining it.

Definition, to the old masters of philosophy, was an essential part of discussion, and most of them spared no pains in explaining clearly the meaning of the terms they used. Roger Bacon, the friend of Edmund Rich and Robert Grosseteste—all three mathematicians and scientists—pointed out the necessity of understanding the words employed so that each would readily comprehend the right meaning of the other's statements. Bacon said: "The mixture of those things by speech which are by nature divided is the mother of all error."

The Roman jurist laid it down: "He is just who gives to each what belongs to him."<sup>1</sup> Whether or not this interpretation of the term would suit the politicians and sociologists of our time is hard to say, but one can very well imagine, from the way they employ it, that they are not seeking the justice referred to by the ancient jurists and philosophers. To these latter the matter was so important that they devoted

<sup>1</sup> A translation of the *Institutes of Justinian*, 1: 1: "*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens.*"

more thought to the question of what it was and was not than to any other abstract term. Indeed, Plato made it the plot of his most famous work, "The Republic." The search for justice is its leading motif. And the inquiry conducted by Socrates led the controversialists to definitions which I have set in the following composite form:

Justice is the institution of a natural order in which a man can produce food, buildings, and clothing for himself, removing not a neighbour's landmark, practising one thing only, the thing to which his nature is best adapted, doing his own business, not being a busybody, not taking what is another's, nor being deprived of what is his own, having what is his own, and belongs to him, interfering not with another, so that he may set in order his own inner life, and be his own master, his own law, and at peace with himself.<sup>2</sup>

Socrates and his friends agreed that some divine power must have conducted them through the inquiry to a primary form of justice.

#### I-

THIS TERM WAS REGARDED by the ancients as a fundamental so precious in its relationship to the happiness of man that they crowned it with such words as "eternal" and "divine." Aristotle himself tells us:

God, then, as the old story has it, holding the beginning and the end and the middle of all things that exist, proceeding by a straight path in the course of nature, brings them to accomplishment; and with him ever follows justice, the avenger of all that falls short of the Divine Law—justice, in whom may he that is to be happy be from the first a blessed and happy partaker.<sup>3</sup>

Chrysippus, who, we are told by Diogenes Laertius, excelled in logic, the theory of knowledge, ethics and physics, said:

You cannot find any other beginning of justice than that from Zeus and from common nature; for from this source all such must have its beginning, if we are to take any ground on boons and evils.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Francis Neilson, "The Eleventh Commandment," New York, 1933, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> "De Mundo."

When one browses through the classics in search of what the ancients thought of this term, one finds references to it so abundant that it is difficult to know where to stop, and the impression one gains from this lavish expenditure of thought upon justice is that they considered it the vital matter to be solved before proceeding to discuss questions of economics, the State, politics or society. Perhaps in this we may imagine how widely our thought of today separates us from that of classical times.

Two generations ago, in the heyday of the pseudo-rationalists, when State Socialism was discussed by hard-headed thinkers, it was the fashion to sneer at abstract terms, such as "justice," "right," and "God." John Robertson and Charles Bradlaugh questioned the usefulness of young scholars bothering about the terms upon which the classical scholars wasted so much time. It was said that they had no utilitarian value and were never transmuted into practice, remaining always in the realm of philosophical controversy. Such views were never supported by historical facts, but they were swallowed whole by superficial people. Strange as it might appear to many loose thinkers of this day, the pseudo-rationalists were wrong, for justice was the basis of the ancient economic systems, and the literature of the beginnings of different peoples proves conclusively that justice—economic justice, eternal justice, divine justice—was the foundation of every settlement and was held in veneration until it was overthrown by the State.

There should be no difficulty in discovering that this was the case, for every library of any worth contains works which prove that justice was a practical system which lay at the basis of the economy of the people. I admit it is not easy for the untrained student to find the data he desires. He will have to spend many years in reading the literature of ancient

peoples before he can gather the material upon which he must form a judgment. Still, suiting the modern methods, there are short cuts to much information of great value.

When we turn to the Mosaic laws and the early laws of England, and pursue the study of the term justice, we find that these two separate peoples—one monotheistic, the other pagan—grasped the same truth about the word. This is one of the most striking coincidences to be found in the laws of different peoples. But is it as strange as some of the historians of the last generation imagine? Elsewhere I have given instances of similar coincidences concerning the term justice in the old laws of China, India, Persia, and Egypt.<sup>4</sup> It seems that the boundary stone, the landmark, was the symbol of economic justice, and that Egypt, Greece, and Rome used this symbol in the same way as the Israelites did to mark the limit of the land of a tiller against a possible aggressor.

When we look into the Pentateuch, we find that nothing could have been clearer than the injunctions given to the Jews. There were really only two economic conditions upon which they should enjoy the Promised Land; these were: fundamental justice to be rigidly kept, and "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmark."<sup>5</sup> Nothing could be simpler. For the fulfillment of these conditions the people were given "a land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack anything in it."<sup>6</sup> So long as the Israelites adhered strictly to these injunctions, things went fairly well with them, but such an economic beginning, a springtime of a people, is not rare.

It is, however, in something more fundamental than the similarity of the statutory laws that we must look for the economic fundamental with which separate and very differ-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. "The Eleventh Commandment," Ch. III, and the passages of "The Sacred Books of the East," ed. by F. Max Müller, Oxford, 1885 (49 vols.), cited therein.

<sup>5</sup> Deuteronomy 19: 14.

<sup>6</sup> Deuteronomy 8: 9.

ent peoples made their beginnings. The clew to be found has been somewhat neglected by the widely-read historians of the nineteenth century. Few of them discovered it, and even then they did not pursue it far enough to understand that it led to the basis of existence before the State came into being. Perhaps this is the reason why more careful scholars have accused the historians of a want of thoroughness. They take too much for granted, seldom explaining the true causes of the rise and fall of civilizations and why, after a certain political and social zenith has been reached, there enters a decline that nothing can stop; the end, like a monstrous epitaph, signifies the vanity of political action.

Sir Henry Maine has devoted many pages to this rather slipshod procedure of investigating and recording. What he says of the "widespread dissatisfaction with existing theories of jurisprudence," may be said of many historians. Writing of the method which should be followed in an inquiry upon the economic and social beginnings of man's activities, he says:

It would seem antecedently that we ought to commence with the simplest social forms in a state as near as possible to their rudimentary condition. In other words, if we follow the course usual in such inquiries, we should penetrate as far up as we could in the history of primitive societies.<sup>7</sup>

The missing link in the chain of history of a people—from its known inception to the coming of the State, as that system is understood by us (for it is only in a backward glance that we see the State as it really is)—is no new discovery. It is not as if documents were found today that no one in our era knew existed. The information is set down in the works of classical writers and in the Bible itself which was better known and understood in the Middle Ages than it is today.

Let us see if we cannot present this clew once more and, at the same time, show that it was to be discovered not only in

<sup>7</sup> "Ancient Law," London, 1861, reprinted in Everyman's Library, 1931, p. 70.

the history of one people but in the records of all the classical nations and even in the lands of people so far removed from the eastern Mediterranean as India and China.

## II

FIRST, LET US TURN to the Bible, in which we shall find the story set out in full of how a system of economic justice came into being and how it passed into desuetude, thus destroying the people. In Deuteronomy we learn that the disposition of the land and the use of it by the tillers is the all-important matter which concerns the well-being of the people, and the command is laid down: "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbour's landmark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance, which thou shalt inherit in the land that the Lord thy God giveth thee to possess it."<sup>8</sup> This is what I call "the eleventh commandment."

The third curse reads: "Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour's landmark."<sup>9</sup> And thereupon follows in chapter 28 the denunciation and penalties for transgressions. Not even the punishments laid down in the sacred books of the laws of India can compare in prophetic fearfulness and horror with its awful vengeance. There is no work to which we may turn which so clearly describes the basic economic law of the community.

It is the landmark which symbolizes the just economic system of the ancients, and this is the clew to be followed if we would study the similarities of economic settlement of early communities. In it we discover the necessity for the laws set down in the ancient books of people living far apart and with no known means of communicating with one another. The very severity of some of the laws affecting land and its tillage denote the sacredness of the trust imposed that it be used justly. We find in the history of the Hebrews

<sup>8</sup> Deuteronomy 19: 14.

<sup>9</sup> Deuteronomy 27: 17.



that, in periods of affliction, the Prophets cried out for the restoration of the landmark. In some of the times of greatest distress, this was the paramount question, and in Nehemiah there is the story of the restoration of the land to the people, when Ezra read the book with sense and understanding.

The importance of the law of the landmark is referred to by Josephus who says:

Let it not be esteemed lawful to remove boundaries, neither our own, nor of those with whom we are at peace. Have a care you do not take those landmarks away, which are, as it were, a divine and unshaken limitation of rights made by God himself, to last forever, since this going beyond limits, and gaining ground upon others, is the occasion of wars and seditions; for those that remove boundaries are not far off an attempt to subvert the laws.<sup>10</sup>

A few years ago when I was in Egypt, one of the new finds which interested archaeologists more than usual was that of some landmark stones. The discovery inspired Arthur Weigall, Inspector-General of Antiquities, to search the record for references in the laws, but with what result I never learned. That the landmark was an Egyptian institution has been accepted by Egyptologists, and Professor Edward Hull says:

. . . In Egypt the land had to be remeasured and allotted after each inundation of the Nile, and boundary-stones placed at the junction of two properties. . . .<sup>11</sup>

Babylonia also had a similar system, and in the Oxford Bible is a picture of a Babylonian landmark. There is an inscription upon it calling down curses upon any official or other person who shall remove this "everlasting landmark," or attempt to interfere with the boundaries of the land described upon it. The gods are entreated to destroy any such offender and his children for ever and ever.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> "The Jewish Antiquities."

<sup>11</sup> Hastings' "Dictionary of the Bible," iii. 24.

<sup>12</sup> "The Oxford Bible," Plate L; *cf.* also "Oxford Helps to the Study of the Bible," p. 77 and Plate cxi.

The landmark, then, was a symbol of justice and, so long as it was maintained in its integrity, the people suffered none of the evils of poverty and slavery. Their afflictions followed the removal of the landmarks, and the Prophets—Daniel, Hosea, Micah, and Haggai—denounced the injustices and iniquities that fell upon the people, and demanded the restoration of the law of justice.

When we turn to Greece, we find that the same fundamental law was established. In Plato's "Laws" it is laid down:

. . . No man shall move boundary-marks of land, whether they be those of a neighbour who is a native citizen or those of a foreigner (in case he holds adjoining land on a frontier), realising that to do this is truly to be guilty of "moving the sacrosanct"; sooner let a man try to move the largest rock which is not a boundary-mark than a small stone which forms a boundary, sanctioned by Heaven, between friendly and hostile ground. For of the one kind Zeus the Clansmen's god is witness, of the other Zeus the Strangers' god; which gods, when aroused, bring wars most deadly. . . .<sup>13</sup>

In "The Republic" Socrates shows that a sure way of making war is to covet a slice of our neighbor's land. And he says to Glaucon:

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, this much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in states, private as well as public.

In a fragment of one of his poems, Solon complains:

The ambition of the rich knows no bounds; the most wealthy wish to grow yet more so. Who may be able to assuage this insatiable greed! They respect neither sacred property nor public treasure; they plunder all, in defiance of the sacred laws of justice.

Aristotle describes how the people of Greece were reduced to penury and the poorer class "were in absolute slavery to the rich."<sup>14</sup> He attributed the sufferings of the poor to the

<sup>13</sup> 842E *et seq.*

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, "Athenian Constitution," Kenyon, London, 1892, p. 2; *cf.* also W. Romaine Paterson, "The Nemesis of Nations," London, 1907, p. 163.

fact that "the whole land was in the hands of a few persons." The landmarks had been removed and in their place the debt pillar became the symbol of slavery.

The tutor of Alexander was not as thorough, however, in defining the term justice as his philosophical predecessors. He says:

Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as exercised towards one's neighbour: and for this reason Justice is thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and

"neither Hesper nor the Morning-star

So worthy of our admiration:"

and in a proverbial saying we express the same:

"All virtue is in Justice comprehended."

And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice of perfect Virtue. . . .<sup>15</sup>

Although Aristotle found fault so often with the notions of Socrates, I think the Athenian sculptor had the advantage of the Stagirite.

I cannot refrain from mentioning a reference to the landmark to be found in the "Iliad."<sup>16</sup> When the gods fell into bitter strife, we are told

. . . they clashed together with a great noise, and the wide earth groaned, and the clarion of great Heaven rang around. Zeus heard as he sate upon Olympus, and his heart within him laughed pleasantly when he beheld that strife of gods. . . .

Then began the angry tumult between Ares, the god of war, and Athene. Ares struck her with his spear.

. . . But she, giving back, grasped with stout hand a stone that lay upon the plain, black, rugged, huge, which men of old time set to be the landmark of a field; this hurled she, and smote impetuous Ares on the neck, and unstrung his limbs. Seven roods he covered in his fall, and soiled his hair with dust, and his armour rang upon him. . . .

This, I think, is the only occasion when the landmark was used for such a purpose.

<sup>15</sup> "The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle," trans. by D. P. Chase, Book V, 1129b.

<sup>16</sup> "The Iliad of Homer," English prose version by Andrew Lang, Walter Leaf and Ernest Myers, Modern Library, Book XXI, pp. 393-4.

Turning to the history of Rome, we find that the god Terminus protected the boundary stone; for the removal of one, the culprit, together with his cattle, was forthwith put to death. It was Numa who commanded his people to mark the boundaries of their land by stones, and altars to Terminus were set up. This was the form in which they worshipped justice, and so firmly was this order established in the minds of the people that, when Tarquin wished to remove the altars of several deities in order to build a new temple, Terminus and Juventas alone objected to being displaced.

### III

THIS SYSTEM—the basis of economic justice—was that of the village communities of India. The ancient laws make scarcely any mention of slaves, and the Rig-Veda does not refer to them. Moreover, the village communities had no written laws at first, and we learn that the Council of Elders was not called upon to give orders. Sir Henry Maine says: "It merely declares what has always been."<sup>17</sup> And some of the commentators upon this system have said that it has endured so long, the impression remains ineffaceable in the minds of the people.

In Gautama's work, "Institutes of the Sacred Law," it is laid down that "Hell (is the punishment) for a theft of land."<sup>18</sup> And the penalties for violating the sacred rules governing the work and chattels of agriculture are extremely severe.

Maine notes:

. . . The Village Community is known to be of immense antiquity. In whatever direction research has been pushed into Indian history, general or local, it has always found the Community in existence at the farthest point of its progress. . . . Conquests and revolutions seem to have swept over it without disturbing or displacing it, and the most beneficent systems of

<sup>17</sup> Sir Henry Maine, "Village Communities," p. 68; cf. also Ch. Letourneau, "Property: Its Origin and Development," New York and London, 1914, p. 225.

<sup>18</sup> "Witnesses," Chap. XIII, 17.

government in India have always been those which have recognised it as the basis of administration.<sup>19</sup>

Mountstuart Elphinstone says:

The popular notion is that the Village landholders are all descended from one or more individuals who settled the village; and that the only exceptions are formed by persons who have derived their rights by purchase or otherwise from members of the original stock. The supposition is confirmed by the fact that, to this day, there are only single families of landholders in small villages and not many in large ones; but each has branched out into so many members that it is not uncommon for the whole agricultural labour to be done by the landholders, without the aid either of tenants or of labourers. The rights of the landholders are theirs collectively and, though they almost always have a more or less perfect partition of them, they never have an entire separation. A landholder, for instance, can sell or mortgage his rights; but he must first have the consent of the Village, and the purchaser steps exactly into his place and takes up all his obligations. If a family becomes extinct, its share returns to the common stock.<sup>20</sup>

Maine, commenting upon the extreme antiquity discoverable in almost every single feature of the Indian Village Communities, remarks:

. . . We have so many independent reasons for suspecting that the infancy of law is distinguished by the prevalence of co-ownership by the intermixture of personal with proprietary rights, and by the confusion of public with private duties, that we should be justified in deducing many important conclusions from our observation of these proprietary brotherhoods, even if no similarly compounded societies could be detected in any other part of the world. . . .<sup>21</sup>

The whole ground of this ancient system is so wide that it is impossible to give any idea in a short essay of its extent and how far back it goes into the history of people. But a reference may be made to the economic law of some of the African tribes. Driberg, in his excellent essay, "The Savage as He Really Is," says:

. . . A clear distinction is made between the soil and the enjoyment of its products. The former is the possession of the clan or of the tribe: the

<sup>19</sup> "Ancient Law," p. 153.

<sup>20</sup> "History of India," I, 126.

<sup>21</sup> "Ancient Law," p. 156.

latter belongs to the individual farming the land. Ownership gives no rights of property in the soil, and only the use of the soil can be transmitted to an heir. The same principle holds good among pastoral tribes; for though they do not cultivate the soil, the tribal lands are divided into clan pasturages, the grazing rights of which are strictly preserved.

In no case can land be sold or alienated by gift, exchange or any other form of transfer. . . .<sup>22</sup>

Why should the ancient philosophers and jurists deem it of vital importance to separate mundane justice from divine justice? The Roman jurisconsult, in considering the law of nature, realized the necessity of going back to a type of perfect law which ought gradually to absorb civil laws. Sir Henry Maine writes:

. . . It is important too to observe that this model system, unlike many of those which have mocked men's hopes in later days, was not entirely the product of imagination. It was never thought of as founded on quite untested principles. The notion was that it underlay existing law and must be looked for through it. Its functions were in short remedial, not revolutionary or anarchical. And this, unfortunately, is the exact point at which the modern view of a Law of Nature has often ceased to resemble the ancient.<sup>23</sup>

Today this fascinating labor is calling for a fresh-minded young scholar who will give us the history of the term justice and collect examples of its practice by people from the earliest times. There is a voluminous literature on the subject, which might be explored, and the findings co-ordinated in a story the world might well read now with interest and profit. The neglect of this by our modern scholars is hard to understand, for justice is what the world stands so sorely in need of; not the mere justice of the courts, of the measures of legislators, of the codes of the lawyers, but economic justice—that justice the ancients called eternal and divine. To put it in a crystal: the justice which is the law of Providence inherent in nature; the justice that distinctly marks the difference between things created and things produced.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Adam Savage, "The Professor's Hotchpotch," 1934, p. 68.

<sup>23</sup> "Ancient Law," p. 45.



## Ideology as a Means of Social Control, II

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

### VII

#### The Use of Myths

ALL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS require that men behave regularly and coherently. This can be realized only through the common direction of the wills of a multitude of individuals by the common directives of ideas—myths. Myths are the imaginative explanations of natural and human phenomena in the absence of more scientific data. Many of the myths about great leaders are purely expressions of man's playfulness of mind and his love for narrative, told in an attempt to entertain himself and those about him, as well as to raise his self-esteem by attributing super-human, highly ethical and moral qualities to the figures representing his collectivity (race, nation, religion, group, tribe). Time and distance eventually glorify the prominent ones with the mystical halo of heroism and other virtues. Thus any nation with a rich mythology may rightfully boast of a glorious past.

In a highly technical world the "social myth" (Sorel's "*illusion*") of "things as they might be" is indispensable as a springboard for social action. Ideologies create fictitious ideals which glorify the leaders<sup>13</sup> and the exploits of a group or some of its members. They enshroud happenings in sentiments and protective pathos, and offer dreams which give the group an escape from the hard facts of reality in the vision of a glorious future.<sup>14</sup> The myths transmit values of fact,

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Charles H. Cooley, "Social Process," New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918, Chapter 11.

<sup>14</sup> Some of the most interesting historical myths are: William Tell did not shoot an apple off the head of his son; as a matter of fact, the name of Tell is not to be found in the archives of the Swiss canton. Alexander the Great did not weep for more worlds to conquer; there are even strong reasons for believing that his army suffered severe reverses in India, and that he was forced to withdraw from that country. William Pitt never made the famous reply to Walpole beginning, "The atrocious crime of being a young

which are accepted always uncritically as natural and right. The notions embodied in them seem to be axiomatic in their obvious truth. They give a concrete expression to the desire for a better order, offering both the criticism of the old and the picture of the new in ideological form.

The future, the "better future," is pictured either as an altogether too distant divine event, or as a "just around the corner" proposition, in which case it will secure much more devotion, since, as Henri de Man argues, the justification of a myth must be found in its service as a way of present action. To serve only in the future is a way of life for only those who place no value on themselves, the already defeated.<sup>15</sup> In either case, successful ideologies must promise a reign of justice and equality in this world or the next, must claim that the "good" will be rewarded and the "wicked" punished, and must assert that the "New Order" or the "Better World" will ensure lasting security and uninterrupted comfort.

## VIII

### Expressions of Vital Interests

EFFECTIVE IDEOLOGIES APPEAL to wide masses by expressing the vital interests of social groups (Sorel's "*tendancies les plus fortes*"),<sup>16</sup> the grievances they profoundly feel, the ambitions which are most burning at the moment and for which many are ready to make the necessary sacrifices. What a number of our decisions are, in reality, nothing more than the results of wishful thinking! We allow our judgments to be warped by our emotions, and, in consequence, we arrive at conclu-

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man . . ."; the reply was invented by Doctor Johnson. Sappho did not hurl herself from the Leucidian promontory for love of Phaon; her respectability and virtue are beyond question, for she was a matron of the most exalted virtue and the mother of a large family. Philip II of Spain did not die of burning because royal etiquette forbade his servants to touch the royal person; he died a natural death. It would be a commonplace cliché today to note that George Washington did *not* chop down a cherry tree.

<sup>15</sup> Henri de Man, "The Psychology of Socialism," New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1928.

<sup>16</sup> Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la Violence*, Paris, 6th ed., 1925, pp. 17 ff.

sions which differ from those we should have reached had we kept our feelings in their proper place.

Ideologies help to bring the emotional under-currents to the foreground. They give expression to the wishful thinking of the masses, motivating mankind by posing successive ideals as social goals for humanity. They accomplish the submergence of differences, of different ends, by securing joint action for a common interest. The Democrat, the Republican, the Jesuit, the Nazi, each has vested interests in the points of view of his ideology. To the Christian church, whose early strength lay in devotion to the democratic ideology of the City of God, slavery was evil. Since the Greek states were sustained in their existence through the use of slave labor, Aristotle accepted slavery.

Out of the needs of groups, then, there arise ethical demands which constitute part of the politico-economic ideology of those groups and of all other people upon whom they can impose their beliefs. This resulting ideology is the base from which the sovereign powers, including law, as the principal symbol of political force and power, are derived.<sup>17</sup> The broader the base and the more common the interests whose needs are expressed in the ideology, the less will be the friction, and correspondingly, the less will be the demands, the struggles, and the readjustments of the ideology.

The ambitions, grievances, and vested interests expressed in an ideology must be common to many individuals, living preferably over wide areas, so that the ideology becomes a spiritual tie uniting a large number of people by their strong emotional reactions of unity and opposition to others. It is quite helpful to have the membership faced by a minority status. Many persons do not derive a feeling of self-regard and self-respect from the accepted standards of the majority. They prefer to identify themselves with goals not yet

<sup>17</sup> James Marshall, "Swords and Symbols," New York, Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 143.

achieved, with ways of life not yet approved by the majority. Others are rebels against the culture which surrounds them, and join ideological movements which frown or laugh at the common criteria of status. Still other people join a minority movement "just on general principle," as individuals who choose to follow what they think is a creative, dynamic and rebellious movement since they are quite indifferent to the norms of a culture or the standards of the majority.

Whatever might be the case, the more the vital and vested interests of the member are sustained or enhanced in his ideology, the greater effectiveness it holds. The resulting ideological unity inspires self-sacrifice in a common interest, submerges personal conflicts, and thereby releases new energies for group loyalties—to party, to nation, to racial stock.

## IX

### The Claim to Scientific Objectivity and Realism

IF AN IDEOLOGY is to be influential in providing an impetus to social movements, it is necessary to have it presented as a scientific truth—a fashion started by the Marxians' claims to "scientific socialism." The term "scientific" is a word of the highest prestige, which proves, so the Marxians think, that the communist ideology is based definitely on ascertained and incontrovertible facts. Communism, in this respect, claims to be a social system built and based on a foundation of the discovery of an historical truth, "historical materialism." This permits the Marxists to claim perfect objectivity of mind, and to assert that their theories, based upon a dialectical-materialistic approach, can never be refuted. Those who wish to be thought sound without being communists designate themselves, on the other hand, as "relativists."<sup>18</sup>

Note, however, that it is precisely because Marxism has been a religion rather than a genuine science that it has exerted such great power over the minds of a multitude of men.

<sup>18</sup> Carl L. Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 10 ff., presents a delightful analysis of the ideological aspects of the term "scientific."

Once the claim of an ideology to scientific status is accepted by the followers of the doctrine, the ideology becomes a tremendously effective social force. A man will submit cheerfully to the rulers and the representatives of authority, have his head chopped off, wallow through mud and die of wounds in war if the "cause" is based on a doctrine claiming to be THE TRUTH, with a capital T. This Truth, this myth, this fairy tale, is always considered mightier and more truthful than all the previous truths, although history teaches that, if anything, there is no absolute norm for what we call "the good" and "the bad," "the right" and "the wrong." These terms, rather, depend for their content upon the time, the place, and the previous condition of servitude of their individual groups. The ideologist *knows* THE TRUTH, and presents it "scientifically."

## X

## The Granting of the Élite Status

SINCE THE IDEOLOGIST "knows" the coming state of affairs, the "inevitability" of the future, his doctrine divides mankind, in general, into two groups: (1) those who are granted the status of "knowing" the way to open the door to the "better world," and who are, therefore, willing to make the necessary sacrifices to bring about its realization; and (2) those who, in spite of all the chances to join the movement which is ready and anxious to transform this "vale of tears" into the promised paradise, only retard the process by their obstinate obstructionism and opposition. The "believers" are promised that God, Nature, Nazism, Fascism, or dialectical materialism makes their victory certain. Their opponents, it is shown, have acquired their preponderance by an accident, or a particularly dirty trick, while God, or Nature, was temporarily off duty.<sup>19</sup>

The world, then, is divided into the "vanguards of prog-

<sup>19</sup> Hitler: "We didn't lose the war; we were stabbed. We won the war, but the fruits of victory were stolen from us."

ress," "the élite," "the believers," the "superior Aryan race," plagued by the "unbelievers," "the pagans," "the devils," "the democrats," "the capitalists," "the Jews," and the like.

The "superior kind," prodded on by its "sentiment of self-regard,"<sup>20</sup> is consequently forced to carry on the struggle, which gives them a chance to satisfy the spirit of abnegation and sacrifice that is a component of every personality and which becomes integrated with the psychology of pride and vanity. Those who follow the "true" ideology become the "moral" kind, the "superior" kind, because they represent the doctrine which is "moral" and "superior." Thus in Marxian ideology the proletariat is the only class which can create a "just" economic society. In Hitler's ideology the superior rank is granted to the pure Aryan, and the "devil" is symbolized in the Jew and the non-Aryan. The Jew in the Nazi revolution, in fact, plays the same rôle as the *bourgeoisie* in the Russian revolution. Such classifications, however, are but variations of the old, old story of the struggle between the good and the evil, between the angels and the devil, between the forces of light and of darkness.

Since there is no room for disillusionment in an effective social platform, the creed is sweetened for the followers by what the realist is apt to call hokum. Human frailties are assigned only to the opponents, the scapegoats. Everyone knows, Hitler keeps telling us, that all Jews are parasites and that the plutocratic democracies are decadent. Even the well-known loyalty of Jew to Jew is a myth to Hitler. Such a sense of cohesion as the Jews possess is merely a primitive herd-instinct; they hold together only when threatened by a common danger or lured by a common spoil. When these ties are removed, they display selfishness, and in the twinkling of an eye become a pack of savage rats tearing each other to pieces. Marxist sympathy for the worker is merely a cloak for pursuing Jewish ends.

<sup>20</sup> W. McDougall.



Useful short cuts in the work of the ideologist are his abilities to express his ideology in symbols and personalities. People seem to get more excited when they are reacting to symbols and personalities than to general programs. It is much easier for the Communist to despise the capitalist than the whole complex framework of capitalism. The proponent of Democracy surely hates Hitler more than all the ramifications of the Nazi ideology. Specific objects or persons are much easier to conceptualize to focus attention upon, than are more general and complex causes. They furnish a definite objective toward which verbal action can be directed. Christianity has its "devil," England its "Hun" and "Jerry," and Nazi Germany its "plutocrat."

## XI

### Pretensions to Universal Values

THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATION is one of the most difficult questions confronting the psychologist.<sup>21</sup> The problem becomes, however, quite simplified for the ideologist, who not only expresses what drives men to join movements, but informs them in a true ideological way of their "needs." The ideology then becomes a tie which binds together personal ambitions into group values, and which pretends that these personal values are really group values transcending the existence of the group. Thus the selfish character of individual and group demands gets lost, ideologically, in devotion to the cause which rises above the group interest by pretending its loyalty to a universal value. Each politician claims that his ambition to secure office stems from his desire to serve his country, his people, and his God. But the party must also pretend that its motives are not to acquire power, but only to "serve" or "save" the country.

These pretensions appear particularly pertinent in international politics. Politics in general is a contest for power in

<sup>21</sup> Hadley Cantril, "The Psychology of Social Movements," New York, John Wiley, 1941, p. 30.

which moral arguments are powerful weapons.<sup>22</sup> But morals have never dissuaded a nation from a desired course of action. Thus every nation claims that it is fighting not only for its existence, but for certain values transcending even existence.<sup>23</sup> Hitler's claims, up to his alliance with Stalin, had been that Germany had been trying to protect the world from Bolshevism. The Hitler-Stalin alliance forced an ideological somersault and Hitler began screeching against the "pseudo-democracies." When, in turn, he attacked Russia in 1941, he harangued the world again about the need to save it from Communism. Every ideology pretends that its primary loyalty is to a universal value by identifying it with universal values and thus sanctifying its partial and particular interests. The ideological pretension of universality is necessary for every aggressive group so that its limited and selfish interests become identified with as large a number of others as possible, so that its demands become integrated with the universal standards. The proponents of an aggressive ideology simply have to be convinced that the values and meaning of their social group really represent absolute meaning, that their ideology is related to a larger source of meaning, that their little cosmos is related to a larger cosmos.

## XII

### Operation Within the Framework of Conditioning

HUMAN BEINGS, AS HUMAN BEINGS, are "conditioned," i.e., habituated to a definite sequence of facts as encountered in their life-span in their environment as the result of learning. Within their cultural framework they learn to make the proper responses to sounds, objects, people, and other stimuli. This process becomes quite complicated as a result of elaborate

<sup>22</sup> Cf. J. S. Roucek, "The Essence of Politics," in R. V. Peel and J. S. Roucek, "Introduction to Politics," New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1941, pp. 3-13; Roucek, "Political Behavior as a Struggle for Power," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vi (July, 1941), pp. 341-351.

<sup>23</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christianity and Power Politics," New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936.

conditioning and cross-conditioning of specific stimuli and responses.

Clever promoters of an ideology know this and seek acceptance of their doctrine by appealing to the established patterns, traditions, and sentiments. It is a device of "transfer," by which the ideologist carries over the authority, sanction, and prestige, of something we are accustomed to respect, and revere, to something he would have us accept. The prestige of the authority of God is used to sanction the Nazi foreign policy. In America, both the Communists and the Nazis swore their allegiance to the American flag and professed their loyalty to the "true principles of Americanism." Both Hitler and Stalin fight for the "true democracy."

### XIII

#### The "Wave of the Future" Principle

THE CLAIM TO "SCIENTIFIC" CHARACTERISTICS of ideologies is interrelated with the proposition that the present chaos is something which only provisionally threatens the world, because the future will shape itself according to the ideologist's predictions.

This, "The Wave of the Future" principle, the claim to "The New Order," gives men a sense of fatalism and fanaticism. The "New Order" is coming, inevitably and irrevocably; hence every reasonable person or group, if it knows what is good for it, must work for its realization, since it is useless and hopeless to oppose the inevitable.

In short, in a successful ideology the future must appear as the necessary and inevitable result of the social forces of the present (a point already noted by Sorel).

### XIV

#### Prophets and Disciples

IDEOLOGIES, TO BE EFFECTIVE, must be transplanted through simplification and popularization from the sphere of theoretical thinking into the sphere of political and social pro-

grams and slogans. This characteristic of current ideologies is connected with the mass character of contemporary political thinking; for the task of current ideologies is to mobilize wide masses in political struggles. On this basis, groups are formed which are united by an ideology in a struggle for social realization.

Such an ideology must be propounded by a "charismatic" leader,<sup>24</sup> one who can induce in his followers an identification with the ideology as a cause worth fighting and dying for. A charismatic leader functions as a glorified symbol of the movement and is able to command the unquestioned obedience and devotion of his followers. History shows a succession of such leaders, prophets who have a great gift for stirring a defeated folks' imagination, the kind of leaders who grip a people's heart, enliven its spirit and inflame it so that it casts off all other loyalties and responsibilities to follow the prophet to the Promised Land elucidated earlier in this work.

The father of an aggressive ideology must, of necessity, find enough disciples, "drummers," to popularize the original doctrine. They must be instilled with enthusiasm and able to instill their dogmatic convictions into others. In order to make an impression, they must "lay it on thick," overstress certain colorings, and interpret the system according to local needs. At grips with all the imperfections and weaknesses of human nature, they agree, down deep in their hearts, that the end justifies the means, "that if men are to be led they have to be fooled to a certain extent."<sup>25</sup> In order to secure proselytes, they must make others believe that they are profoundly convinced themselves, willing, unconsciously, to overstress certain sentiments and minimize others, ready, if necessary, to use all kinds of persuasion and force.

A promotion group must first of all hold the attention of the community by a persistent barrage of propaganda (meet-

<sup>24</sup> Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gemeinschaft*, Tübingen, 1922, p. 124.

<sup>25</sup> Gaetano Mosca, "The Ruling Class," New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 169.

ings, the press, pamphlets, posters, displays of symbols, ostentatious demonstrations, parades, congress, and participation in affairs affecting the community). Secondly, it must justify its claim to leadership by keeping the issue alive, continually stirring up prevalent opposition and carefully tying up dissatisfactions with its ideology. Thirdly, the prophets must win the confidence of the masses by manoeuvring themselves into a position of ascendancy over competing groups and by continually combating their opponents successfully. A fourth task is the development of an adequate organization, not merely for the carrying out of the propaganda and for the struggle with competing and opposing groups, but also in preparation for the taking over of power.<sup>26</sup>

The leaders, being only human beings, usually aspire to become rulers. To build up their position in relation to the ruled and to satisfy at the same time their uneasy craving for ethical justification, they provide an ideological theory proving that the people who actually want to wield power are precisely the ones who ought to control it. Hitler fills this rôle for the Germans to perfection. In his own terms: "By virtue of a natural order," he says, "the strong man is chosen for fulfilling the great mission"—meaning, of course, Hitler. The first point in the creed of Hitler Youth is: the Leader is always right. The desire to justify a particular form of political organization and, in some cases, of a personal will to power has played a most important part in the formulation of ideologies postulating the existence of a meaning in the world.

## XV

### Extremisms of Ethnocentrism

A FAVORABLE AND ALMOST INDISPENSABLE CONDITION for the continued success of an ideology is the closing of the

<sup>26</sup> Theodore Abel, "The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement," *American Sociological Review*, II (June, 1937), pp. 347-352.

environment to all external influences of counter-ideologies which might attract the sentiments for the competing ideas. This has been a lesson taught to the world by Germany by such acts as the dismissal and exile of all "politically unreliable" teachers and the muzzling of those who remained, the censorship of culture, the exclusion of everything "foreign," "alien," or in any way divergent from the official nature of culture as defined by the Propaganda Ministry, the smothering of free discussion, and the demand for constant proof of "loyalty."

But since it is impossible to provide a water-tight set-up for the exclusive operation of an ideology, like every dogma, every doctrine, every religion, every ideology must tolerate no wavering of faith and must reject competing values. You either "believe" or are damned. "Either you are one of us, or you are against us," is Hitler's dictum. Or, as Mussolini stated, "We or they!"

Unfortunately, when ideological ends are proclaimed to be ends good in themselves, when an ideologist proclaims that there is no meaning or value except in the ideological construction arbitrarily selected by him (the nation, the State, the race, the class, the party), grotesque and monstrous results follow. Remember the experiences of Galileo and the insane persecutions of the enemies of Communism, Fascism, and Nazism by maniacs denying meaning and value to the world as a whole, while assigning to themselves in a supreme degree the knowledge of the only TRUTH, as members of supremely meaningful and valuable communities, deified nations, races, and classes.

Theirs is the end so absolutely good in itself, so admirable that those who pursue it have no responsibility of bothering about anything else. Communist, Fascist, Nazi, and all nationalist ideologies are alike in their affirmation that the end justifies the means, and that end is their triumph over the rest



of the world. This justifies the unlimited use of violence, terror, and cunning.

## XVI

## Glow Words

AN ADEQUATE IDEOLOGY expresses the ideal in terms of current "glow words"—ideas that carry a strong and prevalent emotional tone, as for example: "nationalism," "socialism," "racial superiority," "liberty," "justice," "equality," "democratic methods," "dictatorship," and "fatherland." Since recent studies in "semantics" deal more fully with this problem, we need not continue here. But it is necessary to note that an ideology, in order to function as the basis of a successful movement, links up the goal with the issue by setting forth a plan in which the items are the opposite of that which is regarded as the cause of the problem-experience. This is done by the use of the so-called "polar" words.<sup>27</sup> For example, in Germany it was Dictatorship vs. Parliamentarianism, *Gleichschaltung* vs. Liberalism; all ideologies fight "injustice" in order to establish "justice"; they want to change the "bad" for "good" conditions. The task of the "drummer" and the staff of his popularizers is to reduce the ideology to some attractive terms, words, and slogans, to indulge in orgies of verbomania, and to substitute these words and slogans for thinking.<sup>28</sup> Once reactions are established by the process of repetition, the hearing of the familiar sounds and slogans or the sight of the characters and symbols (written and spoken words, the flag) is then attended by passions and convictions of fearful intensity. The ideologist works diligently to have his term awaken indefinable but precise emo-

<sup>27</sup> T. W. Arnold, "The Folklore of Capitalism," New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937, chapter VII, "The Traps Which Lie in Definitions and Polar Words," pp. 165-184.

<sup>28</sup> C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, "The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism," New York, Harcourt, Brace, 3rd. ed., 1930, p. 42. Stuart Chase has popularized this nature of the symbolic process of "blabities" in his "The Tyranny of Words," New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1938; he has utilized notably I. A. Richards' "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," T. W. Arnold's "The Symbols of Government," Alfred Korzybski's "Science and Sanity," and P. W. Bridgman's "The Logic of Modern Physics."

tions which make discussion for the most part very sterile since many of the most popular subjects are infested with symbolically blank but emotionally active words.<sup>29</sup> Listen to a speech by a communist and notice the emotional reactions to such words as "imperialism," "*bourgeoise*," "fascism." But exactly the same words will have quite a different meaning and promote different emotional reactions when used on the "fascist." When ideologists talk about "justice," "honesty," "duty," and "loyalty," they always identify these words of favorable effect with their own doctrine. The same deeds perpetrated in the name of the same abstraction by the opposing side become "treachery," "injustice," and "betrayal."

Endless confusion is furthermore promoted by labeling collections of things with words—"mankind," "Germany," "individualism," "Truth." While individual men or individual Germans certainly do exist, "mankind" and "Germany" do not—except as fictions. Yet the ideologists are forever using such abstractions to prove certain points, failing to see that because no referents can be found for them, no two of them can possibly refer to the same thing. A *Tyranny of Words* is the result; and most of them can be given any meaning by any ideologist. As Humpty Dumpty said, once upon a time:

"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" said Alice.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you.'"

"But," Alice objected, "'glory' doesn't mean a 'nice' knock-down argument!"

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."

<sup>29</sup> Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

(Continued)

# On the Unification of Science<sup>1</sup>

By HORACE S. FRIES

## I

THE UNITY OF SCIENCE Movement as outlined in most of the papers in the first number of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* raises some crucial questions in regard to scientific method. The social sciences, in their orthodox forms, are notorious for their unscientific concern to emulate physics in an unscientific manner. Physics, as a highly developed experimental science, has an imposing body of abstract material in the form of mathematical equations, concepts of electrons, neutrons, etc. The social sciences also have an "imposing" set of abstractions. Unfortunately they are split several different ways by incompatible theories. But the serious deficiency is that none of these abstractions in the social sciences have been tested for their relevance or fruitfulness in the *concrete* material of these sciences; namely, our social institutions. Doubtless the social abstractions are *of* and *about* institutions and other social-human relations. But in general they provide no operational indications of what actual changes could be instituted in the social order as a result of putting the abstractions to work. Furthermore, even where these abstractions appear to indicate possible concrete operations, they afford no clue as to how they would have to be modified, after being set in operation, in view of their inadequacies as these would be discovered by operational tests. In short, social concepts are at best trial and error guesses lacking any self-corrective indices.

A more critical emulation of the advanced nature sciences suggests a remedy for this deficiency. Operationally a scien-

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from an article, "Can Science be Unified Humanistically?" *The Humanist*, I (Winter, 1941), pp. 142-5.

tific hypothesis is meaningless which fails to indicate, either directly or in virtue of its place in a more comprehensive theory, what actual operations (experiments) will serve to test, modify, and improve the abstract instruments of the science. In physics, we are told, the scientist has to choose among various mathematical sets (e.g., between Euclidean and Riemannian geometries). The choice is based upon experimental convenience or necessity. Until such tests are performed on the various abstract concepts the latter are at most merely potentially operational in the concrete world of physical transformations. Indeed it is doubtful if many of the new systems which have been developed in pure mathematics will ever be applied in experimental inquiries. Yet there are unfulfilled mathematical needs in experimental physics. Mathematicians who care to, direct their research in pure mathematics *in view of* these concrete, experimental needs.

Now, in so far as the attack on the problem of the unification of the sciences begins exclusively from the abstract end of the sciences, it gets off to an unfortunate start on two counts. In the first place, since the abstractions of the social sciences are included in the attempt at unification, untested items are being introduced. In the second place, it is difficult to see what concrete operational procedures the Movement envisages as tests of the second degree abstractions which it must make from the abstract materials of the various sciences in order to bring them together. Given sufficient logical ingenuity any number of compatible abstract sets can be "unified" (in any number of ways). The question is what kind of abstractions to make and for what kind of unity to aim.

Mr. Dewey's paper, "Unity of Science as a Social Problem," in the first number of the *Encyclopedia*, seems to sug-

gest a concrete, as over against an abstract approach to the problem. Such an approach can lead the way to a significant unification movement which will enable advance in one science to carry over into the others. Thus it will provide for the mutual enrichment of the social sciences, the nature sciences, and of life. Where can we look for a concrete embodiment of this approach?

The TVA and a few other governmental agencies are trying in dead earnestness to develop self-corrective procedures in social planning.<sup>2</sup> Their efforts involve the best *scientific* use possible of *all* relevant scientific knowledge from physics through psychology to economics and public administration. Somewhat unintentionally, perhaps, they are trying to unify the sciences. And they have a definite, concrete test of success; namely, improved techniques for resolving actual social conflicts. The continuous improvement, however slow, of abstract concepts for use in resolving concrete social conflicts constitutes experimental social science. In physics the test of adequate abstract concepts is their operational success in controlling concrete transformations. In experimental social science the adequate test of scientific truth is likewise success in improving the operations in its concrete material of social institutions and conflicts.

## II

IT IS THE FACT of conflict among human interests which affords an objective basis for securing operationally objective judgments in social science. Perhaps the logical structure of self-corrective social inquiry can best be indicated by an example. Imagine a labor-management mediator called in on a specific conflict. He tries to draw up a plan which will be as *satisfactory* as possible to the conflicting interests involved in the situation. To this end he will try to get the

<sup>2</sup> See "The TVA Labor Relations Policy at Work," by Judson King, National Popular Government League, Washington, D. C.

participation of both sides in drawing up the plan. For it is largely their interests which will determine the failure or success of the plan. If it is to succeed for very long, it probably must provide for continuous revision as its deficiencies come to light or as new conditions come to affect the situation. Again, it will try to provide for the direct representation of the crucial interests involved—those of management and labor—in this continuous task of revision.

Since our concern here is not with the interesting and important democratic implications of the procedure, we shall turn at once to the scientific aspects. If the conflict of interests is to serve science, then one other condition must be imposed before the mediating plan can be considered completely successful. It must be drawn up and administered in such a way that, in the long run, it (and others) will throw light on the ideas and principles employed in drawing it up. When this condition is met, the plan has become a scientific hypothesis. It has been deduced from principles of human conduct and association, just as an experimental hypothesis in the laboratory is deduced from laws, theories, and principles about nature. In the case of the plan, it will doubtless involve principles which include economic, political, and psychological relations. As it fails or succeeds it will throw light on the deficiencies of these underlying principles and thus provide for their correction.

Thus a labor mediator interested not only in the practical success of his plans but also in improving the principles of planning is an experimental social scientist. An institution which adopts such methods of mediation is a social experimental institution. As it expands these procedures to apply to conflicts of interests among citizens generally (from marital conflicts to those involved in economic relocations, sales, purchases, and priorities), it is broadening the area of social inquiry.



There is one point about this analysis which calls for special emphasis. Scientific ideas are instruments of control. Like all instruments they are ethically neutral: they can be used for good or ill. But when they are employed operationally to improve planning principles, they cannot be deliberately employed for bad ends. For the improvement of the abstract social science planning principles requires the *improvement* of the plans. But the test of improved plans is in terms of the *satisfaction* of the interests involved in the plans. To learn experimentally about human interests and their complex of interrelationships which constitute social institutions, we must aim to achieve more satisfactory satisfactions and interests. Satisfactions and interests are neither static entities nor subjective epiphenomena. They can make or break a plan, but they also change and can be deliberately changed as they come to participate gradually and with sounder guiding principles in a great self-corrective experimental venture.

Analogously to the mathematician working in connection with problems in the physics laboratory, the social scientist in the university or college who cares to can direct both his teaching and his research in such a way as to provide better abstract tools for use in the many and various branches of public administration to establish and improve self-corrective operational procedures. But such efforts require thorough co-operation and interdependency between the faculties and public administrative agencies.

### III

THAT SUCH SELF-CORRECTIVE planning activities can serve for the unification of the sciences presupposes that experimental social science logically *includes* all the others. This assumption is warranted on theoretical grounds by any naturalism which denies that the more complex orders of

nature are externally added "levels" and which affirms that they are developments *of* and *within* the other orders.<sup>3</sup> Thus it involves a denial of both supernaturalism and materialism.

There is one assumption common to both materialism and supernaturalism which stands in the way of a whole-hearted acceptance of the development of an experimental social science and a concrete unification of the sciences. This is the prevalent belief that experimental method is inherently incapable of being employed in deciding questions which involve ethical evaluations. This is the so-called ethical neutrality of science.

It is clear that in order to engage self-corrective inquiry in on-going social affairs, moral evaluations must be made at every step. For a social plan must be continuously evaluated in terms of the human interests which it incorporates and directs. If, as I believe, we do actually have self-corrective inquiry under way in some of these governmental agencies (on however small a scale), it would seem that the assumption of the ethical neutrality of science has been refuted by actual empirical developments. But the prejudice is so deeply ingrained that we can hardly hope for such an easy humanist victory over the materialistic and supernaturalistic supposition that science is a *mere* instrument; that is, an instrument which cannot be employed to tell us how best to use science.

However, a critical examination of the assumption reveals that its only logical justification depends upon the presupposition that ethical evaluations are absolute in a way in which scientific judgments are not. The moment an ideal is taken as a tentative social plan, and an ethical evaluation is taken as a tentative judgment of the human consequences involved in

<sup>3</sup> See John Dewey, "Social as a Category," *Monist*, XXXVIII, (1928), pp. 161-177; reprinted as "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea" in "Philosophy and Civilization," pp. 77-92; and in part as "The Social" in Ratner's selections, "Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy," pp. 1059-69. See also Dewey's "Logic," Ch. XXIV, "Social Inquiry," esp. pp. 491-492.

instituting the plan, then that moment there is no theoretical reason for denying that by intelligent and co-operative effort we can develop self-corrective procedures of social planning which involve evaluations of human satisfactions in terms of human interests. The main reason why we have failed to date to find a working wisdom for modern life is, as M. C. Otto says,<sup>4</sup> that we have not looked for it in the concrete modern world.

The Vienna circle of logical positivists is intimately connected with the Unity of Science Movement. It is this school which has been most voluble in insisting on the scientific nonsense of ethical terms. It is significant that Jacques Maritain<sup>5</sup> can exploit fully for neo-thomist ends this aspect of positivism. He tells us that, "Generally speaking, the school of Vienna manifests no hostility toward religion, and certain representatives of this school . . . show a certain sympathy for the work of the theologians, whom they prefer to university philosophers."<sup>6</sup> One need hold no special brief for university philosophers to cite this passage; attention need only be called to the neo-thomist meaning of "theology" as the science of *revealed* truth (as the Church decides) and its very special meaning of "religion." The basis of Maritain's use of positivism is clear. For insistence upon the inherent neutrality of science is the chief logical and moral reason for a supernaturalist morality.

The consequence of such a supernaturalist position for experimental social science is clear and is clearly recognized by advocates of supernaturalism. It means that experimental social science is impossible, and that any scientific attempt to resolve moral-social conflicts must be repressed.

The assumption of the neutrality of science doubtless served an important purpose in liberating science from the

<sup>4</sup> M. C. Otto, "The Human Enterprise," Ch. IV, "Truth and Ideals."

<sup>5</sup> In Ch. II, "Scholasticism and Politics."

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 41.

control and restrictions of the Church which at the time of the advent of experimental inquiry was the jealous and powerful guardian of the "deeper" human values. But the persistence of the assumption now endangers the very existence of science by blinding it to the possibility, let alone the necessity, of accepting responsibility for its own social consequences. The pressing need for planning has allowed the dictatorships to take charge of science (and its "unification") in their development of non-participative planning methods. Participative social planning affords an alternative approach which is both democratic and scientific.

## Public Opinion and the Peace

### The 'War Guilt' of the German People

By F. A. HERMENS

WHEN, IN SEPTEMBER 1939, the new war began, there was at first reason to hope that the "deliberate sense of the community" would prevail and that the "psychology of the crowd" would not again be allowed to develop. That this was an international civil war seemed obvious. Had Hitler, as he claimed, enjoyed the confidence of the great majority of his people, he need not have sent hundreds of thousands of them into concentration camps. Some of the refugees from Nazi terror had for years been in the Allied countries to report on what they had seen. There would have been a great many more of them had it been possible to admit a larger number. We sometimes overlook the fact that the Nazi victory was the first overthrow of a democracy to occur during the world economic crisis, when unemployment in the older democratic countries was so great that they increased the heights of the barriers against immigration, and when the chances of securing a place of refuge in some other country became but a fraction of what they were, for example, at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. Many of those now confined in the frontiers of Hitler's Reich would have fought on our side if given a chance.<sup>1</sup>

So far as the reaction of the Germans at home to the war is concerned, American reporters left no doubt about their lack of enthusiasm. As Joseph C. Harsch put it: "The German people did not want this war in the beginning. Their utter reluctance to face war and their spiritual depression at its outbreak were attested by every objective observer and supported by scores of specific instances of lack of enthusiasm."<sup>2</sup> Nor was the common man in Germany much interested in Hitler's victories. The French request for an armistice represented the peak of Hitler's power and glory but, as Wallace Deuel reports:

I was on two of the principal streets of Berlin for the first half-hour after the news became known that France had asked for terms. At last, I thought, I would have seen some normal, human reaction. It was, after all, one of the greatest military triumphs of all times.

<sup>1</sup> During the campaign of 1940 a company entirely composed of German refugees was among the forces covering the Allied retreat. (See "Britain's German Minority," *Bulletins from Britain*, June 18, 1941.)

<sup>2</sup> "Germany at War," New York, 1942, pp. 7-8.

But there was no reaction to be seen—none at all. The Berliners looked neither jubilant nor happy nor even relieved. They looked just the same they had looked for more than six years. They just looked tired.<sup>3</sup>

Generally speaking, the people in the Allied countries, at first, were aware of this situation. There was still a feeling of revulsion against the propagandistic eccentricities of the first world war, and likewise there remained a feeling akin to embarrassment concerning the many volumes, pretending to deal with the German national character, that had appeared between 1914 and 1918. In the United States, the term "Hun," for the most part, was avoided; "Dachshund" and "Sauerkraut" were acquitted of all guilt and so far have not been indicted again.

#### Trends in England

ACCORDING TO the Gallup poll, the percentage of the English voters who held the German people responsible for the new war rather than the Nazi government was, in September 1939, only six percent—the same percentage which took this position in the United States as late as in June 1942.<sup>4</sup> However, when these figures were recently re-published they were accompanied by another figure which shows a rather ominous trend of affairs: in England the percentage of those who blame the entire German people had risen by November 1940 to 50 percent. Obviously, there is no rational explanation for this change. From the psychological point of view, however, the explanation is easy enough. Between 1939 and 1942 the British had suffered great and humiliating losses in the field. There were the mass bombing raids upon English cities. The average Englishman had no way to fight back. This made him all the more inclined to threaten dire consequences for the day when events would turn in his favor. Hitler did his best to provide fuel for such feelings; the shooting of hostages began, and most alarming reports began to trickle out from occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. All of this has not yet entirely changed the tenor of public opinion in the United States. But the longer the war and its sacrifices last and the larger the number of its victims grows, the more unlikely it will be that the deep anger already felt by the people will not turn into passionate hate.

As could have been expected, some of the intellectuals in the Allied countries began to busy themselves to provide the necessary rationalization for such feelings. Since such a graphic picture of their activities during the first world war had been drawn by Julien Benda, many of us hoped that

<sup>3</sup> *Chicago Daily News*, Jan. 9, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> *New York Times*, June 13, 1942.



such aberrations could not occur again within the life-span of one generation. Still, a few months after the outbreak of the war some of the most prominent French intellectuals signed a manifesto, addressed to their British colleagues, in which an attempt was made to marshal the facts of a history of twenty centuries, artfully selected and arranged, against the German people as a whole rather than against their masters who were so clearly responsible for the new holocaust.<sup>5</sup> Some of these Frenchmen now support "collaboration" with Hitler, but their work has been taken over by such men as Lord Vansittart, who, after having participated in the policy of "appeasement," now, in a series of radio lectures entitled "Black Record," and elsewhere, pays Hitler the compliment of indicting the German people as a "race."<sup>6</sup> Other intellectuals, in particular those who for business reasons feel compelled to approximate, if not exceed, the quota of a book a year, have added their bit. Nor is it surprising that these writers use their own methods in order to propagate their peculiar ideas. They do not refute opponents; they denounce them. As Professor Harold J. Laski has put it: "The politicians of hate reject this distinction (between the Nazis and the German people) and are now in the full tide of an organized, if half subterranean, campaign to impose the results of its rejection upon the government and the people of this country."<sup>7</sup> Laski deals with conditions as they are in England, but it need not be repeated that they tend to become the same in the United States.

#### The Ignorance of the Propagandists

THE VERY NATURE of these charges should be sufficient to destroy their appeal to anyone who is accustomed to reason for himself.<sup>8</sup> If the French condemn the German "race" such as it was during the time of Caesar, they must include those whose descendants now populate large sections of France, including a part of the Franks, from whom the modern French have derived their name. The English might remember that the Angles and Saxons, the Hanovarian Kings, and Prince Albert, were members of the German "race." Also, of course, the English "hereditary enemy" was for centuries France, with whom after all a "hundred years war" was

<sup>5</sup> For the text of this manifesto see *The Tablet*, London, Dec. 16, 1939.

<sup>6</sup> For some comments, see the editorial entitled "Indicting a Race," *New York Times*, Dec. 1, 1940.

<sup>7</sup> H. J. Laski, "The Politics of Hate," *New Statesman and Nation*, Feb. 21, 1942.

<sup>8</sup> Incidentally, one wonders what would happen if an Irish Nationalist were given the task of making an analysis of the English national character? As a matter of fact such an Irishman could not do much worse than some of the propagandists of Pétain and Doriot who, in certain French circles, seem not at all to have been entirely unsuccessful in piecing bits of history together to show that the true "Black Record" was made in England.

fought. Throughout most of modern history English policy supported Prussia against the French attempt to dominate Europe. This was done, for example, during the Seven Years' War and during the Napoleonic Wars. The English were never hostile to Prussia; they became antagonistic to the Germans only at the close of the Nineteenth Century. And then the policy which alone could disrupt the old bonds of friendship was, strangely enough, inaugurated by a grandson of Queen Victoria, who reversed all principles of Bismarckian foreign policy by encouraging the Big Navy crowd in Germany, and by adding fuel to the fire by uncontrolled utterances. Is there need for further details?

Similar things could be said about the racial history of Germany. True "Nordics" are to be found in a majority only in Schleswig-Holstein; the rest of them are living in the Scandinavian countries. The bulk of the German population is of Slav and Celtic as well as of Germanic stock. People with predominatingly Slav features prevail in Berlin and in every point east of it. Slav influence deeply extends into the industrial districts, in particular into the Ruhr valley; before the first world war this area annually received thousands of Polish miners, who as a rule settled there with their families. Just one incident will characterize the results of these developments. A few years after Hitler's rise to power the German champion soccer team ("Schalke '04") played a French team in Paris. French reporters pretended to be greatly impressed by the disciplined Hitler salute which the team gave at the beginning and end of the game. A look at the program would have told them that all but one of the eleven players had Polish names, and they probably had as little use for Hitler as had the French. On the other hand, there are considerable numbers of people of Polish descent who belong to the "old guard" of the Nazi party. The list of the candidates presented by the Nazis during the elections of the 1930s contains a good many such names. This led to ironic criticism on the part of the Social Democrats, which then was followed not by a purge of the Nazi ranks of such members, but simply by change of names on their part. Nor should the believers in this racial theory, who as a rule exclude Austria from their indictment of the German "race," overlook that Hitler was both born and educated in Austria. And, as the title of an article by Joseph C. Harsch puts it, Hitler's Reich is "a one-man concept" with Hitler on the top.<sup>9</sup>

#### **The Argument from 'Tradition'**

NOR IS THE CASE against the German people much better if it is based upon historical "tradition" rather than upon "racial" theory. History, of

<sup>9</sup> *New York Times Magazine*, May 18, 1941.

course, always is what the historians of the time think it is. Scientific history ought to present an analysis of an essential series of individual developments which, for the most part, are quite different one from the other. Bad metaphysics crop in immediately if we speak of "historical laws," and the situation is only partially better if the search for "traditions" is substituted. In that case a few coincidences are selected from the great mass of historical material; the rest is ignored, and inevitably the facts selected correspond more closely to preconceived ideas than to an historical analysis which in any way would measure up to scientific standards.

In dealing with Germany, the "traditionalists" forget that nationalism is the driving force of modern history, and that German history differs from the history of other European nations in that national unity was won later than by other countries, and against greater obstacles. The forging of "national unity" in both England and France had its share of "blood and iron," but that is such a long time ago that we are inclined to forget it. Germany's modern history began with national disintegration rather than integration, and the Thirty Years' War at first seemed to have made such disintegration permanent. Territorial princes started where the emperors had to leave off, and of them the rulers of Prussia were the most successful. Since the "Myth of Prussia"<sup>10</sup> has been recently dealt with so brilliantly, there is no reason to go into any detail here.

If we mention only a few events and start with Frederic the Great—upon whom no moral sympathy need be wasted—it is obvious that after the Seven Years' War (when, to repeat, England was his ally) his policy was one of peace and stability. The new period of wars was born out of the French revolution, when the armies forged out of the *levée en masse* swept aside the decadent forces of "Prussian militarism" without much effort. The new Prussia arising out of the Napoleonic Wars at first had a liberal function and contained liberal elements in herself. Napoleon was a tyrant, even though an enlightened one, and the "invasion" of France between 1813–15 in which the English, Austrians and Russians participated, and which some French writers nonetheless hold up as one of the proofs of German aggressiveness, had no other function but to ensure "freedom from fear" for the nations of Europe. The Allies of that time ended that war in a way which is full of lessons for the present. With Napoleon they removed the source of aggression, and the French monarchy which they restored was accorded equal treatment from the very beginning. England can be proud of the fact that her representatives at the peace table helped to prevent any punitive measures and this has certainly some-

<sup>10</sup> F. Borkenau, "The Myth of Prussia," *Political Quarterly*, April–June, 1942.

thing to do with the fact that there has been no war between the two nations since.<sup>11</sup> Let it be added that one of the results of the treaty of Vienna was to make Prussia a German power against her will. Some of the eastern provinces, which were of Polish nationality, but in which the Prussian kings were more interested than in possessions in western Germany, were ceded to Russia, and Prussia, in spite of the misgivings of her rulers, was given the Rhineland and made a neighbor of France.

The subsequent history of both Prussia and Germany began to be dominated by Bismarck. In discussing this complex personality, and the conglomeration of forces which he left in control of his political creation, the German Empire, it is not easy to weigh the positive and negative elements properly. In particular, this applies to those who, like the present writer, adhere to the school of thought according to which the attainment of national unity, to which Germany was and is as much entitled as any other nation in the world, should have been left to a more gradual and peaceful process, rather than be accomplished by "blood and iron." This method, other things apart, separated Austria from Germany. Still, regard for what "might have been" should not lead us to an unbalanced judgment of what actually happened.

#### War as an Instrument of Policy

BISMARCK DELIBERATELY USED "war as an instrument of policy," but so did the statesmen of other nations both before and after him. He does not bear the sole responsibility for any of his wars; if, for example, we take the war of 1870-71, in which there is at present more interest than in any other, we might well bear in mind that according to Professor Hearnshaw—who tried to give something like a scientific foundation for Vansittart's somewhat illiterate allegations—"after 1867, a number of important people (in France) . . . wanted war at any price."<sup>12</sup> Indeed, had Napoleon III not wanted war, all he had to do was to refuse to declare it, and allow the storm caused by the famous Ems telegram to blow over. In addition, if Bismarck knew how to make war, he also knew how to make peace. In 1866 he flew into a fit of rage when the Prussian generals wanted to enjoy the triumph of marching into Vienna at the head of a shiny army, and when his own king wanted some Austrian territory. He

<sup>11</sup> When the question is asked whether the democracies will, at the end of this war, be able to do what the monarchies did in 1815, it must, of course, be borne in mind that the undemocratic character of those governments eliminated the influence of the "psychology of the crowd." Whoever does not have to rely upon the active cooperation of public opinion need not fear that passion will take the place of deliberate consideration.

<sup>12</sup> F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Germany the Aggressor Throughout the Ages," New York, 1942, p. 204.

won out, and his historical reward—lasting friendship with Austria—is as well known as should be the lessons which it contains for future peacemakers. When he negotiated the armistic and the peace with the French in 1871, there was none of the barbed wire behind which the representatives of the German Republic found themselves in Paris in 1919. Count d'Hérisson, in his "Journal of an Ordnance Officer," has given us some delightful anecdotes about the courteous atmosphere which characterized Bismarck's negotiations with Jules Favre.

Bismarck's subsequent policy was one of peace. Friendship with Austria was a matter of course; the good relations with Italy<sup>13</sup> were continued; the relations with Russia were at least made tolerable by the re-insurance treaty; great care was to be taken not to antagonize England, and for this reason no large navy was to be built.

Bismarck had given Germany, however, a ruling class which found it impossible to continue the prudent foreign policy which he had pursued since 1871. The Liberals, who still dominated German political thought in the 1860s, were subdued; some of them went over to the enemy and formed a new political *élite* together with the Junkers, the army and the bureaucracy. This group was anything but homogeneous, and after Bismarck it lacked the man who could have protected it from itself. New democratic elements arose at the Left, led by the Social Democrats, the left-wing Liberals, and more often than not supported by the Center party. However, as long as the old ruling class retained the initiative, it could and did follow a successful policy of divide and rule against those who by force of circumstances worked in the direction of parliamentary government.

Thus Germany represented a welter of political forces, and the man upon whom it depended to bring order out of the chaos was William II, who, after his father—a man with definite liberal tendencies—had been on the throne for only a hundred days, came to power at the age of 29 years. He was, as his father frankly said,<sup>14</sup> immature at that time and was destined not to mature for the rest of his life. It was the vital defect of Bismarck's Constitution to place decisive power into the hands of a man who was a mere accident of the hereditary principle; from the democratic point of view the many blunders of this man are eloquent proof of the superiority of democratic methods of selection over those of any monarchical constitution.

<sup>13</sup> One wonders why some of the leading Italian exiles deem it necessary to chime in with the current denunciations of Germany. Italy was Prussia's ally when in 1866 the decisive blow was struck against Austria, and Italy was richly rewarded.

<sup>14</sup> For the text of his letter see "New Chapters of Bismarck's Autobiography," London, 1920, pp. 5-6.

William's constitutional position was in the main the one of the "*Grand Électeur*"; it depended upon him who was to occupy the key positions in the country,—and who was to have practical power even if he lacked constitutional authority, which was to be the case frequently in regard to the General Staff of the army.

#### Responsibility for World War I

UNDER THIS LINE-UP of forces, as determined by William II, all the rules of commonsense were violated in German foreign policy, one country being antagonized after the other, and "encirclement" made so easy that at last it became a fact. Still, neither William nor anyone else in Germany should be charged with either the complete or the direct responsibility for the outbreak of the war in 1914;<sup>15</sup> if the German leaders had wanted to provoke war, they would have waited the few years that were needed to out-build the British navy and to reverse the—then decisive—balance of sea power. But they had a good share in the responsibility for the failure of measures which might have made war impossible, such as had been embodied in the proposals submitted to both of the Hague peace conferences, and in William Jennings Bryan's treaties of conciliation. Also, the mentality which caused the guarantee of Belgian neutrality to be called a "scrap of paper" is bound to be resented by all who believe that international relations are subject to the moral law.

Wilson was right, however, when he emphasized that the war had been declared by the German government and that the German people had not been consulted. To be sure, they accepted the war when it was an accomplished fact, and some of their leaders afterwards indulged in a most foolish annexationism, but there is quite a difference between what you will accept after it has been done and what you will do if the initiative is your own.

<sup>15</sup> The initiative lay in the hands of the Austrian statesmen who wanted to subdue Serbia. The last chance for peace was destroyed when on July 30th the Russian Foreign Minister caused the Czar, by threat of revolution, to sign the final order for complete mobilization which, as the English had warned the Russians on July 25th, was likely to lead to war with Germany. The chief reason for reproach to the Germans is their failure to press earlier for moderation in Vienna of the drastic terms of the ultimatum to Serbia. When, on July 30th, they demanded moderation, it was already too late. However, the French should have warned their Russian allies as much as the Germans their Austrian allies; there is no record of any warning at all, and there have been frequent charges that there was underhand encouragement.

If, out of the many works written on the origin of the war in 1914, one takes only the volumes of Pierre Renouvin on the French and Theodor Wolff on the German side (or the scholarly treatment by Professor Fay so far as the American contribution to the matter is concerned), one cannot fail to arrive at the conclusion that there cannot be much disagreement among objective observers on any of the important issues involved. Therefore, why allow any of the old propagandistic simplifications to regain currency at the present time?



What policy the Republican leaders were inclined to pursue when they had the courage to seize the initiative is indicated by the Peace Resolution of 1917, in which the parties of the subsequent Weimar coalition demanded a peace without conquest and without indemnities. Therefore, Wilson was right in basing his hope for the future of world peace upon the control of power by the forces of democracy. As long as believers in democratic government were in control in Germany, peace was secure. In 1918 these democratic forces did at last secure control. Why did they lose it?

The first point is, of course, that as Hoover and Gibson have stated it: "Many actions by the Allied Governments during the Armistice and in the Peace Treaty weakened the liberal movement in the enemy states."<sup>16</sup> The omissions and commissions of the Allied Governments in the subsequent period had the same effect.

Second, attention must be drawn once again to the economic history of the 1920s and the 1930s. Extremism declined in Germany whenever economic conditions improved; it raised its head immediately when economic conditions deteriorated. There was little left of the Nazis after the elections of May, 1928, when economic conditions were good. Hitler's party then elected only 12 deputies, although the Communists increased their strength to 54, greatly to the detriment of responsible work by the Social-Democrats. From that time onward the fever curve of the Nazi (and Communist) strength is remarkably close to the indices which portray the progress of the depression. The Nazis elected 107 deputies in the elections of September, 1930 (the Communists 77); and 230 in July, 1932 (the Communists 89). As a result of this latter election the combined Nazis and Communists had a majority of the total number of deputies in the Reichstag (then 608), which meant that no democratic government was possible.

#### **The Nazis' Alleged Popular Following**

MANY PEOPLE HOLD that the rising strength of the Nazi party indicated agreement of the voters with Nazi principles, and they are bound to conclude that the large number of those who in their opinion expressed Nazi feelings by voting for them at the polls indicates serious defects of the German "national character." This argument loses its force as soon as we consider the actual motives of these voters. As Konrad Heiden, who knows more about the history of the party than perhaps any other writer, has put it, in commenting on the campaign of 1931: "Speakers busied

<sup>16</sup> H. Hoover and H. Gibson, "The Problems of Lasting Peace," New York, 1942, p. 109.

themselves with Conservatism, Liberalism and Parliamentism in the belief that the electorate was opposed to democracy. In reality it was only opposed to unemployment and taxation."<sup>17</sup> In other words, the German voter reacted to the great depression in the same way as the voter did in all other countries; he emitted a mere "protest vote." He voted against something, not for something. This is indicated by the most successful slogan of the time: *Es muss anders werden*—"things have got to get different," the average voter being quite unmoved when asked whether he made sure that things would really improve if he caused them to change.<sup>18</sup> There is nothing unique in such a popular reaction. In this country we can look back to a history of more than a hundred years so far as the protest vote is concerned; Van Buren was its first victim when he sought re-election in the midst of our first great depression in 1837. The same applies to Cleveland in 1896 and to Hoover in 1932. Nor was the situation different so far as the victory of the "National Government" in England in 1931 was concerned, or the victory of the Popular Front in France in 1936.

It is true enough that in the instances mentioned the only effect of the protest vote was to make the pendulum swing from one great democratic party, or coalition of parties, to the other, whereas in Germany it favored the extremists. But the reason is that the countries mentioned had a system of voting which left little chance for any extremist party, of the Right or of the Left.<sup>19</sup> The majority system of voting—and, in particular, the plurality system as used in England and the United States—is most unkind to extremist parties, which have been defeated, and eventually eliminated, as often as they tried their luck. On the other hand, Germany had a system of proportional representation which was much more disruptive than is

<sup>17</sup> K. Heiden, "A History of National Socialism," London, 1934, p. 116.

<sup>18</sup> The present writer, then engaged in a research project dealing with the sociology of anti-parliamentarian movements, spent a great deal of time in trying to ascertain the psychology of the voter. The result only went to confirm what Konrad Heiden said. It was particularly evident that the voters gave little attention to what are the two most characteristic aspects of subsequent Nazi policy, anti-semitism and war. Again and again I was assured by Nazi voters that when Hitler would come to power he would get rid of men like Streicher as quickly as Mussolini got rid of his extremist followers after he had come to power. This popular assumption harmonizes closely with the facts of modern German history, which shows no popular anti-semitism such as fills the history of countries like Poland and Rumania. So far as the issue of War and Peace is concerned, nothing would lead a Nazi orator to more violent outbursts of oratory than the objection that their policies were bound to lead to armed conflict. The pretended indignation of the Nazi speakers clearly indicates how much they were afraid of the voters in this regard. Needless to say, Nazi speakers were no less violent if it was suggested that Rosenberg's ideas would be applied to Hitler's policies with regard to the Christian churches.

<sup>19</sup> The seventy-two French Communists elected in 1936 present only the appearance of an exception. They were signatories to and beneficiaries of the Pact of the Popular Front, which made them candidates of the Popular Front rather than of the Communist party.

normally the case, on account of the extreme degree of proportionality established between votes cast and seats obtained. During the 1920s the plurality system would have completely eliminated the Nazis from the political picture, and greatly reduced the influence of the Communists, in addition to effecting a consolidation among the moderate parties, which would have been very beneficial from the point of view of the functioning of democratic government.<sup>20</sup> It may interest the American voter to know that if we divide the territory of Germany into 400 districts of approximately equal size we find that not even in September 1930 did the Nazi party have enough local strength to secure as much as 40 per cent of the total vote in any one district.<sup>21</sup> A party whose strength is so diffuse in American elections will incur a disastrous defeat from which there has never yet been a recovery. However, German P. R. served to keep Hitler and the Communists<sup>22</sup> alive during the 1920s, and placed them into the strategic position for receiving the entire protest vote when the depression occurred.<sup>23</sup> None of it could possibly go to the moderates after the elections of 1930. These elections were followed by the famous "majority of toleration," which meant that all moderate parties voted against the combined Nazi and Communist attempts to overthrow the government of Dr. Brüning. As a result, all moderate parties assumed a share of the—then so heavy—burden of government responsibility, and had to share in its unpopularity.

#### *The Nature of Hitler's Coup*

ELECTIONS, HOWEVER, did not put Hitler directly into the saddle. All they did was to produce a condition of near-anarchy. As a matter of fact,

<sup>20</sup> Such as conditions were, the bad functioning which characterizes Republican government in Germany ever since the elections to the first Reichstag in 1920 brought into existence a second kind of "protest vote"—protest against parliamentary inefficiency, instability and irresponsibility.

<sup>21</sup> For the details see F. A. Hermens, "Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation," Notre Dame, Ind., 1941, pp. 257ff. For a reply to critics, see "P. R., Democracy and Good Government," Notre Dame, Ind., 1943.

<sup>22</sup> The Communists also received millions of votes merely as a result of the depression. The Communists assisted the Nazis in breaking down republican government by voting with them against any moderate government, or against any positive measure proposed by such a government. The great majority of those who voted for the Communists can be as little identified with Communism as can the great majority of those who voted for the Nazis can be identified with the particular aims and policies of that party.

<sup>23</sup> Those who assume that the Nazi vote means consent of these voters to Nazi policies might also muse over the fact that in the elections held in November, 1932, the Nazis lost 2 million of the votes they had obtained in July, and obtained only 196 deputies. The Communists, during the same period, gained 600,000 votes and increased the number of their deputies from 89 to 100. Few who observed the situation during the winter of 1932-33 will deny that Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January, 1933, saved his party from collapse.

when in the presidential elections of 1932—which were held under the majority system—Hitler clearly asked the people for power, he received a resounding rebuke. However, somebody had to govern, and old Hindenburg's Junker neighbors managed to persuade the octogenarian that he would only improve his constitutional position if he would bring the leader of the strongest party into the government. The Junkers, of course, wanted power for themselves—not in order to prepare a new war, but simply in order to save themselves from bankruptcy and from the "bolshevist" measures which Dr. Brüning had in mind when he intended that those eastern estates, which simply could not be saved, should be divided and sold to peasant settlers. According to the Junkers, von Papen was to be the real ruler, and Hitler the "drum-beater" who would get up the popular support. As it was put, "Somebody will sometime lose his neck by trying to be too clever in an important matter." Actually, it did not take Hitler long to establish his own rule and put the Junkers in their place together with the rest of the population.

From these events it should be obvious that it would be a mistake to see the primary reason for Hitler's rise to power in the policy of the Junkers and of the intriguing generals who assisted the Nazis at one time or another. Both the Junkers and the generals obtained their power by default. They had it only because the Republic was so weak that anything could happen to it. A republic of ordinary strength, such as the majority system would have provided, would have been able to handle such disturbances—at least as easily as the Third Republic in France handled its MacMahon, its Boulanger, and its general staff during the Dreyfus crisis.<sup>24</sup>

There remains the problem of the extent to which the German people can be held responsible for Hitler's subsequent terroristic policy in his own country, and for its extension after the outbreak of the war. It should be obvious that we can immediately rule out Hitler's claim that the figures published as the results of his plebiscites are any indication of his popular strength. Some people who are wilfully blind<sup>25</sup> nevertheless seem to be

<sup>24</sup> There is no space to discuss the claim that an intellectual tradition starting with Luther and including Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche and Spengler brought Hitler into being. In the first place, it is rather un-sociological to assume that books govern the world. They can scarcely be said to do so now and they have never done so before. In the second place the writings of all these men must be considerably twisted to fit into the picture, which applies in particular to Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche. In the third place none of the writers who have made this assertion ever studied the difference between authoritarianism, which is rule from above, based upon army and police, and totalitarianism, which means rule of a mass party which rises from below. The totalitarian ancestors of Nazism are Bolshevism and Fascism and, as mentioned above, both of them have played into Hitler's hands.

<sup>25</sup> Such as F. W. Förster, "Europe and the German Question," New York, 1940, p. 317.

impressed by such figures, unmindful of what history has to say about the plebiscites of Napoleon I, Napoleon III, of Mussolini, Stalin and various and sundry lesser dictators. One of the many jokes in which the oppressed people of Germany (as in Russia and Italy!) try to "blow steam off," goes like this: There is great commotion in the Ministry of Propaganda. A burglary has occurred, and a very secret and important document of state has been stolen. What does it contain? Answer: The result of the forthcoming elections! If some serious aspects of the matter are to be mentioned, let us bear in mind that in all dictatorial elections or plebiscites there is, first and foremost, no freedom of political propaganda. The followers of the dictators can say all they want, their opponents nothing at all. Second, accomplished facts are to be ratified, and no selection is granted between possible alternatives to an issue, or between several slates of candidates. Then, of course, elections are often public rather than secret and, last but not least, if the results leave anything to be desired, local as well as provincial and national party leaders are there to doctor them up—even though it may happen at times that a local leader makes the mistake of publishing a list of results which contains a larger negative vote than do the figures for the entire district to which the particular locality belongs.

#### **The Leaders and the Followers**

FURTHERMORE, WHEN STUDYING the relation between force and consent in a dictatorship, we must take the essential distinction between leaders and followers. In democratic countries we are often thoughtless enough to neglect it, but occasionally we learn a little about it when someone polls the voters of New York City and finds out that the majority of them do not know the names of their Congressmen. As a matter of fact, the people who care little for the politics of their country are in the majority everywhere—in this country we only have to remember how many people skip the editorial page of their newspapers and reach for the comic strip.<sup>26</sup> The fight waged by the Nazis—or Bolsheviks, or Fascists—against democracy was in its first stage only a fight against those political leaders who alone could provide the active element in the struggle for democracy. As the Bible put it: "I will strike the shepherd, and the sheep of the flock will be dispersed." The killing, exiling, jailing or silencing of the democratic

<sup>26</sup> The common people are nevertheless able to give a sensible reply to a sensible political question, and in this respect they may be ahead of their leaders. See for example G. Gallup, "The People Are Ahead of Their Leaders," *New York Times Magazine*, March 29, 1942, and C. J. Friedrich, "The New Belief in the Common Man," Boston, 1942. In Germany the trouble was that under proportional representation no clear-cut questions were asked and no clear reply was therefore possible.



leaders was accompanied by a utter blackout of the truth, such as cannot even be imagined by anyone who has not experienced it in his own country. The controlled press and the radio started to spread falsehood as well as truth, and in the end no one knew what to believe. In fact, if a person wanted to know what was happening in a town a few miles from his own, all he could do was to go there himself, and he would learn something if he had reliable friends there, and if these had been able to secure information themselves. Whatever was learned, it was again impossible to communicate except to one's most trusted friends. Therefore, if in a community of several thousand people a few knew the truth about something like Hitler's purge of June 30, 1934, it does not follow that any others would learn it<sup>27</sup> and, therefore, if they voted in a plebiscite which was supposed to pass on this policy they did not know what they were passing upon.

The greatest difficulty of the opponents of a totalitarian régime consists in the utter impossibility of organizing their supporters. When in the fall of 1931 the present writer came to Rome and, in the blissful ignorance which characterized the majority of tourists, asked his Italian landlord whether there were any anti-Fascists, the reply, given with a sarcastic twinkle in the eye, was "Anti-Fascisti? Ce ne sono moltissimi, ma sono disbanditi"—"There are lots of anti-Fascists, but they are dispersed." These few words contain the secret of the success of totalitarian rule. The ruling group has a monopoly of organization. They can meet when and where they want, they have all the armaments they desire,<sup>28</sup> and they have another advantage of incalculable value: they have no inhibitions. They will do anything against any opponent,<sup>29</sup> whereas those who believe in the principle of democratic government are bound to have a moral sense which revolts from the use of such methods as those employed by a totalitarian régime. Gresham informed us that the bad money drives the good money out of the country—and in a dictatorship the bad people will drive the good ones out of the country, or into jail, or into death, or into silence.

<sup>27</sup> Duff Cooper in a lecture in South Bend, Indiana, delivered during the winter of 1939-40, rightly said that the question whether the German people approved of Hitler's policies or not was beside the point, because they did not know what those policies were. The realization of this obvious truth did not prevent the same speaker from asserting the opposite, and becoming one of the most vocal exponents of Vansittartism when he returned to London and assumed control of the Ministry of Information.

<sup>28</sup> This is particularly important at a time when the technique of warfare has developed so much that no one can win unless he has tanks and planes—and it is hardly possible for the anti-Hitlerites to put together makeshift tanks and planes and hide them in their cellars!

<sup>29</sup> Any of the numerous descriptions of the methods used in concentration camps will suffice to drive home this point.



In all three totalitarian countries this lack of inhibition on the part of the ruling minority has made it easy for them to prevent any effective organization of opponents. If, for example, a circular is distributed on behalf of a certain group, the secret police will arrest hundreds and, if necessary, thousands of the members or possible members of the particular group and beat them all up. Chances are that among this number there are some who know about the matter and that one will succumb and talk—after which the rest is an easy matter. Therefore, those who say that there is no opposition to the Nazis in Germany because there is no opposition that is organized for effective action, merely beg the question. Any totalitarian régime which would be unable to prevent the development of such an organized opposition would for that very reason be on the verge of collapse.

#### Unrest Under Dictatorship

DEPRIVED OF THEIR LEADERS, and of the knowledge of the truth, the great majority of the people in a totalitarian country are set adrift. Under certain conditions they may sincerely approve of the policies of their rulers, and in a greater number of cases they will persuade themselves that they do so, because it is better for their mental and physical health.<sup>30</sup> Dictators have been warned, however, since the times of Aristotle and of Machiavelli, not to interfere with their people's daily lives. Yet, it is in the essence of tyranny that this will be done to a greater or lesser extent. Dissatisfaction of the people may then become acute. Even if it has no effective way to express itself, it is there, and favorable circumstances may bring it to light. There is little doubt, for example, that the various measures which Hitler has taken against the Protestants as well as against the Catholics and the

<sup>30</sup> A case in point are such matters as the re-militarization of the Rhineland, which was described to the people of Germany only as an incident of a peaceful abolition of a discrimination directed against them. Similar considerations apply to the occupations of Austria and the Sudetenland. Recently one of the ablest members of the staff of *The New York Times* (H. Callender) referred to such facts as a proof of the militaristic character of the German population. Two considerations should be borne in mind, however: In the first place some of those people in Germany who are in favor of a democratic government expressed approval with these parts of Hitler's policy out of dissatisfaction with the democracies. If one is accused of "whining" every time a request is made for something by peaceful methods, and if then an advocate of violence like Hitler comes, helps himself to what he wants, and is encouraged either by the inaction or direct approval of the democracies, then it is rather difficult not to become disgusted. In the second place, if some Germans acted under a nationalistic impulse, they can well point to the feelings which have been expressed by Winston Churchill, who on Sept. 13, 1937, had this to say: "One may dislike Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement. If our country were defeated I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations." ("Step by Step," New York, 1939, pp. 143-4.)

Jews,<sup>31</sup> against the middle class people, the farmers, the businessmen—in short, against all except his own privileged followers—have turned popular feeling overwhelmingly against him. In the groups mentioned above (excepting, of course, the Jews, but only because Hitler excludes them since otherwise there would be Nazis of “non-Aryan” descent), there are numerous minorities that support the Nazis, either because they have received personal benefits, or because they are fanatics, or because they have identified themselves with Nazi policies to such an extent that they cannot turn back. But, according to all evidence, they do not add up to a majority of the population.<sup>32</sup>

If, therefore, we assign the direct and active guilt (were we to consider indirect and passive guilt, the democracies themselves would come in for a good deal of blame) for this war, we fix it where it belongs: upon the Nazi minority. The wielding of power by a small group is not confined to Germany. As William Henry Chamberlain put it, writing about Russia: “Because of the appalling concentration of power in the totalitarian state there has perhaps never been an age in human history when so few could inflict suffering on so many.”<sup>33</sup> And if, so far as the future is concerned, we look for a remedy, our purpose should be, as Josiah Phillips Quincy formulated it two generations ago, “The Protection of Majorities.”<sup>34</sup> Democratic majorities, when not exposed to the effects of the “psychology of the crowd,” are both humane and prudent; society is safe when under their control, but in grave danger immediately as soon as political power falls into the hands of an extremist minority group.

<sup>31</sup> No one has reported from Germany yet that such anti-Jewish measures as the “November action,” which formed such an eloquent postscript to the Munich conference, has brought Hitler any popularity among the non-Jewish population. There is positive evidence that the contrary reaction took place. See P. Hagen, “Will Germany Crack?” New York, 1942, pp. 220–1.

<sup>32</sup> It is interesting that S. Haffner, “Germany: Jekyll and Hyde,” New York, 1941, p. 77, places the number of *real* Nazis at 20 per cent of the population, taking as the criterion of Nazi allegiance the approval of the excesses against the Jews.

<sup>33</sup> “The Sources of Russia’s Strength,” *Harpers’ Magazine*, March, 1943, p. 402.

<sup>34</sup> See his book under this title, Boston, 1876.

## An Inter-American Pattern for War-Area Rehabilitation

By JOHN M. CLARK

IN THE SUMMER of 1942, a United States technical mission arrived in El Oro Province on the south coast of Ecuador to undertake a rehabilitation task. The province had been damaged in the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Normal economic life, already suffering from loss of foreign markets for cocoa and bananas, was disrupted during the fighting. A large part of the population, totalling around 40,000, had fled during the hostilities. In contrast with its name, which means gold in Spanish, El Oro had been through dark times. It was, in fact, the only task of rehabilitation involving a war-damaged area in the Western Hemisphere.

Now a year of rehabilitation work in the province is showing practical results. El Oro is rising from the disorder and despair of the conflict. The glow of a new era of work, reconstruction and good harvests have brought real meaning again to the name "El Oro." It is not a golden period of prosperity by any means. But El Oro is back on the road toward economic vitality. With the helping hand of a Good Neighbor and its own Ecuadorian Development Corporation, El Oro has recuperated substantially from the blows of the border quarrel and the economic disasters preceding the fighting in 1941.

The tangible evidence of the area's recuperation is plentiful today. For 1943 El Oro has a good cocoa crop, a record-breaking rice crop, fair yields of tobacco and coffee. These are the usual cash-yielding crops of the tropical lowland areas. The harvests of these are partly the result of the restoration of economic life since the settlement of the border dispute. It is revival in the old pattern of El Oro production.

But there is revival in a new pattern, too. This new pattern comes out of the rehabilitation work and the hemisphere trend toward increased production of tropical-grown materials formerly imported from outside the hemisphere. El Oro is swinging into new hemisphere production rhythms. The province is producing more food for local consumption. It is increasing for local use or for export the production of such strategic materials as fibers, vegetable oils, rubber, balsa wood. With this diversification of production, El Oro again hopefully looks forward to enjoyment of the fruits of a sounder economy.

## I

TO THE ORENSES, the practical benefits of the revival are becoming manifest. Cocoa, long the chief money crop of the area, now can be shipped in sacks woven locally from fibers grown on El Oro land which formerly produced nothing. Trails are being cut to the rubber-yielding forests of the uplands. And from the latex gathered locally, rubberized sheets are being made for hospital use in the province. Furniture built in local shops from El Oro lumber also goes into hospital equipment. Oil from innumerable palm trees is being collected for soap-making.

This increased self-reliance is timely. For El Oro, like many other areas in Latin America, is forced by war-time necessity, by the scarcity of shipping and difficulty of importing goods, to rely more on home-produced goods, on capacity to utilize local materials and local skills for the essentials of individual and community life.

The Orenses, moreover, are eating better. Demonstration farms and gardens established in the past year are showing the Orenses how to produce additional and nourishing food crops, such as soy beans and other vegetables. Superior breeds of livestock have been introduced. Small loans have been made available to help farmers get started. A tractor shows farmers what can be done with modern machinery. To travellers on the Machala-Pasaje Railroad, the white walls of a new demonstration farm symbolize El Oro's revival.

There are many other marks of this revival on the El Oro landscape. Buildings burned during the 1941 occupation of El Oro are being repaired or replaced. Hospitals and dispensaries are being overhauled and improved. A medical center is being built in Machala, the provincial capital and rail junction. Sewage disposal and water projects are improving sanitary conditions. Puerto Bolivar, gateway to the province, rests securely again behind a restored sea wall. Along the water front of Puerto Bolivar, 10,000 square meters have been filled in with oyster shells. This port improvement project illustrates how the economic revival of El Oro has spread its benefits. The oyster shells were brought in from nearby islands. With the proceeds of these hauls, fishermen were able to buy new canoes and gear. This, in turn, has increased the supply of fish. The revival in El Oro multiplies its benefits.

In miniature, the economic history of El Oro repeats a story familiar in other hemisphere tropical areas. El Oro is near the equatorial line, with cool mountains and hot plains, ranging to extreme aridity. Between the mangrove swamps on the coast and scenic grandeur of the Andes are

stretches of rich soil, capable of producing good yields of the traditional tropical crops—cocoa, bananas, sugar, coffee, tobacco. Once El Oro was in large part responsible for Ecuador's world-wide fame as a producer of excellent cocoa. But the witchbroom disease and the rise of cocoa plantations in other parts of the world sent Ecuador's cocoa industry into a decline. With this misfortune, El Oro learned the danger of over-specialization. Then came the culmination of the long-standing border dispute, erupting into hostilities in 1941.

When the Rio de Janeiro conference of American Foreign Ministers assembled in January, 1942, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the border conflict was one of the dissonant notes in the theme of inter-American harmony.

Pearl Harbor emphasized the menace of Axis aggression in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. For hemisphere defense, Ecuador, on the western bulge of South America, held a vital position. Besides holding a commanding position on the West Coast of South America, Ecuador owns the Galapagos islands, 500 miles west in the Pacific. These islands are part of the natural guardians of the Panama Canal. Fortunately for the Americas, Ecuador had a wholehearted desire to co-operate in defense of the hemisphere. Consequently, the settlement of the border dispute was one of the notable accomplishments at Rio. Joint frontier commissions were arranged to define the boundary.

Thus arose the hemisphere's first rehabilitation task in a war-damaged area during this world struggle. With millions of refugees uprooted in the war zones of Europe, Asia and Africa, the El Oro task was obscured in the shadow of overwhelming events abroad. Still the task in El Oro has been a constant reminder of the rehabilitation jobs which will come in the wake of the tornadoes of destruction in Europe, Asia and Africa. Almost unobserved by the world, El Oro has risen from the wreckage of the border dispute and, with a helping Good Neighbor hand, has received a strong start on the road toward a sound economy and higher living standards. This lesson of co-operation in the inter-American Good Neighbor spirit should not be lost in a world grouping for peace and economic stability.

## II

THE RECONSTRUCTION of El Oro began in March, 1942, soon after the settlement at Rio. Thousands of refugee Orenses were crowding back to their rural homes by boat and mule. They had lost or sold most of their possessions. They were hungry and many were sick. Obviously, the first job to be done was emergency relief. The refugees were returning to a

waste land. Livestock, tools and food supplies were gone. The railroad and power systems were crippled. Poor water supply, neglected houses, weed-choked streets increased the menace of typhoid, dysentery and malaria.

It was a task the returning Orenses and the government of Ecuador alone could not handle. So the United States, under its policy of inter-American collaboration, offered to assist. The offer was accepted. A mission was dispatched to El Oro.<sup>1</sup> Quinine, vaccines, sulfa drugs and other medical supplies were sent by air transport to the stricken area. Forty tons of rice, potatoes, beans, onions, evaporated milk and lard were bought and shipped from Guayaquil to feed the hungry. Soap and cooking utensils and more than 1,500 machetes, saws, shovels and axes also were shipped to the area.

Promptly, 500 men went to work as sanitary squads to clean the towns and check the danger of malaria. Gradually, economic life began to revive. The Orenses, backed by the Ecuadorian government, readily accepted their share of the rehabilitation work.

### III

AFTER THE EMERGENCY RELIEF, came the longer-range program. This necessitated an attack on fundamental problems: malnutrition, tropical disease, poor water supply, primitive and run-down communications, damaged houses, schools, hospitals and business facilities.

In collaboration with the Ecuadorian government, the United States mission drew up a program. It covered three principal sections: agriculture, public health and public works. Improvement of agriculture was necessary to feed the people and to provide cash income. Public works were needed to drain swamps, open roads, rebuild towns and provide better sanitation facilities. Public health required medicines, training of nurses and doctors.

For the main rehabilitation task, the Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs allotted \$500,000. A group of technicians was assembled as part of the United States contribution.<sup>2</sup> This mission was assigned to

<sup>1</sup> It was headed by Charles O'Neill, of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Also in the mission were Robert Nichols, an agriculturist, with tropical experience, and Henry Baker, dean of the American Red Cross disaster relief organization.

<sup>2</sup> This group included Allen Edwards, a West Pointer who organized relief of the Yellow River flood and famine in 1931-32 before business took him to Latin America; John Lassiter, with a long record of emergency relief services and administrative work in the Caribbean; Dr. Philip Ovalle, Colombia-born and Colombia-trained physician, who fashioned a second Gorgas miracle in an oil camp on the upper Magdalena; Lee Hunsinger, with thirty years of tropical experience as a banana engineer; Gardner Gantz, who learned his practical engineering in Peru and Venezuela; Angel Sandoval, Honduran-born graduate of New Mexico's agricultural school, who was recruited from the Soil Conservation Service; William Howard, tropical livestock specialist; Kalervo Oberg, anthropologist, who moved from the African veldt to apply rural economics in the Southwestern States; Angela Mc-



the newly-organized Ecuadorian Development Corporation, formed to develop the economy of Ecuador as a whole. One of the objectives of the technical mission from the start was to train the local people so they could carry on when the mission completed its work. Young Ecuadorians have been employed wherever possible in a combination of work and training. The program has been developed to make as little demand as possible for machinery and materials imported from the outside. This has been made necessary in part by the concentration of United States industry upon war work. At the same time, this policy has enabled the Orenses to gain experience and to observe what can be accomplished with materials at hand.

The El Oro work has enlisted the services of engineering students of the Guayaquil and Quito Universities, physicians and nurses, agricultural specialists, apprentices for administrative and other advanced tasks. On the labor payroll are more than 1,000 persons paid at a wage scale set by Ecuador's Department of Labor.

With the co-operation of the Ecuadorian government and under the broad program of the Ecuadorian Development Corporation, the mission has moved toward its goals in the field of agriculture—diversification of crops, subsistence farming, improvement of livestock, aid to small farmers through loans and demonstration of modern farming techniques. A 75-acre tract was acquired for a demonstration farm. This farm includes a model acclimation pavilion, poultry house, a dairy and an abattoir. Twenty-five acres have been planted with fodder. Seedlings are being produced for distribution to farmers. This project shows Orenses how they can grow profitably such crops as soy beans; barbasco, source of rotenone; and oil-bearing crops, such as sunflowers. Demonstration gardens have been established throughout the province to encourage growing of vegetables to improve diet.

Loans, ranging up to \$100, have been made to enable small farmers to get started. These loans are passed on by local committees. Many of the loans are being repaid out of the resulting production. Farmers are repaying in kind, returning birds for eggs, sucklings for sows.

Rubber is another illustration of how the Orenses get started. The forests of the uplands contain much natural wealth, including balsa wood and oil-bearing trees, in addition to rubber. The United States Rubber Development Corporation supplies machetes. These essential tools are

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Cutcheon, social worker of Uruguayan extraction, who had specialized in service among the Spanish-speaking groups in New York City; Isabel Needham and Helen Freeman, nurses, who learned their Spanish dealing with Spanish war casualties.

distributed to rubber tappers, to be paid for at the rate of 15 pounds of crude rubber for a machete.

Thus, with the loan of a tool, the Orense gets a start toward making his country yield its natural wealth for the new marketing opportunities which have risen since the years when cocoa alone meant gold to El Oro.

Among the newer crops, fiber-growing especially holds promise of economic returns for El Oro. The Americas use tremendous quantities of fibers, such as jute, sisal and hemp, for sacks, ropes, twine. Fiber needs for handling staple crops like coffee, cocoa and grain are enormous. Most of these fiber needs had been covered by imports from the Far East. Jute for bagging had come from India, manila hemp from the Philippines. Now, with the loss of imports from the Far East, this hemisphere finds it urgent to increase production of fibers.

And El Oro, recovering from her troubles, has fallen in step with the hemisphere swing toward increased production of fibers for home needs. Cabuya and other fiber plants grow wild in the province. Fibers can be cultivated readily.

To show what can be done, three demonstration plots have been planted with cabuya. Nurseries annexed to these demonstration plots have 175,000 seedlings for eventual distribution. Fibers have been introduced from Mexico and Colombia for experimental purposes. One objective is to demonstrate how arid land can be used for fiber cultivation.

Meanwhile, five decortivating plants have been established to process fiber. Wild cabuya will supply these until plantation growths come into production. At Santa Rosa a complete spinning and weaving factory has been installed. Indian fiber-weaving experts have been brought down from the mountains to teach the local people their craft. The factory has provided jobs for many persons, especially women. Some who started as apprentices are now working as skilled weavers and spinners. Young people from the Santa Rosa rural normal school have been given an opportunity to obtain practical experience in the factory.

#### IV

THESE BEGINNINGS make a base for larger-scale development of El Oro's fiber industry. After local needs have been covered, hemisphere markets offer ample outlets for whatever surplus El Oro can produce. This is the prospect, too, for El Oro's increasing production of rubber, oils and balsa wood. Ecuador is supplying rubber, balsa wood and quinine to the United States and is stepping up production. Reviving El Oro is contributing to

this flow of strategic materials. It is another instance of how inter-American co-operation pays off in practical terms.

More than 70 per cent of the population of El Oro depends upon the harvests from the chief agricultural crops. That is the big reason why good harvests of rice, cocoa, tobacco this year mean better times for the Orenses.

Another reason for the better times is that the rehabilitation work has facilitated the return to the land and to subsistence farming by many families through distribution of seed, tools, poultry, pigs, cattle.

El Oro livestock raisers are stocking pastures with beef cattle, some purchased with the help of private loans on recommendation of the technical mission. Prize livestock, including Ayreshires, Brown Swiss and Duroc-Jersey hogs, have been imported into the province. Some of these have been brought in by William Howard, the livestock expert, from Venezuela. Fine-breed poultry also have been acquired, some from as far away as Chile. These include Rhode Island Reds, Plymouth Rocks, Catalana Prats. Excellent varieties of ducks and turkeys have been introduced. These, along with the vegetables, mean better eating for the Orenses.

The rehabilitation work in El Oro province from the outset has been a unified program, ranging from immediate relief to basic work in food and health. The health work emphasizes reorganization and training. At Machala, a medical center is being built to provide surgical, obstetrical, pathological, isolation and training services. Malaria control involves a variety of projects for elimination of mosquito breeding places, general improvement of sanitary conditions.

In this work, Ecuadorians take keen interest. This was illustrated recently when a thirty-piece band, lent by the Carabineros of Guayaquil, spent a week in the province enlivening dances, parades and athletic contests given as benefits for a hospital fund. Committees representing local government, labor, churches, schools, farmers' and women's organizations provide leadership in community work. The small loan committees are points of co-operative contact between the technicians and the local people. Quick response from the Orenses has been forthcoming in projects for building trails and feeder roads.

This local interest is vital to the success of the rehabilitation program. For, in the long run, it is the Orenses themselves who must do most of the work, who must continue when the United States technicians depart. Much of the work will continue in the long run through the Ecuadorian Development Corporation. This corporation functions with the aid of a

\$5,000,000 credit of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. It has three representatives of the United States and three of Ecuador on its board of directors. Essentially this, too, is an Ecuadorian undertaking. Hence the stress on training to pass on skills, initiative and experience which specialists from the United States have brought to El Oro.

In this remote spot in the Western Hemisphere, so far removed from the battlefields of Europe and Africa, the Americas are learning useful lessons in the rehabilitation of a war-damaged area. Perhaps it is too soon to try to appraise the value of these lessons. The great rehabilitation tasks lie ahead after victory is won in the global struggle. The rehabilitation tasks of Europe and elsewhere will involve problems of far greater weight than those which have confronted the technical mission in El Oro. Nevertheless, the El Oro program shows what can be accomplished through co-operation. The revival in El Oro, small though it be in relation to great world problems, is a living example of what nations can achieve by working together for a common interest. El Oro, Ecuador, the United States and all the Americas are gainers by the change which has come over this erstwhile hemisphere sore spot.

## The Meaning of the Present Conflict

By T. SWANN HARDING

LIKE THE REST of the world we are engaged in the First Global War, but it is as difficult for us to understand the nature of the conflict as it was for the French and British to understand the Hundred Years War while it still raged. Broadly speaking, of course, the First Global War is an effort on the part of the world to attain a new and more stable power equilibrium. The last such equilibrium began to disintegrate with the past century itself.

The present struggle is but another phase of a conflict which may be said to have begun, if we must have a date, on March 31, 1905. On that day Kaiser Wilhelm II disembarked at Tangier, wearing the dazzling uniform of His Imperial Majesty's Cuirassiers. His presence declared to the world that Germany intended to intervene in the long-time Franco-British intrigues involving prostrate Morocco. Less accurately it may be said that a generation or two of war to attain a new power equilibrium began with the new century.

### A Revolt Against Technology

IN A VERY REAL SENSE this First Global War may be regarded as a revolt against science and the machines, though not exactly as Samuel Butler saw this in "Erewhon." It is, however, an unavoidable outbreak of violence caused by our world-wide misuse of scientific knowledge. We refused to use this knowledge to improve living standards for all people in the world and to enrich human culture. Instead we debased and exploited it to destructive ends. Ultimate explosion was inevitable.

As science progressed war became increasingly certain and destructive. Such progress has not yet gone far enough, however, to permit mankind to attain maximum slaughter and impoverishment, nor will it before this phase of the conflict ends. This phase of the Global War will probably continue until about 1945-46. It will then end, as did the 1914-18 phase, in a truce or armistice during which a new tug of power will occur.

The world's political equilibrium was challenged in 1905 by Germany because certain nations felt it did them scant justice. The equilibrium created after 1918 was innately unstable and bound to collapse. The same and other dissatisfied nations again challenged it and in 1931 the present phase of the conflict began with Japan's entry into Manchuria. Re-involvement of all important powers was preordained; it was only a matter of time.

The next truce will bring on a new tug of power operated through economic and diplomatic channels as was the case between 1918 and 1931. Finally the truce will be broken and that phase of the Global War, which may last a decade, will make the present phase seem like an Elk's picnic. However, it will be decisive.

For by that time the technology of destruction will have attained a perfection that will enable human beings to ravish every inhabited part of the world, efficiently practicing the scientifically-organized destruction of human life and property in every nook and cranny of the earth. Only this can bring a decision and open the way for a new equilibrium that may last two or three generations.

#### **An Inter-dependent World**

FOR IT WILL THEN DAWN upon human beings that science has made the world one, that political boundaries and sovereignties are obsolete, that world resources must be pooled and world trade must be free throughout. Only then will mankind be willing to co-operate peacefully on a global basis, using science for socially and economically constructive ends. Only then will humanity realize that if it does not do this science will destroy it and all its works.

It is true that the science of destroying human life and property has progressed rapidly and continues to progress even as we fight. But it can scarcely attain the intensity required to bring the human race to its senses during this phase of the Global War. It will scarcely be possible for human beings to wipe out life and all forms of military, residential, industrial, and cultural establishments in every part of the globe where they exist.

Furthermore, many people in the world are still under the dominance of peaceful psychology whereas even to survive we must become ruthless even as our enemies are ruthless. It is quite impossible to fight such a war as this in accordance with rules which would in part transform it into a polite interchange of diplomatic amenities. No cannon can be fired off a little at a time. We must all follow the Commando rule—Kill or be killed. Every civilian and every bit of property is fair game.

Because our humanitarianism makes us shrink from this unpleasant method of warfare we shall find it still difficult to fight our present enemies to stalemate. They are professionals. Their psychology is ruthlessly brutal. Pitted against them are what amount to amateurs, except for the Russians, still trying to preserve ordinary civilized deportment to some



small extent while seeking to conquer armed foes who have renounced civilization. It is salutary for us to face these realities.

### **The "Neutrality" of Science**

IN YEARS NOW GONE, science was bound to be used by someone. Since those who created science sought austerely to remain aloof from politics, economics, and sociology, the acquisitive and the predatory took it over to exploit it for financial gain or for imperialistic conquest. The entire machinery of production and consumption was deranged for price maintenance and to turn out arms and munitions. Incredibly uneconomic use was made of both human skill and natural resources.

Communities were accustomed gradually to get along with about half what their industrial and agricultural plants could have been producing, so that price, profits, and guns might be maintained. While the margin of safety was large, this irrational system somehow functioned; when it narrowed, catastrophe was inevitable. All the while intangible but well-protected boundary lines were distorting the natural growth of properly organized society based on machine technology.

The effort to force the tremendous wealth created by scientific knowledge into the framework of obsolete political and economic systems was bound to breed trouble. For no intelligent, systematic effort was made to reorganize world society so that science and technology might enrich civilization and promote the welfare of all peoples. Science meanwhile shrank the world, the distant continents and islands became adjacent, the earth was a physical unit.

At this point no great power could stand aside isolated when any two such powers got into a brawl. The United States since its establishment formed part of the European complex of power politics, as a reading of history demonstrates. For a long time now anything that has seriously affected any considerable community anywhere on earth has had ultimate repercussions throughout the world.

Moreover many parts of the earth which were formerly immune to the direct effects of a war involving their nationals now became part of the front line. Some, however, still remain too remote to be touched directly by war's horror. This will not be true in the next and final phase of the Global War which we may expect to begin in the 1950's.

### **The Maelstrom of Europe**

EUROPE'S ECONOMY became hopelessly unhinged in the process outlined above. Science had fostered there the growth of a tremendous population

far surpassing the soil's capacity to support it under the monopoly conditions prevailing. These hordes were artificially parceled off into sovereign States. Their very crowding nursed and inflamed the archaic animosities of the pre-machine age. Our restriction of immigration added to Europe's difficulties, for we had long channeled off the more disturbing elements.

The power of nations to assume world leadership rose and fell with their aptitude in adopting the latest advances in industrial and military technology. Europe could not reorganize itself on a rational, scientific plan; instead she accentuated nationalism and made war, decimation, squalor, and universal bankruptcy inevitable. In doing so she chose the path for the whole world. The individual leaders who rose and assumed command at opportune times were mere incidents in a prolonged and inevitable process.

Another factor was that science became too complex for the common run of humanity to comprehend as other than a new form of magic mysticism. Its esoteric nature bewildered many good people who therefore felt we should be better off if we renounced it and returned to natural simplicity. For the entire spirit, method, and attitude of science are alien to the genetic endowment of human beings.

The ascetic impersonality and rationalism of science made it and its practitioners suspect. Scientific thought is foreign to our customary human ways of thinking. It has been tolerated largely because it served the lucrative ends of those powerful enough to nurture it. The breakdown of monopoly capitalism in 1929 placed science squarely on the defensive.

#### Slaves to the Machine

LIKEWISE MACHINE TECHNOLOGY is alien to human biology. There has been wide revulsion not only against mechanistic thinking, but also against the geometrically adjusted routine of conduct imposed upon our life processes by technology and the machines. The very clock enslaves us.

At best the peoples of so-called civilized nations are equipped biologically to live in a condition of moderately advanced savagery. Our mechanical ingenuity has far outrun our capacity to make physical and psychic adjustments. In recent years, living with science and the machines has been accompanied by a tremendous increase in nervous and mental disorders. It has produced acute psychic fatigue, feverish but unco-ordinated activity, and widespread unrest.

When monopoly capitalism wavered all this came to the surface. When the private enterprise and price system proved incapable of performing the

minimum social and economic obligations it had assumed, real trouble began. In its broad effects upon the mental health and well-being of man, science and the machine technology it created had been as untoward as would have been the removal of the human race to some unsuitable climate. Not all our medicine and hygiene could undo the ill-effects of man's machine-made environment.

These things make wars inevitable. It is just as inevitable that some ruthless group will rise in revolt against what it regards as the unnecessary complexity of knowledge and civilization and will seek to turn back the clock by the most brutal means. Unfortunately for our side we had retained the traditional ideas and thought patterns that were suitable in an age of physical isolation before steam and electricity and the gasoline motor bound the world together. We had much to unlearn, and quickly, if we were merely to survive.

#### **Government by the Cartels**

BOTH OUR RESEARCH and our industry were disarticulated from our economy and our culture. Though the function of industry is community service, properly subordinated to democratic government, our industry refused service when it wished, otherwise provided it at high prices, and demanded that it at least be co-ordinate with, if not superior to, the State. Indeed, through international cartels, it had a more potent hand in our foreign affairs than the Government.

Because scientific knowledge and the scientists were wholly subservient to industrial barons under monopoly capitalism, no ethical code was developed to control the social use of scientific and technical knowledge. Thus a certain fatalism was created by our anarchical use of science and the machine. The malady of the modern world was deep-seated. Insane concentrations of power and monstrous industrial and political superstates began to appear.

Thus was human personality warped and disintegrated by our modern machine environment, as Thorstein Veblen predicted many years ago. Life was forced into artificial compartments and unco-ordinated segments and living as a whole became impossible. Each worker used but tiny fragments of his muscles, nerves, and brain. The entire biological pattern of our lives was deranged by the environment and a sort of futile desperation or aimless irritability was generated which could find relief only in dictatorship or in war.

### Can Humankind Survive?

THE NEWER DESPOTISMS did appear to release new fountains of energy in many dispirited peoples too, but directed these energies to persecution and conquest. The Global War is being fought to solve the question of whether man can survive in his mechanized environment without becoming dehumanized. Democracy must learn how to revitalize human life in a machine civilization. It must learn how to release energy now wasted and direct it to humane, cultural, and constructive objectives. But first it must fight ruthlessly for mere survival.

The idea that we could be isolated from this war was pure American moonshine. Technological progress had involved us from the first. We were involved in the struggle more than we knew it even before 1914-18. We belonged to the world complex of nations which distorted science had woven into a rough and disorderly texture. Our participation in the Global War was as foreordained as our undeclared war with France in the 1790's or our war against the Tripoli pirates under Jefferson in 1805. Even our war with England in 1812 showed that we knew we were part of the world complex of nations.

Certainly we could not exercise free choice about re-entering the phase of the Global War which began in September 1939. We could determine only the nature, extent and, in part, the timing of our participation. Our isolationists and interventionists were equally blind and misguided, though our President saw the world picture clearly as early as October 1937, and perhaps still earlier. We immediately took note of the fact that the Global War had flamed again when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, though Britain ill-understood this.

We formally re-entered the Global War by way of the President's declaration of intent before Congress on May 16, 1940. The shock of Pearl Harbor merely served to awaken many who still slept in fancied security and actual ignorance of world affairs. It is true that this phase of the war initially resembled earlier nationalistic wars with which history had familiarized us. Even the 1914-18 phase of this war retained its traditional complexion until the Russian revolution.

### The Lesson of 1918

THE ARMISTICE of 1918 was signed because the opponents were temporarily exhausted. There was no winner. While the Allies appeared to have the physical power to take Germany over they clearly lacked the psychological drive to do so. Germany had protected her homeland from invasion

and destruction but she could go no further. New materials must be accumulated, new equipment invented and manufactured, new political and economic ideas fostered, for continuance.

Soon revolutionary movements brought forms of dictatorship to most of Europe. Hostile economic and political moves became increasingly ominous. Violence reappeared in China and in Ethiopia, and in the Spanish war the global conflict definitely assumed the character of world revolution. The nature of the Global War bewildered us only insofar as we tried to think of it in obsolete imperialistic and nationalistic terms.

Huge blocs of nations now oppose one another to determine what the nature of the new order shall be. The peoples of Europe cannot be expected to co-operate with Germany in making her New Order operative, for it would reduce Europe outside Germany to peasant status at low living standards. Force and brutality would have to be used to maintain the system. It would bring a measure of economic stability, and everybody wants that, but the Nazi brand of the article would be pretty poisonous.

#### **Economic Bases of World Order**

ANY SUCCESSFUL NEW ORDER must create new ties and new loyalties. It must somehow combine the maximum in individual liberty with the authority and discipline necessary for cohesion. If civilization is to survive, the artificial barriers between the nations must be erased, there must be world-wide freedom of trade and pooling of resources, industry and agriculture must be redistributed, and geared to produce a good living for all peoples everywhere and somewhere there must be scientific centralized control administered democratically.

Freedom from want is now a physical possibility for all mankind. But the common people of the world are today in revolt against a system that has not properly used the machine and thus has failed to supply a fair and equitable distribution of sufficient of the world's goods. Will the machines be slaves or master?

Democratic government must develop appropriate instruments to prevent the future expansion of industry without regard to social needs. It must learn so to control the use of industrial equipment and processes that the public welfare will be served first. This involves the right to call private enterprise to sharp account for acquisitiveness, inefficiency, predation, or indifference to public needs.

The mere gainful manipulation of property, heedless of social needs and consequences, must be ended. Scientific knowledge is in reality our human

heritage, our common possession. Our entire world economy should be organized under an international plan formulated by statesmen of all nations with expert advice. Industrially and agriculturally competent peoples everywhere should have ready access to necessary raw materials and to good arable land.

#### A Long Struggle Ahead

ONLY THUS can we effect the abatement of cyclic world crises of ever-increasing ferocity. But, humanity being what it is, we should be very sanguine to expect the dawn of any such order immediately after this phase of the First Global War. For the necessary degree of fright, squalor, and exhaustion will scarcely be achieved throughout the world by then. We probably shall still refuse to face facts. Until we do face them, the struggle must continue in one way or another.

There may be armistices, truces, and stalemates. There may be unexpected changes in composition of the conflicting blocs of nations. Hostilities may proceed now by diplomatic and economic and now by military means. But the difficulty must be resolved by fighting to a finish. No bloc and no nation will win in the traditional sense, however, for the war is far too big for that.

In the immediate future we must learn to be as hard as our enemies are ruthless. We must learn to accept hunger, toil, and sacrifice. We must co-operate with our allies to the fullest extent, regardless of our doubts about their sincerity, their religion, their political ideologies, their plans for the future, and their possible animosity towards us. They aid in killing our enemies and in destroying their property. That is enough. It seals the bond.

But, right now, we must also start planning the steps we must take after this phase of the conflict ends. Undoubtedly new power alignments will occur, new blocs of nations, new unions. We cannot afford the traditional luxury of isolation. We must pick the best possible friends, just as Britain has done for many generations, and gird ourselves for the final phase of the First Global War which should blast every part of the earth. For then the instruments for the organized destruction of human life and property should be well perfected.

Then no part of the globe should be unharried by the struggle. For only when humanity has been blasted, starved, frightened and despoiled to the utmost can we hope that it will come to its senses and resolve, at least for two or three generations, to act in rational world-wide co-operation.



Then, at least for a little while, we can expect the enrichment of human culture and an era of peace and plenty.

That this will last many generations we may well doubt. For new aggressors always arise and new world power equilibria become necessary. Mankind varies little through the ages and appears to remain permanently in a state of slightly advanced savagery. Fortunately science looks to an end of the comedy.

Though all men are enemies, they ironically inhabit a small planet that has cosmic enemies of its own. In time it is destined, as a charred cinder, to revolve helplessly around this or some greater sun for the shocking eons of eternity. And mankind and all his works will have vanished. Time and the great fire will have consumed them. And the universe will be exactly as it was had this curious animal never appeared in one of its remoter and less important communities.

## The New Institute of World Affairs

TO CONTRIBUTE to a diagnosis of the present state of world affairs will be the primary task of the new Institute of World Affairs, 66 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Our work is to center in collective research of fundamental trends with special regard to social controls on the international level, and to the dominant forces, material and spiritual, as they foster or impede the establishment of permanent world order. Here the sociologist joins hands with the economist and both are to integrate their findings with those of the political scientist and the moral philosopher.

The research program for the initial activity of the Institute is now being shaped. Blockade and occupation have brought about an artificial unity of the territory between the channel and the Russian border. Though there is little doubt that the victory of the Allies is going to restore the former sovereignties at least of the United Nations in this area, reconstruction will succeed only if the continental countries can agree to a much higher degree of political and economic co-operation. Whatever the economic fate of Germany, neither the occupation of her territory nor her ultimate reception in the European family of nations can be made effective without supranational arrangements. Therefore the project on "Germany's Position in European Post-War Reconstruction," in which the Institute is now engaged, leads not only into the core of the political and economic but also of the psychological and cultural problems of post-war Europe as a whole.

In the Western hemisphere, supranational collaboration is primarily a question of improved communications, capital investment and trade policy. Under the heading—"Practical Co-operation in the Western Hemisphere"—these problems are to be subjected to detailed analysis. Another project in this series is concerned with "Recent Technological Trends and their Effects on the Flexibility of Labor." A comprehensive investigation is planned dealing with the effect of full employment on international trade and international capital movements. The planning devices of the Western countries are the subjects of two new projects, one dealing with "Comparative Government," the other with "Comparative Administration."

The Institute is aware that the success of its program depends on the co-operation which it hopes to obtain from the leading social scientists in this country and from other American research institutions working in the same fields of world affairs.

ADOLPH LOWE

## The Unanimity of Moralists on the Peace

By DONALD A. MACLEAN

A GROUP of outstanding religious leaders in the United States, including Bishop Henry St. George Tucker, president of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America; Archbishop Edward Mooney, chairman of the administrative board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference; and Rabbi Israel Goldstein, president of the Synagogue Council, issued on Oct. 7, 1943, a statement defining what they believed to be the basic moral principles of a just peace.

The principles outlined in this joint statement are as follows:

1. The moral law must govern world order. The organization of a just peace depends upon practical recognition of the fact that not only individuals but nations, states and international society are subject to the sovereignty of God and to the moral law which comes from God.

2. The rights of the individual must be assured. The dignity of the human person as the image of God must be set forth in all its essential implications in an international declaration of rights and be vindicated by the positive action of national governments and international organization. States as well as individuals must repudiate racial, religious, or other discrimination in violation of those rights.

3. The rights of oppressed, weak, or colonial peoples must be protected. The rights of all peoples, large and small, subject to the good of the organized world community, must be safeguarded within the framework of collective security. The progress of undeveloped, colonial, or oppressed peoples toward political responsibility must be the subject of international concern.

4. The rights of minorities must be secured. National governments and international organization must respect and guarantee the rights of ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities to economic livelihood, to equal opportunity for educational and cultural development, and to political equality.

5. International institutions to maintain peace with justice must be organized. An enduring peace requires the organization of international institutions which will (a) develop a body of international law, (b) guarantee the faithful fulfillment of international obligations, and revise them when necessary, (c) assure collective security by drastic limitation and continuing control of armaments, compulsory arbitration and adjudication of controversies, and the use when necessary of adequate sanctions to enforce the law.

6. International economic cooperation must be developed. International economic collaboration to assist all states to provide an adequate standard

of living for their citizens must replace the present economic monopoly and exploitation of natural resources by privileged groups and states.

7. A just social order within each state must be achieved. Since the harmony and well being of the world community are intimately bound up with the internal equilibrium and social order of the individual states, steps must be taken to provide for the security of the family, the collaboration of all groups and classes in the interest of the common good, a standard of living adequate for self-development and family life, decent conditions of work, and participation by labor in decisions affecting its welfare.

This statement, embodying minimum basic requirements for an enduring world peace, has rightly been hailed as a history-making document. It affords a beacon-light as well as a moral and juridical basis for a fundamental solution of the most vital and momentous problems that have beset world leaders and nations throughout the ages.

In Great Britain, the principal Christian bodies through their recognized leaders—Cardinal Hinsley, the Anglican Archbishops of York and Canterbury and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council—in a joint letter to *The Times* of London, Dec. 21, 1940, have been forward in expressing their agreement with the earlier statement of Pius XII on these moral prerequisites for world peace. Subsequent endorsement, by the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, of the joint statement of the British Christian leaders, reflects this general acceptance, throughout the English-speaking world. Needless to say, many hundreds of millions outside Great Britain and the United States, even within Germany itself, will readily and wholeheartedly subscribe to such basic foundations for universal peace.

But the concerted publication of these moral and juridic principles will in reality constitute an important stage in building world peace only if they are accorded hearty acceptance by our statesmen, our political leaders and above all by those who are to participate in negotiating and planning for our future world order. Mere military victory over the forces of Fascism and Nazism will be but barren gain if the triumph of moral and religious principles be not assured thereby. Besides, the winning of peace necessitates post war conquests and sacrifices no less onerous than those involved in the triumph of victory on the world's many battlefronts. Conquest over destructive social and political ideals is of paramount importance. The primacy of right over might in the regulation of national as well as of international affairs is vital to the welfare of mankind.

Through the repudiation of the above basic moral and religious principles during the peace conferences of World War I, the peace of mankind was sacrificed, after a "war to end all wars," in spite of our military

triumph. Because the architects to whom we entrusted the building of world peace suffered from spiritual myopia they failed to recognize the moral pernicious anemia with which extreme nationalisms were insidiously undermining both national and international societies. The development of totalitarianisms signalized the challenge of the dominance of might over right as a paramount world philosophy.

The Atlantic Charter and the Moscow Agreements of themselves afford little promise of a world peace, fundamentally different from the counterfeited peace which concluded World War I. Therein were sown the seeds of our present catastrophe. The explicit repudiation of fundamental religious and moral principles as essential guides for international life constitutes one of the major tragedies of history. Repetition of this fatal mistake must be guarded against at all costs. The existence of many manifest unchecked tendencies indicate that the world today is not free from the danger of a recurrence of such a catastrophe.

Refusal or failure to acknowledge our dependence on God's sovereignty and His universal law sets the world on an inevitable drift towards chaos. Thereby are undermined the very foundations on which rest the ideals of the brotherhood of man, human solidarity and world peace. Supremacy of the doctrines of absolute sovereignty, power politics, national interests, neutrality and splendid isolation, balance of power, world revolution and "a classless society," finds no place in a world order under God. Only basic religious and moral principles can afford effective inoculation against a general recrudescence of totalitarian barbarism. Bereft of that saving remedy even victorious democracies will inevitably succumb to this deadly infection.

The great task of creating a new world order guaranteeing real liberty, peace and prosperity for all peoples will remain but a dream until men turn for sure guidance towards the Eternal Ruler, Who alone can guarantee them. As Marshal Jan C. Smuts recently stated we must "make up our minds that no false pride of nationhood, of isolated sovereignties, shall defeat the great hope and vision of a peaceful, ordered society." Sincere acceptance, by all peoples and particularly by world statesmen, of the above basic moral principles, indicated by basing concrete peace and reconstruction terms upon them, alone will effectively ensure the rebirth and growth of a new sense of social justice and comity among nations and at the same time provide a stable foundation upon which to construct a vital world peace.

### The Boom in Farm Land Values

ONCE AGAIN the nation is confronted with a farm land boom. Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, in a series of addresses in the midwest in November and December, 1943, pointed out that the speculative rise in farm land values "promises to be more extensive and more disastrous than the one which occurred during and after the last war." The boom of World War I all but wrecked American agriculture. As Mr. Wickard recalls, "since that boom nearly one-third of the farms in this country have gone through forced sale, usually because someone paid too much for his farm."

The situation is one that concerns the whole nation, not the farmers alone. The great depression of 1929 occurred from a complex of causes, but the agricultural depression in the United States which immediately preceded it played a part in producing the industrial crisis and was one of the chief reasons for the length and severity of the slump. Yet, though we have this lesson before us, we face the prospect of entering the post-war period on the heels of an even greater agricultural depression. Measures to avoid depression from the business side of the economy have yet to be fixed upon.

The extent of the current boom has been summarized by F. F. Hill in the November, 1943 issue of *Farm Economics*. The index of farm real estate values in the United States, he pointed out, rose from 103 in 1914 (1912-14 = 100) to a peak of 170 in 1920. It then declined for 13 consecutive years, reaching a low of 73 in 1933. Beginning in 1934, land values rose slowly until they reached an index of 85 in 1937, when they levelled off until 1942. Since 1942, values have increased rapidly. During the first four years of World War I, 1914 to 1918, land values in the United States increased from an index of 103 to an index of 129, or by 25 per cent. During the first four years of World War II, 1939 to July, 1943, they increased from an index of 84 to an index of 102, or by 21 per cent.

Although land values in the United States were at a lower level at the beginning of World War II, Hill noted, the percentage increase in values since the outbreak of war has been nearly as great as in the corresponding period of World War I. The average rate of increase during the past year was nearly one per cent a month, the highest on record outside the boom year 1919-20. The volume of voluntary sales has also been the highest since 1919-20.

WILL LISSNER



## The Development of a Scientific Attitude in Economics

By RICHARD W. LINDHOLM

TO PLACE ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS upon the importance for a modern democracy that it possess an electorate of economic literates is, perhaps, unnecessary. The indisputable trend of governmental activity toward increased control and initiative in economic matters requires in a democracy that the electorate be able to think intelligently upon economic problems. The general public must be economic literates not only in things concerned with the household economy but also in regard to the larger national and world economy.

The rôle of the American college course in economic principles assumes broodingnagian importance when it is realized that for most college graduates, the future moulders of American public opinion, it is in normal times the only guided economic training received; and also that it will be the economic ideas of the American electorate which will determine the economic policies of the American government, whose policies in turn, in the form of legislative and executive action, will influence to a large extent the economic programs pursued by the nations of the world. Certainly the assumption of this responsibility requires of the economics teacher a heedful self-examination and continual critical analysis of teaching methods and subject matter. For upon the principles of economics course, in the American democracy, has come to rest the obligation of making economic life, which can no longer operate under the guidance of the "invisible hand," function under the "visible hand" of social control, operating to a considerable extent through governmental activity.<sup>1</sup>

### I

THE CHICAGO UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE of 1909, which attempted to set down the aims of the college course in the principles of economics, attracted considerable attention and interest: it remains the most ambitious effort to formulate such aims.<sup>2</sup> Since 1909 the American Economic Association has used the principles course as the subject of a number of well attended round tables; research studies have been made regarding current procedures

<sup>1</sup> Adam Smith used the term "invisible hand" to mean the operations of the market place, which he thought provided the best possible determination of types of economic activity to be pursued within a nation.

<sup>2</sup> See *Journal of Political Economy*, 17 (1909), 676-706.

in use in the teaching of the course; and also numerous economists have presented in the journals their conception of the manner in which economic principles should be taught. The reports, summaries, and data resulting from these numerous attempts to indicate the aim of the economic principles course show that the course means a number of different things to various economists. The objectives, however, have not changed throughout the years; every new study and analysis has been merely an endeavor to clarify and substantiate previously expressed purposes. For this reason it is possible to analyze under four general indications of purpose the development that has taken place during the past thirty-four years in the formulation of the objectives of the principles of economics course. These aims are:

1. To provide training in mental discipline and thus to create the habit of logical thinking.
2. To re-establish the true economic principles formulated by the early nineteenth century economists.
3. To give the students some concrete facts relative to the manner in which the nation's economic life is conducted.
4. To explain various economic theories and relationships that pretend to describe and provide an understanding of various isolated economic phenomena.

The above goals are, however, secondary and are expressed and discussed because of their supposed efficiency in attaining the primary purpose, "good economic citizenship," and perhaps an increased proficiency in the specialized economic courses, and only incidentally because of their own desirability.<sup>3</sup>

The primary purpose of the study of economics has remained the same since the science's beginnings. Great changes, however, have taken place in the meanings attributed to the words "good economic citizenship." In the eighteenth century it was thought that "good economic citizenship" was attained simply by consuming as little as possible and producing as much as possible. Today no such simple formula is either useful or available. "Good economic citizenship" in the twentieth century requires of an individual that he not only conduct his own business affairs in a manner which maximizes income but also that he have concern for the social ex-

<sup>3</sup> For a further discussion of the aims of the principles course see *Education*, 59 (1939), especially the article by V. O. Watts, "Some Hurdles for the Economics Teacher"; and *The American Economic Review*, 16 (1925) (Supplement) 71, the article by Raymond T. Bye. The use of economic theory in advanced courses is discussed by Richard T. Ely, *Journal of Political Economy*, 18 (1910), 438; and by Frank A. Fetter, *American Economic Review*, 13 (1923), 248.

penses resulting from his activity; and that he have an ability to arrive at intelligent opinions regarding governmental economic activity.<sup>4</sup> It is upon their ability to create this portion of "good economic citizenship" that the four most constantly reiterated aims will be analyzed.

Necessarily, each of the above four objectives of the economic principles course are closely tied to the psychological concept of transfer or integration. Students of the process of learning have noted that there is a considerable variation in the completeness of transfer of various types of activities with which an individual has become acquainted. However, they agree rather completely that little transfer takes place unless the learned activities have become an integrated part of the individual's actual daily life. An activity to be transferred must appear to be meaningful at the original contact and also to be applicable to the new situation in which it is to be applied.<sup>5</sup> This psychological fact concerning the learning process is, of course, the principal weakness of any educational aim that is to be accomplished indirectly by the attainment of other subordinate abilities.

It shall not be the purpose of this discussion merely to analyze critically the *anima scripti* presented by teachers of the principles course; however, the fact that these notions receive frequent repetition as the basis of specifically given or assumed aims of the general course, makes necessary that they be considered in some detail in order to clear the table, as it were, for the presentation of aims that appear to be more fundamental and more possible of attainment.<sup>6</sup>

The idea that economics is in an extremely fortunate position because it is "taken as a discipline quite as much as a matter of useful information" is deeply imbedded in the thinking of many economics teachers. This justification must of necessity include the assumption that the habit of logical thinking is easily transferred to other fields and to economic problems encountered outside the classroom; actuality is just the reverse. Leaders in education have long known that logical reasoning is merely an inseparable part of human thinking upon subjects which are vitally connected to an

<sup>4</sup> It is, of course, with the second and third phases of economic citizenship that the principles course in economics is most closely associated.

<sup>5</sup> For a further discussion of transfer of learning see "Economy and Technique of Learning" by William F. Book, 1932, pp. 472-499; "How We Think" by John Dewey, 1933, pp. 23-24 and "Social Learning and Imitation" by Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, 1941, p. 131.

<sup>6</sup> To obtain numerous variations of the four aims given above as being those generally presented as the goals of the principles course in economics see "College Teaching," edited by Paul Klapper, 1920, pp. 217-221; "The Teaching of Introductory Economics in the Liberal Arts College" by Jesse S. Robinson, *Education*, 58 (1938), 225-8 and "Some Hurdles for the Economic Teacher" by V. O. Watts, *Education*, 59 (1939), 333 and *Journal of Political Economy*, article by A. B. Wolfe, 17 (1909), 676, 682.

individual's well-being. Thus all attempts to formulate in the student's mind an ability to think accurately upon a basis provided by unreal and "dry-as-dust" theory become a hopeless waste of time.

Economists have had considerable experience with the economic expostulations of scientists trained in various other fields. This experience would lend considerable verifying data to Dewey's well known statement that "logical attainment in one direction is no bar to extravagant conclusions in another." Yet, if the aim of a principles course taught to engineers, for example, is to be mental discipline, it is necessary that the mental training acquired in economics becomes an integrated part of the student's thought, and thus available for use in the solution of engineering problems.

## II

THE SECOND AIM mentioned, "the re-establishment of true economic principles," is of course fundamentally a position of older men.<sup>7</sup> It represents an inability to adjust thoughts and ideas to the conditions which have evolved since the acquiring of the particular mental set.

The possession of a mental set is considered so detrimental to effective teaching of economics that Professor A. B. Wolfe doubts if most men or women who had acquired their academic training more than ten years ago could be trusted to teach a course in elements.<sup>8</sup> Economics has been such a rapidly developing field of knowledge that it requires a tremendous effort for an individual to overcome the temptation to take the easy way out and assume that ideas and opinions he acquired a number of years ago represent the "true religion" and that all other ideas have resulted from following a false Messiah.

It is a gross violation of the basic concept of the scientific method to attempt to apply a solution determined by one set of conditions to a problem involving a quite different set of conditions. Yet that is exactly what an individual does when he attempts to apply a concept or law that was developed as a solution of economic problems which existed a number of years ago. It may be assumed that a solution hit upon by economists in the first part of the nineteenth century was correct in every detail; nevertheless, this does not justify the mechanical use of that analysis in the solution of a modern economic problem. A correct solution of a current problem can be obtained only after a careful study of the existing conditions has been completed by an expert capable of placing each fact in its correct

<sup>7</sup> See "Dynamic Economics Teaching" by Roger P. Bristol in *School and Society*, 36 (1932), 84-6.

<sup>8</sup> A. B. Wolfe, *Journal of Political Economics*, 28 (1920), 741.

causal relationship to every other fact. The expert will be aided in this study by the conclusions reached by other individuals who have worked on similar problems, but this will not require that the solution fit into a framework constructed of their results. This is true not only because the present problem exists under specific "spatio-temporal conditions" but also because the tools of analysis available to the modern student are keener and more suited to the work at hand than were those available to the older investigators. The belief in the idea that a certain group of facts and relationships express the only correct method of analysis leans dangerously close to the requirements necessary to maintain faith and religious fervor, which certainly has little place in the application of rigorous scientific procedures.

### III

THE THIRD AIM, "the presentation of concrete economic facts," has been urged as the method best able to give students, in a short period of time, an understanding of our economic system. The advocates of this aim, then, seem to assume that a knowledge of the method of selecting the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System will enable the student, at all times, to formulate an intelligent attitude toward the policies of the system and the general attitude of government and business toward the activity of banking interests. This, of course, is a wholly unwarranted assumption, and could not be seriously presented if any attempt had been made to analyze the manner in which the conclusion had developed from the original statement of recommendation.

Professor Frank A. Fetter has spoken of the acquiring of a number of concrete economic facts as the vocational aim of economic teaching. It is Fetter's opinion that such teaching has little place in a collegiate institution and should be relegated to the trade school. But if such a course were taught in a college it certainly "should be given by a vocational teacher rather than by a specialist in social or political economy."

The learning of concrete facts regarding the economic system is certainly a necessity; and if the student has no opportunity to acquire these facts other than that afforded by the principles course, it would appear that one method of attack would be to proselytize the principles course for this purpose. It must, however, be kept in mind that a course of this type furnishes little, if any, aid to the student in the solution of economic problems which might be faced in later life. "In a changing world the solution of today's problem does not forever remain a correct solution." The possession of concrete facts concerning the present economic institu-

tions is very apt in the future to mean remembering a mass of misinformation, with no ability to bring about the adjustment needed to meet the changed situation. It is very doubtful if an individual in this position is any better able to arrive at intelligent conclusions regarding current economic questions than would be an individual who had never taken the economic principles course.

## IV

THE FOURTH AIM, "to explain various economic theories concerned with particular segments of economic life,"<sup>9</sup> represents the aim that would be accepted, with assorted modifications, by most teachers of the principles course. This aim seems to be basic to most economic textbooks that pretend to present a well-rounded general course. It is considered advantageous because it introduces students to the established theory of the various specialized phases of economics, which in turn is supposed to aid the student in his later more particularized or advanced courses in the field. This basis of support is specious but appears to be largely fallacious. It is incorrect first, because by far the greater portion of the students taking the principles course do not continue with more advanced courses;<sup>10</sup> secondly, the grades of students taking advanced courses but who failed to take the elementary course appear to be as good as those of students who had previously successfully completed the elements course;<sup>11</sup> also, the aim possesses the weakness of all teaching aimed at indoctrinating a student with a particular logical framework into which the solution of all problems of a particular type must be fitted. The seriousness of this final shortcoming was vividly expressed by John Locke in the first of his famous typical forms of wrong belief.

The first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbors, ministers, or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for the saving of themselves the pains and troubles of thinking and examining for themselves.

This is certainly a vivid description of the type of thought encouraged by all attempts to indoctrinate students with fixed economic theories.

Another fundamental weakness of the principles course as a basis for future study of economics is discussed by educators when they speak of the difficulty an individual experiences in attempting to integrate a tech-

<sup>9</sup> See Roger P. Bristol, "Dynamic Economics Teaching," *School and Society*, 36 (1932), 85.

<sup>10</sup> See Harry G. Brainard, *Education*, June, 1942, p. 610.

<sup>11</sup> John Ise, *American Economic Review*, 12 (1922), 615.



nique learned in isolation. If it is accepted as a fact that learning is much more rapid if the technique is included as a part of the operation pattern of which it is to form a part, then the more rapid learning of a technique due to its inclusion within a meaningful pattern is the result of the creation of attitudes more favorable to the learning situation. John Dewey has named these attitudes "open-mindedness, wholehearted or absorbed interest, responsibility in facing consequences." The attempt to teach in the principles course the fundamentals of the various specialized branches of economics violates these laws of efficient learning.

"Good economic citizenship" is closely associated with the ability to arrive at intelligent decisions concerning the various methods advanced as solutions of current economic problems. The ability to do this requires accurate economic thinking. Certainly it is impossible for one to think accurately about economic problems unless one first obtains a proficiency in the method of analysis required to obtain logical solutions of social problems. The above three sentences appear to state an indisputable truth so obvious that it should be accepted without further discussion. Its acceptance as the chief aim of the principles course, however, would require a radical change in the conventional procedures. Yet it would appear that unless the principles course was aimed definitely at the acquiring of proficiency in the solution of social problems it was not being taught in the manner that would achieve most efficiently the course's avowed fundamental aim.

It is, of course, quite possible to agree that efficiency in the solution of social problems is the chief aim of the principles course and yet, because of differences in point of view in regard to the best manner to solve social problems, be in complete disagreement as to the way in which the course should be taught. However, if discussion of the economic principles course were to become centered about the most efficient method of teaching students to become "good economic citizens," it would be a healthy and commendable development. The presentation of such an analysis is the principal aim of this study.<sup>12</sup>

#### V

THE FOUR AIMS of a principles course frequently mentioned by economists as an efficient method of acquiring an ability to solve economic problems were most severely criticized because of their inefficiency as aids to the

<sup>12</sup> See *Journal of Political Economy*, 34 (1936), 745-771, article by Rudolph Peterson, for discussion of attempts at the University of Iowa to measure growth of ability to reason intelligently upon economic problems of a public nature.

development of healthy thought habits. Certainly this criticism is fundamental. Efficient problem solution is impossible unless individuals possess the ability to think independently and accurately.<sup>13</sup>

Writers in the field of education and psychology have developed methods which, if followed, lead toward effective thought habits. These principles have become fairly well established. It would seem that the burden of proof certainly falls upon the individual who claims to be developing effective thought habits through the use of methods fundamentally at variance with those advocated by experts in the field of teaching and learning processes.

To learn to think is to make the mind an efficient apparatus. The ability to think should not be considered as a faculty but rather the "organization of materials and activities." Therefore the problem of teaching an individual to think is indirect and cannot be the subject of intensive drill. Psychologists are agreed that the mind cannot be taught to think by repeated exercise in the manner that a muscle can be made to lift. Rather the problem of creating desirable habits of thought is the problem of creating and guiding curiosity and of making connections that will at a later time "promote the flow of suggestions." It also requires the setting up of a problem "that will favor consecutiveness in the succession of ideas."

The ability to think in one field or on one subject does not include the ability to do so in other fields. However, it should be emphasized that the ease of transfer is dependent upon the number of elements common to the two situations under consideration. Thinking is to a large extent the ability to grasp common elements of a particular situation. Therefore if a person has really learned to think in a particular field he has many more elements that can be transferred than would a person who had not acquired the habit of thinking. If no thinking had occurred in the particular field of specialty, transfer would be impossible. It follows from this fact that those elements of the thinking process that are most intimately connected with daily activities are also those which are most readily transferred. This would be true because of the larger number of common elements. (This fact regarding thought processes is perhaps also a partial explanation of the inability of certain technical experts to think accurately in fields outside their specialty. The same fact in regard to transferability of effective thinking should make the general economist a man of great wisdom.)

Economic teaching of the type that will develop thinking must be much

<sup>13</sup> For a complete discussion of the effect of social institutions upon individual thought, see "Ideology and Utopia" by Karl Mannheim (1940).

more than the presentation of an elaborate logical structure, and it, of course, must be much more than the presentation of concrete facts concerning the nation's economic institutions. Economic teaching of the type that will develop the student's ability to think must excite student questions. Then the teacher with the aid of the students must be able, through the use of facts and previous thought concerning the problem, to develop a solution that possesses a strong logical framework which can in turn be used at various other times to aid in the solution of other questions that may be raised. Teaching of this type calls for a particularly well trained instructor.<sup>14</sup> He must possess a very wide and flexible knowledge of the subject, which will enable him to select the portions needed at the times when they are required. The set lecture or the predetermined economic problem is definitely *not* the type of teaching which most efficiently develops the ability to think. The acquiring of the ability to think will be lessened also in direct proportion to the instructor's inability to organize the material in a manner which promotes consistency and consecutiveness of ideas.

Economics, in relation to modern concepts of the thought process, has maintained its place as a subject possessing many assets of a vehicle suitable for teaching students to think. These assets are not, however, its possession of many set logical exercises. Rather the assets consist of the great student interest in the field in addition to the many elements of the study that have a definite relationship to everyday living. The first factor determines a situation which makes thought possible and the second assures a large quantity of integration or transfer.

Life in the machine age has brought about not only the need for increased thinking but also for increased accuracy of thought in all types of human activity.<sup>15</sup> This need is vital and has been largely met in the field of the natural sciences; it has resulted primarily from the field's more active conditioning. In the field of the social sciences, however, accurate thinking has developed much more slowly. Yet certainly if man is to survive, his social thinking "can no longer wander in a dim atmosphere of pure idealism,"<sup>16</sup> but must become accurately adjusted to existing conditions.

<sup>14</sup> For a further discussion of the need for well trained economics principles instructors, see Broadus Mitchell, *American Economic Review*, 30 (1940), 343; *Journal of Political Economy*, 25 (1917), 66, article by Dexter S. Kimball; *Education*, 58 (1938), 228, article by Jesse S. Robinson.

<sup>15</sup> James Harvey Robinson, "The Mind in the Making," 1921, p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> Joshua Rosett, "The Mechanism of Thought, Imagery, and Hallucination," 1939, p. 7.

## VI

IT IS CONSIDERED by some (perhaps a few mathematical economists would be included in this category) that the method of accurate thinking which is applicable to the social sciences should be only slightly different from that which is useful in the natural sciences.<sup>17</sup> If this is true our problem becomes greatly simplified. However, the very fact that accuracy of social science thinking has not advanced alongside the natural science development suggests a search for certain fundamental differences.

These differences are not difficult to find and may be summarized as follows:

1. In the social sciences gross observation is thought to be sufficiently accurate to determine the nature of difficulty.
2. Social difficulties tend to be considered in moral terms.
3. Social science investigators use evaluative procedures based upon ends that ought to be.
4. The belief that the end justifies the means is firmly fixed in social thought.
5. The general belief that social facts are all there and merely need to be observed to arrive at a correct solution.
6. The general belief that a social study is scientific merely because statistical methods have been used.
7. Social investigation must be limited to problems which have grown out of an existing social environment.
8. A social problem under study is not fixed, but constantly changing.
9. Social problems must be considered in relation to the flow of history.
10. The belief in social conceptions which are regarded as truths is to be accepted without question.
11. The division of social science into little compartments which have little or no logical basis.
12. The practical difficulties that inhibit social experimentation.
13. Due to the complexity of the interweaving it is very easy for the social scientist to gather statistics without understanding their connection or consequences.

The above peculiarities of social activity must become an integrated part of all consideration of social problems. This fact requires a considerable modification of the scientific method of thought which has been developed for the solution of the problems of the natural sciences. However, the unique conditions applying to the social sciences do not require a change of the fundamentals of scientific research.

In order to think intelligently upon social problems it is necessary first of all that the problem be carefully defined. It is at this point that social

<sup>17</sup> See Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 166, for a brief analysis of the method of attaining social truth and understanding; also Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

analysis is most apt to be weak. It is here, at the beginning, that the social scientist wanders the furthest from the scientific method as developed in the natural sciences. For purposes of research it cannot be assumed that an understanding of social problems is something of common knowledge. If this is done, the application of a remedy takes on the scientific character of a radio expert fixing a radio without first testing the various tubes and circuits.

To be able to set up an economic problem sufficiently restricted and concrete to permit the application of the scientific procedures of careful delineation is perhaps the most difficult job of a teacher in economics who attempts to teach students in the application of the scientific method; it is also the most difficult task of an expert in economics research. It is perhaps best that the problems chosen for study be of a local nature, which makes possible an intimate understanding, a necessary prerequisite for the analytical observation required to resolve a social situation into a definite problem.<sup>18</sup> When a limited problem of this type has been established, the economist must not permit futility to pervade his thoughts as a result of the tremendously complicated way in which the particular problem is woven into the matrix of the social environment. (This complicated interweaving is largely responsible for the relative backwardness of social thought.) This does not falsify the usefulness of the scientific method in the solution of social problems; it merely means that the results obtained are more apt to be plural, therefore requiring further testing, application, and experimentation.

The abolition of ends is the second great hurdle that must be overcome to obtain accurate thought concerning economic situations. The conceptual approach is very old and very strong in all social thought and especially so in the field of economics. The concept of Natural Law is fundamental to the understanding of classical economic thought and still exists in "the doctrine of an intrinsic hierarchy of fixed values."<sup>19</sup> Yet all belief in *a priori* necessary truths must be completely destroyed before accurate economic thought can be possible.

If the end of economic inquiry is determined as the "greatest satisfaction for the greatest number" the study takes on attributes similar to religion (which has salvation as its end). If economics is actually of this nature, the experimental method is completely out of place and faith

<sup>18</sup> For a further discussion of laboratory work in the social sciences, see L. C. Marshall, R. C. Chapin, and F. R. Fairchild's report in *Journal of Political Economy*, 19 (1911), 776-777. See also Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> John Dewey, "Logic the Theory of Inquiry," 1938, p. 504.

should be substituted. However, experience in the solution of economic situations has been sufficiently frequent to warrant the conviction that economic difficulties may be isolated, and social conflicts reduced as the result of hypotheses and conclusions that grow out of the use of the experimental method. Because this is true, the term science is correctly applied when speaking of economics and the other fields of social analysis. Scientific research has no end towards which it is striving but rather each result of a particular study becomes the means of arriving at additional conclusions, which yet again become the means for additional conclusions; the means-end continuum. This scientific attitude regarding ends must be accepted before accurate economic thought is possible.

If the requirements of eliminating economic ends and strict definition of economic problems are fully understood, the other difficulties of economic research will be correctly attacked and solved by the economics student, and the ordinary college-trained adult will practice intelligent citizenship in considering social questions. Intelligent action in any field must be prefaced by activity aimed at the application of correct methods of thought to the problems of the study. In the field of economics the principles course certainly appears to be the place where such training in thought should be carried out. If this is accepted, the next step is to attempt to develop the means which will be most effective in bringing about good thought habits. The brief scheme developed in this study has the approval of the weight of expert opinion but it certainly is not final and further experimentation regarding thought and learning processes may lead to more effective methods. The point is, however, that if the purpose of the principles course is intelligent thought upon economic problems by the ordinary citizen and the research expert, then the course should be taught in a manner that aims directly at this purpose, rather than in a traditional way which takes in, through the side door, the avowed purpose for offering the course.



# Henry George: The Fight for Irish Freedom\*

By ANNA GEORGE DE MILLE

## 1

### The 'Land Question'

IN 1879, THE LAND question in Ireland was a burning topic of the day. The Irish peasants, oppressed by their landlords, most of whom were absentee, were suffering eviction as well as poverty almost to the point of starvation. The Irish National Land League had been formed to "bring about a reduction of rack rents." During that same year Henry George had written an article on the situation which had been published in *The Bee* of Sacramento. Rack rent he had explained as "simply a rent fixed by competition at short intervals. . . . In our agricultural districts, land is rented from season to season to the highest bidder. This is what in Ireland is called rack-rent."<sup>1</sup>

Charles Stewart Parnell, with a background of English conservatism, was president of the League. But it was one of the honorary secretaries, Michael Davitt, who seemed to be the soul of the organization. He proclaimed the principle of "the land for the people." Released after having served seven years in Portland Prison, England, for his adherence to the cause of Irish independence, he visited New York in the summer of 1880. There he met Henry George and read "Progress and Poverty" with an enthusiasm that led him to pledge the Land League to push the book in Great Britain.

George, deeply stirred by the situation in Ireland, started to write an article on the subject for *Appleton's Journal*, but the work grew under his pen until it became a small book of seventeen chapters. He called it "The Irish Land Question: What It Involves And How It Can Be Settled." In it he showed that in order to relieve Ireland of the horror of rack-renting and to give the benefits of their labor to the Irish people, it was necessary to take the annual rental value of the land alone for community needs, using the new source of revenue to relieve industry and thrift from taxation. Under such a system the laborer would get what he created; no one would have an advantage as a mere landholder. And even though the owner of the land be an Englishman living in England, the value of the land of Ireland would accrue to the Irish people as a whole.

\* Copyright, 1944, by Anna George de Mille. A section of a previously unpublished study, "Citizen of the World"; see *AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO.*, 1, 3 (April, 1942), p. 283 n.

<sup>1</sup> Dec. 21, 1879; ("Written for the Christmas *Bee*"), Henry George Collection, New York Public Library (hereafter abbreviated as HGC), Scrapbook No. 5, TIQB.

Early in March, D. Appleton & Co. published the little book. George sent a post card to Taylor, reporting, "First edition exhausted the first day and not enough to fill orders that have already come in."<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards, editions were printed in London, Manchester and Glasgow. It had splendid reviews everywhere. That in *The New York Times*—a column and a half of small type—began:

One rises from a reading of this weighty pamphlet with a conviction of the justice of the theory advocated and with admiration for the clearness with which it is stated by Mr. Henry George. He had the advantage of having got rid in "Progress and Poverty"—a masterly book on the reasons for the spread of pauperism in the modern social fabric—of most of the prejudices which beset writers on similar topics.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile George's family had left San Francisco and had joined him. They were boarding at Fort Washington, at the northern end of Manhattan Island. Living there afforded a quiet place for work and yet easy access to the center of the city. George's financial burden was lightening: there was a demand for magazine and encyclopedia articles and for his lectures. He made \$130 when he spoke in Chickering Hall. Rev. R. Heber Newton, his classmate of Philadelphia day school and Sunday school days, and now rector of All-Souls Episcopal Church, New York, presided. A Brooklyn lecture, arranged by Andrew McLean of *The Brooklyn Eagle*, netted George \$200. On this occasion, the corporation lawyer, Thomas G. Shearman, friend and attorney of Henry Ward Beecher, was present. It was the beginning of Shearman's dedication to the cause George stood for. Indeed, he threw himself into the fight with an energy and enthusiasm that made him an inspiration.

George became a member of the New York Free Trade Club, through the introduction of Poultney Bigelow.<sup>4</sup> Soon after joining the club, of which Theodore Roosevelt was at that time a member, George attended one of their dinners. He was disgusted at the timid, reactionary tone of the affair, and wrote to Bigelow: "As you said, only worse! worse!! worse!!! I told them four minutes worth of horse sense, however."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> March 16, 1881, HGC.

<sup>3</sup> March 23, 1881, HGC.

<sup>4</sup> Poultney Bigelow is a son of John Bigelow, former United States Minister to France and to Germany. The younger Bigelow had been a fellow-student and intimate friend of Wilhelm Hohenzollern, Crown Prince of Germany and afterward, until his abdication in 1918, Emperor. An enthusiastic convert to the ideas of "Progress and Poverty," Poultney Bigelow translated from the French, for George, excerpts from the writings of the Physiocrats.

<sup>5</sup> May 15, 1881, HGC. See Henry George Jr., "The Life of Henry George," New York, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1943, p. 351.

In the early summer he began lecturing for the Irish Land League through New England and Canada but cut the tour short to make a brief business trip to California, for a friend. While in San Francisco he spoke in the same Metropolitan Temple, where three years previously, in an all but empty hall, he had delivered his lecture on "Why Work Is Scarce, Wages Low and Labor Restless."<sup>6</sup> On this occasion the auditorium was packed, the audience most enthusiastic and present were those friends who had had the courage to voice their belief in the "hobby of little Harry George," even before it had received approval from the discerning East. For an hour and a half he lectured without notes on "The Next Great Struggle."

We are today on the verge of a great movement. An unrest and disquiet pervades the whole world. In France the Commune has wrested victory from defeat. In Germany, under the heel of the man of blood and iron, the social propaganda goes on, and in Russia that enormous military machine is changing into a mighty force for the people. Even now there is a bill in the House of Lords of Great Britain that a few short years ago would have been considered revolutionary. From Scandinavia to Italy all is unrest, commotion, yearning and the presage of coming change. What is it? It is a quickening of the seeds cast here, a renewal of the light focussed here and of the spirit proclaimed in that immortal Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal. . . . But Europe is striving not alone for what we have attained. It is seeking for social and not merely political reform. . . . The same feeling of unrest exists in this country. All was not accomplished when our forefathers instituted the Republic and the ballot. There is other tyranny than that of kings and rulers. . . . Liberty does not exist without social conditions that give liberty. . . . All over the world the struggle is beginning. Upon us devolves as great a duty as devolved upon our forefathers one hundred years ago. The true republic is not yet established, and every true patriot will devote his best efforts to the performance of his duty. Whether the struggle comes with the carol of larks or the beat of war drums, it is coming. Let what may oppose it, let what may stand before it, giant forces are arising which must make their way.<sup>7</sup>

The visit to the scenes of his earlier struggles was indeed a happy one. He enjoyed it the more now that he was able to pay off nearly all the debts he had contracted during the lean times while he was working on his book.

When he returned to New York he had good news. *Truth*, a one-cent daily, with a circulation of between 75,000 and 100,000, was arranging

<sup>6</sup> March 26, 1878. See A. G. de Mille, "Henry George: The 'Progress and Poverty' Period," *AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO.*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July, 1943), p. 549.

<sup>7</sup> "The Coming Contest, Henry George's Lecture on the Next Great Struggle," *The Daily Examiner*, San Francisco, August 12, 1881.

to reprint "Progress and Poverty" in installments. George received no compensation for this but he was grateful for another outlet for his message.

The editor of *Truth* was Louis Freeland Post. Although a printer by trade and later educated for and admitted to the bar, Post preferred to devote his mind and pen to the discussion of public questions. He had complained one night of "the deadly dearth of subjects for editorial comments." William McCabe, one of the printers on the paper, asked if he had heard of "Progress and Poverty." Post replied that he had but there was "nothing to it." Retorted McCabe: "Maybe so; but just the same, there are enough editorial subjects in that book to last you a lifetime."<sup>8</sup>

A few days later Post found a copy of "The Irish Land Question" on his desk. He read the book and was convinced by the author's reasoning of the evils of land monopoly. He acknowledged this in an editorial—explaining, however, what he believed to be the weakness and futility of the proposed plan for abolishing the monopoly. After seeing his remarks in print, "its cock-suredness"<sup>9</sup> worried him; he felt impelled to send a copy to Henry George for criticism. But no criticism or defense came back to Mr. Post, only a copy of "Progress and Poverty" with a brief and friendly note from its author, requesting that he "read the book carefully from beginning to end, for it was 'a linked argument.'"<sup>10</sup> Mr. Post did read the book (and in a single day!) and was completely captured. He was responsible for reprinting it serially in *Truth*.

Louis F. Post was ten years younger than Henry George. Short, stocky, with a mop of thick brown hair, his dark eyes sparkling from behind thick spectacles, he exuded strength and moral character. A man of great courage, he was nevertheless extremely tolerant and had the rare gift of trying to find the other fellow right, not wrong; the priceless gift of making you like yourself. His sense of humor and convincing, simple delivery made him a delightful raconteur and speaker. He became one of the social philosopher's staunchest followers and most beloved and trusted of friends.

Another friendship that started at this time was with Francis George Shaw, a man of great culture and beauty of spirit. Henry George wrote of him to Thomas F. Walker:

He is of a wealthy Boston family that has many distinguished members and was himself one of the mainstays of the anti-slavery movement, and

<sup>8</sup> Louis F. Post, "The Prophet of San Francisco," New York, Vanguard Press, 1930, p. 25. See Chapters III, IV and V.

<sup>9</sup> Post, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, p. 34.

when the war came, gave to it his two sons, one of them being that Colonel [Bob] Shaw who was "buried with his niggers."<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Shaw had lost hope of solving social problems until he read "Progress and Poverty." It so enthused him that he ordered one thousand copies to be sent to libraries throughout the United States. He wanted his gift to be anonymous. George, however, prevailed upon him to let himself be known, explaining that the knowledge of the identity of the donor would double the value of the donation.

The English papers reported that Alfred Russell Wallace had also been endorsing "Progress and Poverty" and saying it "is undoubtedly the most remarkable and important work of the century."<sup>12</sup> George wrote happily: "So the seed has begun to sprout."

Meanwhile, in the British Parliament, the Liberal Government, headed by Gladstone, was having a difficult time trying to bring order into the chaotic conditions in Ireland. Under guidance from Westminster, Lord Cowper, the Viceroy, and William E. Foster, the Chief Secretary, were both working for justice for the tenants, but they were also trying to repress violence toward landlords by evicted and belligerent tenants. *Habeas corpus* was suspended, and hundreds "suspected" of being connected with the cause of the underdog were thrown into jail without trial. The Irish Land League having openly concentrated its influence in opposition to the tyrannical rule, was under the ban. Michael Davitt, secretary to the League, had been sent back to Portland and Charles Stewart Parnell's liberty was threatened.

In New York, Patrick Ford, editor of *The Irish World and American Industrial Liberator*, was challenging the exploitation of Irishmen, declaring,

The strength of the Land Agitation in Ireland will be in exact proportion to how much or how little it accepts of the incontrovertible truth that the land of Ireland was not made for the landlord class, or the farmer class, or any other class, but for *all Irishmen*.<sup>13</sup>

Ford asked Henry George to go to Ireland and England to report the political situation for the sum of \$60 a week plus transportation expenses for himself and his family. George was delighted: it seemed the best chance he had ever had. So on October 15th, having arranged for his son Henry to work as cub reporter on *The Brooklyn Eagle* and his son Richard

<sup>11</sup> From Dublin, Sept. 13, 1882, HGC.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Henry George in letter to Dr. Taylor, Sept. 7, 1881, HGC. See Henry George Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 353-4.

<sup>13</sup> August 20, 1881.

to study at the Art Students' League, he and his wife, with their two little girls, set sail for England.

2

### The Correspondent

JUST BEFORE Henry George left New York, three Irish Members of Parliament, John Dillon, Charles Stewart Parnell and J. J. O'Kelly, had been sent to jail. Because of this, the American correspondent, instead of going to Liverpool, as he had planned, decided to disembark at Queenstown, to study the Irish problem at first hand. While he was still at sea the Land League, as a protest against the Government for having filled the jails with something like five hundred political prisoners under a "crimes" or "coercion" act, had sent out a "no-rent manifesto," calling upon agricultural tenants to refuse to pay rent until the Government should change its tactics. Whereupon the Government proceeded to suppress the Land League. Patrick Egan, the treasurer, promptly moved to Paris with its war chest. The women, under Miss Anna Parnell, sister of Charles Stewart Parnell, organized the Ladies' Land League, in order to help carry on. Ireland was practically in a state of civil war.

On the Queenstown tender the passenger agent called George aside and offered to change his name on luggage and passenger list. Else, he explained, as George's coming had been cabled to Ireland, the correspondent would certainly be dogged from the moment he landed and possibly be arrested. Henry George, of course, refused the man's kindness. Indeed, upon arrival, he met with no official hostility; on the contrary, he was given a welcome that was only short of a demonstration.

Ireland, with its population of little more than five millions, was being patrolled by fifteen thousand military constables and forty thousand picked troops. "I got indignant as soon as I landed," George wrote, "and I have not got over it yet."<sup>14</sup>

The first thing he did on his arrival in Dublin was to try to interview Dillon, Parnell and O'Kelly.

I cooled my heels during three days outside Kilmainham Jail, in an attempt to see men who really represent four-fifths of the people of this country, and as after at length getting in, I at length got out again, there were two great Englishmen whom I wished could have been alive to visit the place—Charles Dickens and John Stuart Mill. It would require the pen that described the circumlocution office to fitly describe the officials at

<sup>14</sup> Quoted by Henry George Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 360, from letter to Patrick Ford, written from 37 Gardiner St., Dublin, Nov. 10, 1881, HGC, Book No. 1, p. 5. (Private letters to Ford are recorded in four small red duplicate copybooks in HGC.)



Kilmainham, and the pains they seem to take to make visits to the suspects, as few and as unpleasant as possible; it would require the author of "On Liberty" to fitly warn his countrymen of what such treatment of *suspected* men really means.<sup>15</sup>

A fortnight later he was able to report:

I have seen the most famous and best loved men of Ireland—the men who are today the real leaders and representatives of the Irish people; but have seen them with the greatest difficulty and under conditions which in other countries surround the worst malefactors. . . .

It was the first time I had ever seen Mr. Parnell. I was most favorably impressed by him. Features and bearing and expression speak a strong, well-poised, and determined character, a man fit to be the leader of men.

Our conversation was exceedingly interesting for a conversation of its kind, but it was an exceedingly provoking kind, for the two warders strained their ears lest anything contraband should be said. . . . But of the things I most wanted to talk to Mr. Parnell, nothing was permitted. . . . No politics of any kind, of any country were to be spoken of, said the warder. . . . So then we spoke of Bishop Nulty, but when I attempted to allude to Bishop Nulty's views, and how he believed there can be no settlement of the Land Question until land is acknowledged as the common property of the whole people, I was peremptorily stopped. There could be no allusion to land, even with the League left out, within the sacred precincts of Kilmainham.

Baffled in all these directions we talked of ancient history and of the persecution of the early Church, of the triumph of Christianity over Paganism, of the course of civilization and the effects upon European thought, of the discovery and settlement of America, of the progress of astronomical science, of the laws of human thought, etc. . . . Not even the gold-banded chief warder, though he looked very uneasy, could sniff "politics" in such topics as these, nor yet when I sought to obtain Mr. Parnell's views on such religious topics as the perseverance of the saints, the relations between faith and works, the final triumph of the right, the ultimate chaining of the devil etc. And so, in a conversation that, understood literally, might have been taken for that of lunatics, I managed to get something of Mr. Parnell's views. He is more than satisfied with the spirit shown by the people, and is confident of success. . . .<sup>16</sup>

Shortly after George had reached Dublin, four committees had waited on him and invited him to deliver a public lecture. Held some weeks later in the historic Rotunda, the meeting was a big success. The enthusiasm so great that it was only by ordering his cabby to whip up the horse and get him away from the crowd that he escaped having his carriage unhitched and dragged by his audience through the streets. He wrote

<sup>15</sup> *The Irish World*, Dec. 10, 1881; HGC.

<sup>16</sup> *The Irish World*, Dec. 24, 1881, HGC.

Taylor: "I am sorry now that I did not let them do it as it would have compelled the press agents to have taken more notice of it."<sup>17</sup>

Dr. Thomas Nulty, Bishop of Meath—who a few months previously had written a pastoral letter that was a scholarly summing up of the essence of the land question—granted the American an interview. George wrote privately about it to Ford:

My visit to Bishop Nulty was most delightful. Instead of in anything falling below my anticipation he rather exceeded it. Here is a Christian Bishop. He treated me with the greatest honor, and what is more with the greatest frankness and cordiality. I never met a man that seemed to me to more fill the idea of a *Rev. Father in God*. How I wish he were Pope.<sup>18</sup>

To *The Irish World*, George reported the publication of the Bishop's pastoral letter to the clergy and laity of the Diocese of Meath. He quoted from Monsignor Nulty:

"... I infer that no individual, or class of individuals, can hold a right of private property in the land of the country; that the people of that country, in their public corporate capacity *are*, and always *must be*, the real owners of the land of their country—holding an indisputable title to it, in the fact that they receive it as a free gift from its Creator, and as a necessary means for preserving and enjoying the life He has bestowed upon them."<sup>19</sup>

Commented George:

The individual who has improved land Dr. Nulty declares entitled to the benefit of that improvement, and should be secured in its enjoyment and be entitled to receive either a selling price or rent for it, but the value of the land which arises from the growth of the community and not from what any particular individual has done (that is to say, rent in the strict use of the term) belongs to the whole community and ought to be taken in taxation for the use of the whole community.

In the fact that rent proper—or that value of land which is not due to the individual exertion of the occupier or improver—constantly increases with the growth of society, Dr. Nulty sees—as everyone must see who recognizes the true relation of this fact—a most beautiful relation of creative design. He says:—

"This great social fact, that the people are and always must be the real owners of the land of their country, appears to be of incalculable importance. . . . A vast public property, a great national fund, has been placed under the dominion and at the disposal of the nation to supply itself abundantly with resources necessary to liquidate the expenses of its government. . . ."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Nov. 20, 1881, HGC.

<sup>18</sup> Dublin, Nov. 10, 1881, HGC, Ford letter book No. I, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup> *The Irish World*, Feb. 21, 1882, HGC.

<sup>20</sup> *Ib.*

George prevailed upon the Ladies' Land League to have Bishop Nulty's article printed and sent broadcast over Ireland. The result was a widespread distribution through priests and laity alike. The Tory papers reprinted it as "an outrageous *official* declaration of communism from a Catholic bishop."<sup>21</sup>

The persecution in Ireland continued. The official League paper, *United Ireland*, was seized, but the plates of the number about to be issued were secretly conveyed to George's lodgings and hidden under his bed<sup>22</sup> until they could be packed into a trunk and shipped secretly to England. There the League managers, instead of printing the paper at once, fumbled the matter, losing time and money by getting out one edition in London, another, an entirely different one, in Dublin,<sup>23</sup> and a third, from the Dublin plates, in Liverpool. George was sadly coming to realize that in the Irish movement there was a lack of management and therefore a waste of power and resources; that the men trying to lead were beginning to show jealousies and incapacities. He still had faith in Parnell, although he did not consider him as strong as Davitt; but he believed Parnell's sister to be an admirable organizer and executive, and that the women's group had been accomplishing very much under great handicaps.

It was when Miss Parnell learned surreptitiously that the Ladies' Land League was to be proscribed, and that one of the Dublin jails was being made ready to accommodate her and her assistant, Nannie Lynch, that the two women lost no time in escaping to England. Beforehand they sent the official records of their organization to Mrs. George for safe keeping. The remaining members of the League importuned Mrs. George to preside over the regular business meeting. Reluctantly she consented although she knew nothing of parliamentary procedure and her nervousness was not lessened by the presence of Government detectives, reporters and correspondents. But she carried through, and the facts that Miss Parnell was absent and that an American woman had taken the chair saved the L.L.L. from proscription.

## 3

## Visit to London

KEGAN PAUL, of the London publishing house of Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., reported astonishing success with "Progress and Poverty." The idea of selling an American work on economics had at first seemed impossible to them and they had had difficulty in disposing of the first twenty copies.

<sup>21</sup> Letter to Ford, Dec. 28, 1882, HGC, letter book No. I, p. 74.

<sup>22</sup> *Ib.*, p. 75.

<sup>23</sup> *Ib.*, p. 80.

Then it began to sell and now they were getting out another edition and expected a quick return. George wrote from London:

I find I have made a reputation quite out of proportion to the sale of the book. This, when I can utilize it, will be our power.

We are staying here with Miss Helen Taylor. We came to her at her cordial invitation when we first came to London, with the intention of remaining only a few days but she will not let us go. There is much I would like to tell you about her. She is a noble woman, giving her life to good work. And she is not a Malthusian, not a materialist, but rather a mystic.<sup>24</sup>

Helen Taylor, after the death of her mother, had been the companion and confidant of her step-father, John Stuart Mill. It was the habit of man and girl to take long walks together—sometimes for twenty miles. This intimate contact of the young groping mind with the mature intellect of the great economist was an extraordinary education for her. When the Georges became acquainted with her during the Irish struggle she was outwardly a typical English woman of the Victorian era—domestic, soft-voiced and gentle in manner, wearing—when in the house—a white lace cap on her smooth, parted hair. But, the love of her fellow man in her heart, she had the ardour of a crusader, and she had thrown herself deeply into the cause of Ireland. Upon reading "Progress and Poverty" she had become a fervent advocate of Henry George's teachings, saying she believed that, had he lived, John Stuart Mill would have taken a similar stand. She won her way into the lasting affections of her American guests; she was equally at home in talking world politics and economics with the eldest or in teaching the youngest to make, from the tinfoil wrapping of chocolates, tiny spoons with which to shovel sugar in the big silver bowl.

The Georges later were guests of Thomas Briggs and his family in Dulwich, and paid a visit of several weeks to Mr. and Mrs. Henry Myers Hyndman, in their home in Portland Place, London. Hyndman had been a leading writer for the British press, but his devotion to the Irish cause had resulted in his being "boycotted." So ardent a Socialist was he that George felt it "a pity to see a man of such force following so blindly such a superficial thinker as Karl Marx."<sup>25</sup> Hyndman tried in vain to bring George to his viewpoint. He had hoped, as subsequently he related:

to convert him to the truth as it is in Socialist economics. It seemed to me quite incredible that a man who could go so far as he had gone would not

<sup>24</sup> To Francis G. Shaw, Feb. 11, 1882, HGC.

<sup>25</sup> Letter to Thos. F. Walker of Birmingham, Eng., June 2, 1884, HGC. See George R. Geiger, "The Philosophy of Henry George," New York, Macmillan, 1933, p. 230n.

traverse with ease the remainder of the distance, and thus obtain a sound conception of the whole subject.<sup>26</sup>

Hyndman had found in the British Museum a copy of a lecture delivered by Thomas Spence in 1775, proclaiming common rights in land and proposing that land values be taken for public purposes. George had never before heard of the existence of Spence. But instead of being disconcerted by the discovery of a predecessor who had anticipated several of his own independently-achieved positions upon the land question, he reasoned that if it could be proved that his own theories were old, they might possibly be accorded quicker recognition. He therefore prevailed upon Hyndman to reprint the Spence lecture, a copy of which he sent to *The Irish World* for publication.

Hyndman, in spite of his Marxism, lived in rather formal style and the informal manners of his American guest often irked him. He relates that George's

indifference to some of our English prejudices were at times rather annoying. On one occasion we were passing the top of Great Portland Street, going home to lunch, when George espied a barrow-load of whelks at the corner being sold by the coster-monger who owned them. "I say Hyndman" quoth George, "I like the look of those whelks." "All right," said I, "if you like them I'll have some sent in for you." "No," was the answer; "I like them here and now." Expostulation was useless. So George consumed his whelks from the barrow while I, got up in high hat and frock coat of non-whelk-eating-at-the-corner civilization, stood by and saw him do it.<sup>27</sup>

He considered that while the economist was "humorous, good-natured and fond of discussion, his was not by any means a first-rate intellect."<sup>28</sup> However George came to consider his host during that visit, history does not state. But the smallest of Hyndman's American guests developed a prejudice against her host. It dated from the time he almost sent her into hysterics by pretending to bite off the toes of her doll.

That same doll, Rose, and "the Babe" or "the Child" as her family called their youngest member, were inseparable. Once when they were staying in Dublin the Babe fell down and broke Rose's crown and even her mother's magic fingers could not heal it. Indeed, Dr. James E. Kelly, a surgeon who called often to talk Irish and world affairs, found that in this case he could not operate successfully. And then the father, entering into the con-

<sup>26</sup> Henry Myers Hyndman, "The Record of an Adventurous Life," New York, Macmillan, 1911, p. 154.

<sup>27</sup> *Ib.*, p. 265.

<sup>28</sup> *Ib.*, p. 267.

sultation, suggested there might be someone on the other side of the Channel who could do so. He was just starting for London on a mission to save some of his Irish friends from jail. Gently he laid Rose inside his bag on a bed of compromising documents and, covering her with the rest of the precious papers, took her away. A couple of days later came a letter to Mrs. George from London:

I have been spending the afternoon and some cab fare in moving about with Rose. All along Regent St. they wanted ten or fourteen days to fix her, which meant sending her to Paris. I found a place over Waterloo Bridge where they will head her, paint her and put back her old wig for 6/ and have left her, to be done tomorrow afternoon.<sup>29</sup>

Next day he wrote: "Rose looks pretty well; I have sent her back by express so as to console the Babe."<sup>30</sup> And sure enough she arrived completely mended, quite her beautiful self, and was again able to go about everywhere the George family went.

While in London, the Americans were entertained a great deal and met many interesting people. Henry George, usually utterly indifferent to his appearance, looked well groomed in the evening clothes he had had made by a fashionable tailor, before he left New York. They had cost so much he treated them with respect and wore them carefully. And his wife had had made for herself a handsome evening gown of garnet satin and velvet. Against its dark red her beautiful arms and shoulders gleamed white. For less formal affairs was the stiff black silk dress, without which no lady's wardrobe, at that time, was complete.

Most of her own clothes Mrs. George made herself, and all the clothes worn by her daughters. When she found she was to be in London for some time, she went to the English agency of the American company of Wilcox & Gibbs, with the idea of renting a sewing machine.

"We'll let you have it for £5," said the salesman.

"That's far too much," exclaimed Mrs. George. "I own one in the United States for which I paid \$85, and I can't afford to pay £5 for renting a duplicate just for a few weeks' use."

"You may *buy* it here for £5, Madam, even though it does cost \$85 in your country where it is produced. You Americans, with your protective tariff, are very kind to us!"<sup>31</sup>

This was a poignant lesson in the stupidity of "protection," that Mrs. George quoted many times.

<sup>29</sup> Sept. 7, 1882 (from J. C. Durant's office); in the private collection of the writer.

<sup>30</sup> Sept. 8, 1882 (in the private collection of the writer).

<sup>31</sup> Related to the writer by her mother.



George wrote to Ford: "I have succeeded once or twice in passing myself off for an Englishman but I can't for an Irishman; my accent betrays me."<sup>32</sup> His wife, however, almost always, while abroad, was taken for an Englishwoman; not only because of her poise but because she did not have the nasal, rasping quality supposed to be typical of "the American voice." Her tones were low in pitch and soft, her enunciation clear. Greatly to her amusement shopkeepers often took her into their confidence; "we'll be getting a 'igher price than this, mum, in the spring, when the Americans 'll be coming h'over."<sup>33</sup>

One night Mr. and Mrs. George were dinner guests at the beautiful home of Walter Wren,<sup>34</sup> celebrated Oxford coach, where they met among other celebrities, Walter Besant. On another occasion they were guests of Sir Francis Jeune (afterwards Lord Chief Justice) and Lady Jeune at one of their famous "small and earlies." It was in reality a large and late, and the crowd so great that it took half an hour to get upstairs to greet the hostess. Tennyson, looking like a dreamer and Browning, looking like a successful business man, were there. But keen as Henry George was about poets, he was more interested in another guest—Herbert Spencer. Although he had once written to his wife: "Instead of trying a novel why not read Herbert Spencer on the chrystalline system, when you want to go to sleep?"<sup>35</sup> He admired the English philosopher, had quoted him in "Progress and Poverty" and had long wanted to meet him. Here at Lady Jeune's the coveted opportunity came.

The two men had hardly exchanged greetings before Spencer asked George what he thought of the situation in Ireland. The American proceeded to condemn the action of the Government and to praise the work of the Land League. He expected that the Englishman who "in 'Social Statics,' *did* condemn private property in land, *did* advocate the resumption of land by the community, *did* unequivocally and unreservedly, and with all his force, declare for what is now called land nationalization"<sup>36</sup> would, like himself, see the solution of the agrarian struggle in Ireland only in terms of the fundamental economic principles that they both had

<sup>32</sup> Dublin, Nov. 22, 1881, HGC. Ford letter book No. I, p. 52.

<sup>33</sup> Related to the writer by her mother.

<sup>34</sup> Letter from his daughter, Mrs. Hildegard Wren Whittaker, Jan. 19, 1935, to the writer; in the latter's private collection. Crippled by illness in his youth, Walter Wren, a brilliant scholar, had taught, sometimes from his couch, many who became distinguished men of their time, royalty, statesmen, writers and soldiers—among the latter, Allenby.

<sup>35</sup> Letter in private collection of the writer.

<sup>36</sup> "A Perplexed Philosopher," New York, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1940, p. 80.

defined. But vehemently Spencer condemned the imprisoned Land Leaguers. "They have only got what they deserve. They are inciting the people to refuse to pay to their landlords what is rightfully theirs—rent." This statement and the way it was made nonplussed Henry George. "It is evident that we cannot agree on this matter,"<sup>37</sup> he replied, and walked away, bitterly disappointed in the man whose work had stirred him.

Joseph Chamberlain, according to his biographer, had read "Progress and Poverty" and had been "electrified."<sup>38</sup> Indeed there was much in common between the great English Liberal and Henry George and the latter, after dining with him and John Bright, as the guests of Walter Wren, wrote of the meeting to Patrick Ford:

We started in on the Irish affairs with the soup, for Bright asked me point-blank what I thought of what I had seen in Ireland and I had to tell him, though it was not very flattering. We kept it up to half past ten, when Mr. Bright had to go down to the House, but Chamberlain remained until nearly twelve.

Bright has got to the end of his tether, and will never get past where he is now; but Chamberlain is an extremely bright man, and his conversation, which was unreserved, was extremely interesting to me, and would make a most interesting letter if I could use it, which of course I cannot, for to print private conversation with men of his position or even to allude to them in print, without permission, would stamp a man as not fit for decent society.

Chamberlain has evidently been reading *The Irish World* for he alluded to some things in my letters, and he told me laughingly to look out when I went back to Ireland that I did not get reasonably suspected.<sup>39</sup>

While the "no-rent" movement in Ireland was as strong as ever, Parnell and a few of his co-workers had grown weary of the fight. They made a pact with the government to "slow down" the Land League agitation, demanding in exchange that the Government release the suspects and extend the existing Land Act. When Parnell and the two other members of Parliament, O'Kelly and Dillon, were released from Kilmainham jail on May 2d, surprise and happiness were general among the Irish factions. Those on the inside, however, suspected the compromise and George wrote to Ford that instead of expressing joy the members of the Ladies' Land League seemed deeply depressed.

<sup>37</sup> Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 370.

<sup>38</sup> James Louis Garvin, "Life of Joseph Chamberlain," New York, Macmillan, Vol. I, p. 385.

<sup>39</sup> London, April 22, 1882, HGC. Ford letter book No. III, p. 18. Quoted by Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 371.

But for those in power to treat with and free Parnell, who had been denounced for treason, discredited their policy. Viceroy Cowper and Chief Secretary Foster resigned. On the evening of Saturday, May 6th (1882), when the new Chief Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish, and Thomas Burke, the Under Secretary, made their official entry into Dublin, they were assassinated in Phoenix Park by a band of political fanatics, self-termed the "Invincibles." When the news of this deed spread around the world it did much harm to the cause of Ireland.

Davitt, who had been in jail again after his return from America, had been released from Portland Prison, near London, early that day, and George had been with him until late that night. They were to meet again next day but it happened much sooner than they had planned. Very early on Sunday morning George was awakened by a telegram from his Dublin friend, Dr. Kelly, telling of the assassination.

Dressing rapidly, George sped out of his lodgings and awakened a drowsing cabby, who drove him to the Westminster Palace Hotel. "At five o'clock," Davitt relates, "Henry George entered my bedroom with an open telegram in his hand and a scared look in his kindly big blue eyes. 'Get up, old man' were his words. 'One of the worst things that has ever happened to Ireland has occurred.'"<sup>40</sup> And George recounts that when Davitt read the dispatch: "'My God' was his exclamation, 'have I got out of Portland for this!' And then he added mournfully: 'For the first time in my life I despair. It seems like the curse that follows Ireland!'"<sup>41</sup>

George carried the tragic message further, to Dillon and O'Kelly. Dillon went for Parnell, who joined the others at the hotel. By the afternoon nearly all the Parnellites had gathered there.

In the meantime, [Davitt says] the manifesto<sup>42</sup> was written by a few of us in the hotel, the last paragraph being added by Mr. A. M. Sullivan as a declaration absolutely necessary to imposing a sentiment of unequivocal sincerity to the terms in which the crime was looked upon and condemned by the Irish people and their leaders. It was sent at once to the press agen-

<sup>40</sup> "Fall of Feudalism in Ireland," p. 357.

<sup>41</sup> *Irish World*, May 9, 1882, HGC. Quoted by Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 373.

<sup>42</sup> The Rev. Thomas Dawson, O.M.I., of the House of Retreat, Inchicore, Dublin, Ireland, has disputed George's statement, "the manifesto was written by Davitt." Father Dawson wrote (Sept. 2, 1933): "My recollection [is] that Henry George, as he must have told me himself, was the inspirer and *writer* of the manifesto. He *had* to write it. The Irishmen were so broken that terrible night and day that they could do nothing. . . . The expression 'nobler vision' . . . is evidently George's."

Told that the writer was unable to confirm his belief, Father Dawson, on May 10, 1939, replied, ". . . it is not surprising . . . [Henry George] could not in honor make the fact (if it be a fact) known. . . . And the Irish politicians themselves, however grateful, could *never* wish to reveal (if so it were) that, in doing all that they could, they had only signed."

cies in Great Britain, cabled to John Boyle O'Reilly of Boston, for the widest publication in America, and wired to Mr. Alfred Webb of Dublin, to be printed as a placard and despatched by Sunday night's last train to every city and town in Ireland, so as to be posted on the walls of the country on Monday morning.<sup>43</sup>

George reported in *The Irish World*:

The feeling of the Irish Members was the same horror and dismay felt by Davitt and expressed in the manifesto. They felt that a great disaster had overtaken their cause and the stigma of a great crime had been laid upon it. . . . Nothing could better have served the purposes of the worst enemies of Ireland, nothing could have given more grief and shame to her best friends than this tragedy.<sup>44</sup>

On that black Sunday night, the Georges were guests at a dinner given by a member of Parliament. The consensus was that there would be violent retaliation against the Irish in England, and therefore the Irish leaders should flee for sanctuary to France. Mrs. George, who regarded moral courage as almost the highest human attribute, took the stand that Davitt "should go to Ireland by the first train, and be a leader to his people in this hour of dismay." Her statement was received with amazement. "But fury and bitterness are running so high—he might be killed by a Government supporter," someone averred. "How could Michael Davitt die better than with his people?" asked Mrs. George.<sup>45</sup> Her husband was to remind her of these words years later.

*The London Standard* made a direct appeal to Davitt to hand over the assassins—as if he, who had just been released from prison himself, could have known where to lay hands on the criminals! He says: "My friend, Henry George, who was with me when their article appeared, wrote a prompt reply. It appeared in *The Standard* over my name."<sup>46</sup>

Although there was no public disturbance anywhere after the Phoenix Park murders, the government was compelled by public opinion to abandon its proposed leniency. "Gladstone," George wrote five years later, "was not wise enough or strong enough to resist the frantic English demand for repressive measures."<sup>47</sup> The old, dreary round of coercion was begun again, and the grief and abhorrence which had swept over Ireland with the news of the Phoenix Park assassination were quickly forgotten in intensified hatred of English oppression.

<sup>43</sup> Davitt, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

<sup>44</sup> May 9, 1882, HGC.

<sup>45</sup> Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 375.

<sup>46</sup> Davitt, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

<sup>47</sup> "Phoenix Park" in *The Standard*, New York, Vol. 1, No. 16 (April 23, 1887), p. 4, HGC.

Parnell openly opposed this in the House. In the Land League he quietly did all he could to "slow down" and kill the old movement. In a few months he had swung away from "the land for the people" back to the old, rather vague program of "home rule." George believed he thereby missed the greatest opportunity any Irishman ever had. Davitt, however, stuck to his guns. His seven years of penal servitude, and his year of solitary confinement did not dim his ardor. Unwilling to be a party to Parnell's "Kilmainham treaty," he made this fact clear when he presided over a big meeting in Manchester where George had been invited to lecture. But Davitt spoke so long that he left the guest of honor barely fifteen minutes. Although George hardly did himself justice, any chagrin he might have felt was overshadowed by gratitude for the way Davitt had condemned the "treaty."

And now the cry was raised that Davitt was trying with Patrick Ford and Henry George to cause a split in the ranks. To Francis G. Shaw, George wrote:

The truth is that Parnell is tired, that the conservative influences in the management of the League have come out in full force, and that they want to settle the land question before it goes too far. . . .

Michael Davitt is full of the idea of popularizing "Progress and Poverty." That was the first thing he said to me. He had read it twice before, and he read it twice again while in Portland and as you may see from his speeches and letters, he believes in it entirely. He says if a copy of that book can be put in every workman's club and Land League and library in the three kingdoms the revolution will be made. His first act was to demand of Parnell and Dillon £500 to use in the English propaganda, £300 of which he wanted to put in my hands for as many copies of "Progress and Poverty" as it would bring. Parnell and Dillon at first agreed, and he went to Paris to get Egan's consent. Egan refused; but afterwards wrote that what Davitt wanted would have to be granted, and then after the Manchester speech Parnell and Dillon refused.

The fact is that the line is really drawn and the split made, but not publicly. . . . I am glad I have been here if for nothing but my influence on Davitt. But the others taunt him so much with the idea that "Henry George has captured him" that he didn't want me to go down into Galway with him. The Land League leaders—that is the "Parliamentarians" have fought shy of me ever since I have been here.<sup>48</sup>

## 4

## International Incident

THINGS CONTINUED TO BOIL in Ireland. Davitt, in a speech on June 6th that caused a sensation, brushed aside Parnell's objections and came out

<sup>48</sup> From Dublin, May 30, 1882, HGC. Quoted in part by Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 380-1.

flatly against peasant proprietorship and for "Land Nationalization." This differed from the method that George had advocated for bringing about his dreamed-of reform. He desired the absorption of economic rent through taxation of land values and was absolutely opposed to touching the titles to land. But Davitt's speech had the old lilt—"the land for the people"—and George, knowing it was not yet time to quarrel over the details of method, and realizing that the right principle was being promulgated, was exuberant.

His second Dublin lecture was so well received that the "Kilmainham Treatyites," as the Parnell faction came to be known, began to concentrate on opposing him. They also brought great pressure to bear on Michael Davitt, who had gone to the United States to try to get money for propaganda. George was bitterly disappointed in Parnell's recanting, in Davitt's "apologies," and in the general disinterest of most of the other Irish leaders in what he stood for. He had the friendship, however, of George O. Trevelyan, the new Chief Secretary for Ireland, and the enthusiastic support of Rev. Harold Rylett of Belfast, of Father Thomas Dawson, O.M.I., of Glencree, and Dr. James E. Kelly of Dublin and many other men and women in Ireland.

In England and in Scotland he found enthusiasm for his cause among men like Joseph Cowen, proprietor of *The Newcastle Chronicle*; Thomas F. Walker, a manufacturer in Birmingham, and William Saunders, president of the Central News Agency in London. He was invited to speak in Glasgow at two large meetings which kindled great enthusiasm and are considered by many to mark the beginning of the radical land movement in Scotland.

George had written to Francis G. Shaw:

"Progress and Poverty" is slowly and steadily making its way—eating in as I am inclined to think no book of the kind ever before did, and the little "Irish Land Question" has certainly produced a considerable effect. And soon now, I think the big discussion is to open and the oxygen blast will be turned on the smouldering fire.<sup>49</sup>

Crossing this letter had come one from Mr. Shaw, enclosing a draft for five hundred dollars. In thanking him George wrote: "You have indeed strengthened me. The \$500. seems to me like the fulcrum for a lever that will help move the world."<sup>50</sup>

Nine days later Mr. Shaw wrote again to say that three thousand dollars had been pledged for the circulation of "Progress and Poverty" by some

<sup>49</sup> London, April 28, 1882, HGC.

<sup>50</sup> Dublin, May 26, 1882, HGC.



one who wished to remain anonymous.<sup>51</sup> With part of this money Mr. Shaw had ordered Appleton to send one thousand copies of "The Irish Land Question" and to follow them with an equal number of the larger book, specially bound, to members of the Society of Political Education.

"The great movement we have so often talked about is coming,"<sup>52</sup> wrote George to Dr. Taylor. For now, thanks to the Shaw money and the co-operation of James C. Durant, who had a printing office in London, a six-penny edition of twelve thousand copies of "Progress and Poverty" was issued and circulated throughout the United Kingdom. A three-penny edition of five thousand copies of "The Irish Land Question" followed. An amusing incident occurred during the preparation of this paper-bound edition of "Progress and Poverty." One day a stranger sauntered into the composing room of the Durant plant. Explaining that he had been a printer, he said he would like to try his hand at the case again. Permission was granted and as he and a man named Boyle set type on the book they chatted. At last Boyle broke in:

"You are an American and a compositor, and from what you've been telling me you've been a sailor and a miner. The man who wrote this book we're working on, was all those things. Can it be that you—are—?"

"Yes," admitted Henry George, "I am!"<sup>53</sup>

In August, 1882, the American set off on a jaunting-car trip to western Ireland to study and write of conditions there. With him went an Englishman, James Leigh Joynes, a master of Eton, who was engaged to write articles for *The Times* of London. They found rural Ireland a peaceful and industrious place, and from his observation of the Irish, George came to believe that there was nowhere a people who would work harder and suffer more for those they love.

They arrived at the small town of Loughree, which swarmed with soldiers and constabulary. As the correspondents drove down the street to the only hotel, the police seemed to start from the houses on each side and follow them.

A month earlier George had written from London to America: "It has been very hard work ever since I have been here. Every word I write or telegraph has been watched on the other side [Ireland] and I have been in a much more difficult place than a mere newspaper correspondent."<sup>54</sup> In-

<sup>51</sup> The donor was subsequently found to be Francis G. Shaw's brother.

<sup>52</sup> London, June 29, 1882, HGC.

<sup>53</sup> Related by Frederick Verinder to the present writer.

<sup>54</sup> July 1, 1882, to F. G. Shaw, HGC.

deed now in Loughree, his position became acute. Later he wrote of it to his wife:

A lot of police were waiting for us and arrested us [under the Crimes Act] the moment the horse stopped in front of the hotel. Police jumped up [on the jaunting-car] and drove us to the barracks where, in a barred room, each valise was searched, each paper read. It was very funny to see them going through everything like a parcel of monkeys.<sup>55</sup>

He was particularly intrigued by the constable who studied, with intense interest, a manuscript held upside down. In fact, the whole episode struck the American as highly ridiculous. Not so Joynes. He was "indecently disconcerted and frightened"<sup>56</sup> which so amused his traveling companion that the latter forgot to be upset by his own discomfort. . . . "This notion of being arrested and being paraded through the streets as a would-be assassin of land-lords, was evidently more horrible at first blush to my friend than being fired at from behind a stone wall—the danger that his friends had warned him he was risking."<sup>57</sup>

The Magistrate who examined them concluded that there had been some mistake, and after three hours the correspondents were allowed to go free. They spent the night in the hotel, paid a visit to the Prior of the Carmelite Order and to the shops of several "suspects," and drove off in the jaunting-car to the nearby town of Athenry. In this hamlet, too small to support a physician, and getting its whole water supply from one pump, were quartered twenty-six constables and fifty-six soldiers. The two travellers called upon Father McPhilpin, did some sight-seeing, and made for the railroad station. But the American did not take the train to Galway, for the police, who had been loitering about, closed in and arrested him again. Joynes they permitted to go free. George relates:

The charge against me was being a stranger and a dangerous character who had conspired with certain other persons to prevent the payment of rent. The police surrounded me and forced me into what in some parts of this country would be called the hoodlum wagon. I was carried to the police station under a formidable guard, and after being cross-examined was locked up. . . . I was taken to the mansion of the squire for examination. I shall never forget the contrast it presented with the misery of the village. Well-dressed people were playing lawn tennis on its beautiful grounds. It had stately trees around it and an air of the utmost respectability and comfort. The squire sent me back to the subordinate magistrate and I was recommitted to the lock-up.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Private collection of the writer.

<sup>56</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>57</sup> *The Irish World*, Aug. 22, 1882, HGC.

<sup>58</sup> Meeker notes, Scrapbook 29, Miscellany TIQB, HGC.

Followed several hours detention, a long examination of papers and a lot of stupid testimony regarding the prisoner's movements. By then, George writes:

I was very hungry, for all I had to eat since morning was a bit of bread and cheese. I had previously suggested to the Court that it should adjourn for supper but it would not. It was near midnight and I was very tired, and if I had to sleep in Galway Jail, as I expected, there was a long ride yet before me, so I said nothing about the effort of kissing a "swear book," nor further bother the inspector.<sup>59</sup>

The magistrate summed up with a justification of the police for having arrested him and then proceeded to discharge him. Whether the decision was due to telegrams which Mr. Trevelyan stated in the House of Commons he had sent to Ireland, or to the judge's native wisdom, George could not determine. He continues:

My papers were restored to me, and as the magistrate expressed a desire to read the whole of "The Irish Land Question," I asked him to accept a copy, and gave one each to the sub-Inspector and the constables who had personally been very polite to me.<sup>60</sup>

Next morning the two correspondents wasted no time climbing into the jaunting-car behind their Irish driver and the fleet little mare. As to further adventure George only indicates

... how the police followed us into the wilds of Connemara, and how we lost them by the aid of a horse that could understand Irish, if she could not speak it.<sup>61</sup>

Irish friends who learned of the American's predicament hurried to his wife to apologize and commiserate with her, and were amazed to find her unworried. Her sense of humor was saving her—and besides she had had a note from her husband saying: "Am enjoying the trip and seeing a lot." Reassuring her further he wrote: "Didn't get arrested, much to my disgust, for I want to see this Englishman in jail again."<sup>62</sup>

But because George knew that such treatment as he had experienced could on occasion prove most annoying, when he reached Dublin, he sent a letter of protest to the President of the United States. After he returned to New York he received a communication from Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, who passed on to him "the regret of Her Majesty's Government that this incident should have occurred"<sup>63</sup> and invited him to put in a claim for damages for the arrests. This George declined to do.

<sup>59</sup> *Irish World*, Aug. 22, 1882, HGC.

<sup>60</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>61</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>62</sup> Private collection of the writer.

<sup>63</sup> Department of State, Washington, Oct. 17, 1882.

The publicity given the arrests in Ireland, the reference to it in the House of Commons, and the spread of the cheap editions of his two books brought Henry George and his theories into the forefront of popular discussion. And when a serious and very laudatory criticism of "Progress and Poverty," occupying nearly five columns, appeared in *The Times*, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. sold out every copy of the book they had on hand.

Shortly afterward,<sup>64</sup> George made his first address in London in Memorial Hall with Professor Alfred Russell Wallace in the chair. It was a chance hearing of the American at this meeting that changed the life of a young Irishman—George Bernard Shaw—and, as Shaw's biographer Alfred Henderson put it, "fired him to enlist in Heine's phrase 'as a soldier in the Libertarian war of Humanity.'"<sup>65</sup>

A few days after the Memorial Hall gathering, George spoke at another meeting, one that gave him inspiration and satisfaction—a meeting of Church of England clergymen—at which there was three hours of serious discussion.

That same evening he was the guest of honor at a two-shilling working-man's banquet. Then he bade England and the many friends there goodbye. They were eager for him to stay but he told them the movement was strong enough to go ahead without him; he perhaps could be of help but no one man was necessary to it now. And with the glad tidings that another edition of twenty-thousand copies of "Progress and Poverty" was to be printed in a few days, he left for Ireland.

In Dublin a farewell dinner was given him and then, with his family, he sailed, on October 4th, for home.

<sup>64</sup> Sept. 14, 1882.

<sup>65</sup> "Life of George Bernard Shaw," Cincinnati, Stewart & Kidd, 1911, p. 4. "Following the clarion call of Henry George," Shaw said subsequently, in a message to America, "my ambition is to repay my debt to Henry George by coming over some day and trying to do for your young men what Henry George did nearly a quarter of a century ago, for me." *Ib.*, pp. 56, 155. Payment was made in full April 11, 1933, when Shaw stopped twenty-six hours in New York to deliver a 16,000-word lecture at the Metropolitan Opera House. (As Professor George R. Geiger has reported, in "The Philosophy of Henry George," New York, Macmillan, 1934, pp. 233-4, Shaw made the same statement to Hamlin Garland in reply to an invitation to attend a dinner in honor of George's anniversary in New York in 1905; cf. the original in HGC. He repeated it in his New York lecture; cf. the text in *The New York Times*, April 12, 1933.)

## • R E V I E W S •

### Social Control of Industrial Monopoly

*Corporate Concentration and Public Policy.* By Harry L. Purdy, Martin L. Lindahl, and William A. Carter. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1942, 650 pp., \$4.25.

The problem of concentration of economic power in the United States is an extremely important one, accentuated at the present time by the needs of war production. While all efforts are directed towards the efficient solution of war requirements, work on the problem of corporate concentration has been suspended, if not entirely shelved. Internal postwar reconstruction, it is hoped, will return to it again as part of the economic reorganization for peace and security. Embryonic attempts toward the solution of this problem begun during the New Deal, as well as our knowledge of the problem prior to Thurman Arnold and the T.N.E.C., will be utilized at that time.

In their preface, the authors state that "no original or revolutionary doctrines with respect to economic theory or public policy are advocated." Rather, "the purpose has been simply to collect the available materials relating to these extremely important economic and social problems and present them in a manner that will be helpful to students of social science." Within the boundaries set by this thesis statement, the work is excellent. The presentation and scholarly assimilation of a wide range of materials are especially commendable.

This study does not attempt to cover the whole field of social control of industry. It is confined to monopoly and monopolistic competition in the general field of industry. The temporal scope of this volume is a welcome addition to economic history. From the colonial period to the present day, the development of the modern corporation is traced and described in considerable detail. Newer developments, as the holding companies, industrial monopolies, and oligopolies, are discussed at considerable length, utilizing actual case illustrations fully documented by facts and figures. The principal characteristics of corporations and monopolies, such as the structure, operation, and ownership control, are clearly delineated.

Legal history associated with modern economic developments is carefully analyzed, beginning with the common law background. Since public policy is expressed as law, the discussion of common law in relation to free competition and monopolies is worthwhile. The effect of judicial decisions on specific acts of Congress or state legislatures is significantly demonstrated. A brief account is devoted to theoretical considerations related to monopoly and monopolistic competition.

Societal controls of monopoly and competitive practices are difficult in application. In the United States, the movement for governmental regu-

lation began in the 1880's among the states. The Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 was the starting point of federal regulation in this field. Since that time many laws, mainly federal, have been passed, and commissions set up, to control this trend towards concentration. The existence of these laws for the past fifty years has not halted or reversed this trend. In 1937 the two hundred largest non-financial corporations in American industry represented 45 per cent of the wealth of all such corporations, and their dividends were in similar proportion. Thus the assets of these two hundred corporations was seventy billion dollars, with dividends of two billion dollars (p. 62). The ownership of these two hundred corporations is spread among two and one-third million people (p. 69), but the actual control is in the hands of a few thousand people who own a majority of the stock (pp. 70-77).

While the anti-trust laws have failed to halt the trend towards concentration, the effect of these laws has not been without some value. The authors conclude that "the system has merits that are much to be desired" and that "our efforts should be directed to its preservation and betterment." Rather than substitute government ownership in all monopolies, a reconstruction of competitive individualism is still conceived as not only desirable, but possible. Closer supervision of corporations, public investigations, tariff reforms, and revision of the present patent system are among the areas that may stimulate competition. Competitive individualism must be abandoned and state supervision or even state ownership utilized, where monopoly or oligopoly conditions exist in an industry, and such conditions are beyond correction.

Since the theoretical underpinning of traditional or historical capitalism depends on free competition, the extent of the development of corporate concentration of a monopolistic character has served to undermine this theoretical eco-legal structure. Furthermore, this trend has served to emphasize another point, to wit, the unequal distribution of wealth and its attendant malfeatures. It follows axiomatically that the distribution of wealth becomes more skewed as the concentration of economic power becomes stronger. It is highly questionable whether economic or administrative palliatives are of any significance, at this stage, for restoring free competition. The vested interests are now quite firmly entrenched. At the time when Henry George first argued against land monopoly and Henry Lloyd Demarest against industrial monopolies, especially oil, the methods described today as possibilities for reform might have been successful. This reader would have appreciated a chapter on the international aspects of monopolies as related to public policy.

For the economist, this work is a welcome addition to the stream of volumes in this field. A more adequate index, including cases, authorities, and authors, would have enhanced this book considerably. This volume is a valuable supplement to the now classic work of Berle and Means, "The Modern Corporation and Private Property," published a decade ago. In another sense the addition of new material, based on the reports of the T.N.E.C. and other organizations, gives the reader a deeper perspective and



appreciation of the problem. The problem of monopolistic competition has in recent years attracted the attention of many economists,<sup>1</sup> and theoretical discussions and proposals will be supplemented by the present work. Students of the social sciences as well as others, it is hoped, will profit from this volume.

ERNEST RUBIN

## National Policy and International Relations

*United States Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic.* By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 177 pp., \$1.50.

Walter Lippmann's book well deserves its sensational success. From the point of view of the *Raison d'Etat*, and traditional power policy, it is an absolutely masterly presentation of the United States foreign policy from the time of the Founding Fathers. Up to 1899, the commitments and the power to fulfill them were well balanced, because Great Britain, whose supremacy on the high seas was as yet unchallenged, was, by her own vital interest, bound to support the United States in every possible Atlantic conflict originating in the Monroe doctrine. Also, there was as yet no danger of a Pacific conflict, with Japan developing only very slowly, and Russia essentially landbound, and friendly. At the conclusion of the nineteenth century, however, this constellation was radically altered, because Germany began to challenge British sea power, and because the annexation of the Philippines had burdened the United States with a new and heavy commitment. From then on, our policy became "insolvent." The nation would have needed vastly increased sea- and land-power in order to bring the scales into balance again, but failed to draw this necessary conclusion. The first world war became unavoidable. But the nation was not told that it had to fight because its most vital interests were at stake. Thus, the peace was lost after the war had been won. Isolationism and pacifism were rampant, the danger kept increasing while the power kept decreasing—and again the second world war became unavoidable.

All this, we repeat, is absolutely masterly, and masterly too, from the viewpoint of power-policy, is the proposal for the coming peace: a "nuclear alliance" of the U.S.A., Britain, and Russia, open to France and the states of Western and Northern Europe; disarmament of Germany and Japan, neutralization of Poland and the Danube- and Balkan-states. This would guarantee a period of peace long enough to heal the wounds of this terrible war. But Lippmann is too clear a thinker and too good a historian not to see that there are dangers lurking if Russia does not content herself with the security within her boundaries, and if China, grown to a united, highly industrialized and therefore powerfully

<sup>1</sup> For example, Joan Robinson, "Economics of Imperfect Competition" (1933), A. R. Burns, "The Decline of Competition" (1936). Earlier works, "The Theory of Business Enterprise" (1903) and "Absentee Ownership" (1923) by Thorstein Veblen are worth rereading in the light of the present work.

militarized nation, should eventually become a new and more dangerous bidder for the domination of the world.

With this, we have revealed the hidden faults of this splendid essay. It contains no single hint as to the most important problem which United States policy will have to solve: *to make our democracy so attractive as to compel or induce Russia and China to imitate it.* Up to now, our system has not had the necessary allure. We must finally realize that it is an imperfect, because only political democracy, and that, in order to remove the danger of communism and newly-arising fascism both here and abroad, it must be developed into a perfect, i.e., also an economic democracy, in which there actually exists *equality of opportunity for all.* This cannot be the case in a state where much more than 50% of the land has been engrossed by far less than ½% of the families of that country. (Lacking ownership statistics, we can give no more than this certainly very conservative estimate. The U. S. census only contains the statistics of operations, which is bad enough, and the general information that about one-half of the operators are merely tenants on soil owned by others.) This is one of the main causes of the evils afflicting our democracy, which honest totalitarians believe to be a complete and final one, incapable of further improvement: Mass migration of rural populations into the cities, dragging down or at least keeping down wages, thus disturbing the balance of producing- and purchasing-power, which is the condition of the smooth functioning of society—primarily economically, and, in the long run, also politically.

Foreign policy—like charity—*begins at home.* We are favored for the time being by the fact that Fascism, and particularly Nazism, have proved to be excessively repulsive. The world can see—for how long?—that our own democracy is certainly by far the lesser evil. But we shall have won the peace only if we reform our democracy so as to convince the world that it is no evil at all.

FRANZ OPPENHEIMER

## Marget and Keynes

*The Theory of Prices*, Vol. II. By Arthur W. Marget. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1942, 800 pp., \$6.

The writing of the history of the development of economic theory has been attempted in a number of different ways. In all instances, however, the authors have realized that what they were seeking to achieve was a history. Professor Marget has written a book with the avowed purpose of taking an active part in current theoretical discussions. In so doing, he has produced a study which has great value as a history of the development of the "kernel" of economic theory. It is doubtful, however, if most students of the development of economic theory will concede that the unique method of presentation he has adopted is superior to the more familiar types of organization. Yet the reviewer is of the mind that Professor Marget's

method of development has many advantages, not the least of which is that it makes much more meaningful a group of theories which otherwise might not be seen by the student in any sort of understandable relationship to each other. It should make much easier the teaching of "dry as dust theory" in a true problem situation.

However, this was not the purpose for which the second volume of "The Theory of Prices" was written. It was to prove to "all" that the Fisher theory of price determination combined with the "neo-Classical" theory of value provided a better tool for the analysis of economic problems than did an analysis along the line pointed out by J. M. Keynes. The stated purpose, to this writer, appears to be a task somewhat of a "scholastic" nature when the "test of usefulness" (p. 91) is applied to the "depression-thirties," the "war-forties" and the "reconstruction fifties."

During the historic period when national governments were unable or unwilling to direct and regulate economic activity, economic analysis was properly of the "micro"—the minute scale—or Marget type; but today, with all the governments of the progressive powers able and willing to direct economic activity, it is the "macro"—the large scale—or modern Keynesian analysis of economic problems that becomes useful (p. 498). Professor Marget points out this relationship of economic theory to theories of government, when he mentions that the "macro" economic analysis was the prevalent type during the period of totalitarian government in Western Europe. He fails, however, to realize that this type of analysis did not develop and grow because theories of government changed, and not because the earlier theories were barren.

Professor Marget's adherence to nineteenth century "micro" economic conceptions is clearly indicated at various places (for example, on p. 200); the concept of the economic man is described as a "second type of fact" (p. 177); Marshallian demand curves are described as useful and at the same time representing actual plans made by prospective buyers; and the ultimate goal of a "Theory of Prices" is stated to be "to explain why realized prices are what they are" (p. 222). The acceptance of the proposition that "micro-economic" decisions and actions make "macro-economic" processes what they are (p. 544) is particularly bothersome and appears to assume a very naïve conception of the causal relationship of social activity.

From p. 504 to p. 518 Professor Marget establishes the statistical and practical possibilities of his "theoretical" analysis (p. 505). The claim for practical importance is supported by three basic assertions: (1) a statistical development of the theory will bring closer "an understanding why prices attained the level they did" (p. 508); (2) "painstaking analysis of separate cogs" is necessary to prevent "over-generalization" (p. 515); and (3) usefulness of intellectual vacuity. The last two, intelligently accomplished, have been readily accepted by all scientists. The first claim, however, is the determinant of the usefulness of the latter two. And the first claim, to this reviewer, appears to be of a definitely limited scope. It fails to realize that the economic questions which monetary and value theory

must answer at present are much more searching. The analysis provided by the "multiplier" and the concept of the "propensity to consume," advanced by Lord Keynes, provide a partial answer to these more searching questions. Marget's analysis does not appear to do so.

RICHARD W. LINDHOLM

### Economic Science and Public Policy

*From Economic Theory to Policy.* By E. Ronald Walker. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943, 273 pp., \$3.

Professor Walker states in his preface that this study is a discussion "of the problems involved in the application of economic theory to policy and of the changes which are required in the economist's equipment." In selecting this extremely difficult and complex subject, the author has indicated that he knows what time of the economic day it is. The work is a serious attempt at synthesis in the social sciences. It is especially praiseworthy because of the lucid style and presentation, so frequently absent in works of this type, especially in economics—the "dismal science."

In particular, the problem may be restated thus: What is the relation between the trained economist and government administration? Recently in this country, college professors were banned from important top positions in the Office of Price Administration. And yet, in 1937, according to Professor Walker, there were "as many as five thousand 'economists' in the federal service of the United States" (p. 17). The reason for this paradoxical situation is explained by the author when he indicates that economists do not make policy (which is a political proposition) but may, however, influence it. If the policy is wrong and the economist right, the policy is changed and the economist may be discharged or rebuked! The economist as an adviser to the practical man in government cannot maintain his scientific objectivity. In this atmosphere conditions for scientific objectivity are absent. The answers required of the economist must be real, in the present, and practical. To isolate certain real but immeasurable or even measurable variables, either for the purpose of theory or scientific control, is almost impossible in problems related to government administration or policy.

Since the economist is trained in a particular study, wherein lies the hiatus between him and the requirements of policy? Professor Walker analyzes this problem in terms of the economist's background, leading to a critical examination of economic theory. Economic theory has for the most part assumed a tautological form. From Ricardo to Keynes, the attempt has been to construct a science employing the methodology of classical physics and mathematics. The result has been to develop *ideal* sets of conditions that exist in the mind of the economist only. In the words of the author, ". . . the chief criticisms that can be made of present economic theory are its frequent use of frankly unrealistic assumptions and its habitual abstraction from elements which are obviously part and parcel of economic life, as the term is usually understood" (p. 48).

The chapters reviewing various aspects of economic theory and the specific theories of economic development prepare the reader for the synthesis Professor Walker proposes for economists, to wit, "liason with other sciences." An economist can profit, for example, from the work of specialists on population and population changes (pp. 192-194), since in government work this knowledge is indispensable. The economist must establish relationships with those scientists working in the borderline areas of the social sciences. Psychology, sociology, and other related fields may contribute independent or correlated evidence to a specific complex problem. The basis of economic theory, if I understand the author properly, is broader than the set of logical relationships that may be deduced from special assumptions, definitions, and axioms. Theory in economics must be built on facts supplemented by the results of other disciplines, especially in the important twilight zones that form the nexus of the social sciences.

From these considerations, two significant results emerge with respect to policy. First, that economic and non-economic objectives cannot be sharply distinguished. The economist can analyze their relationships to one another indicating where they conflict or supplement each other. Second, that *welfare economics* play a greater rôle in economic theory. Welfare economics reverses traditional classical economic thought in the sense that it seeks minimum standards of welfare, scientifically determined, as objectives for the great number, hence minimizing the rôle of maximum profits and the entrepreneur.

This study is a sincere attempt to effect a reconstruction of economic theory in terms of the problems of the real external world. The author has attacked this problem from within, that is, present economic theory and its limitations; and from without, by indicating the content of realistic economic theory as related to policy. The approach has been a practical one, instead of another exercise in methodology, and the results constitute a directive to both academic and government economists. It is to be hoped, that Professor Walker will consider this volume a pioneering step in the right direction, and continue to expand the constructive aspects of "economic sociology."

ERNEST RUBIN

### Nature in Human Experience

*The Garment of God: The Influence of Nature in Human Experience.* By John C. Merriam. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943, 174 pp., \$2.

*Zack Jones, Fisherman-Philosopher.* By Helen Swift. Chicago: A. Kroch & Son, 1944, 225 pp., \$3.

It is certain that man began to find himself when he first became aware of earth and sky. His progress since then as a social and an intellectual being has kept pace with his identification of himself with his natural surroundings, the story of endless time and space written in rock and tree and



in the stars above. So into a future beyond prophecy the vision of man is widening and the mind of man is deepening. And contemplation of his place and destiny may yet bring him to dwell in peace with himself and with his brethren.

That is the simple truth limned in the living raiment of nature which John C. Merriam, president-emeritus of the Carnegie Institution, scientist, educator and philosopher, in the seventy-fifth year of a life dedicated to the advancement of knowledge, has spread upon the pages of "The Garment of God." In this work he has wrought a finer conception of God and with it an ennoblement of man. Dr. Merriam differentiates between scientific appraisal and aesthetic appreciation of nature, the one enhancing the other and both contributing to the fullness of day-to-day living. Everyone who is sensitive to the beauties of nature has discovered a lifetime love for some part of earth and has returned to it again and again to commune with it and with those making it their habitat. For the native and his source in the soil are inseparable and together they reflect the divine image in creation.

Pilgrimages of half a century to a woodland lake in Wisconsin, where companionship with a son of the waters and shores spanned his shy childhood and his ruggedly sincere maturity, have found permanence in "Zack Jones, Fisherman-Philosopher," the record of a relationship nurtured by closeness to the everlasting verities. Helen Swift reveals in this book her feeling for human values which for some splendid years gave America *The Freeman*. She shares imperishable memories and microcosmic understanding with all who have known what it is to stand face to face with Man in Paradise.

GROVER CLEVELAND LOUD

## The Politics of War Relief

*The Blockade of Germany after the Armistice, 1918-1919.* By Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1942, viii + 874 pp. \$6.

This volume is Publication No. 16 in the series of *The Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace*. The materials, edited by Miss Bane, Archivist and Research Associate, and Dr. Lutz, Director of that institution, were selected from records of the Supreme Economic Council, Superior Blockade Council, Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, Supreme War Council and other Inter-Allied organizations and political bodies. They present a documentary history of the food blockade and its expansion to the Baltic. In most of the seven first chapters actual correspondence, quoted from the archives of the American Relief Administration, tells of the unremitting effort of the Government of this country to secure blockade relaxation before the peace was signed. The book's second part deals with the relation of the blockade to censorship policies, and part III reflects the contemporary public opinion about blockade after the Armistice, as



indicated by representative selections from current newspapers and periodicals.

In the preface to the voluminous collection of official World War I documents we read that the continuation of the Allied food blockade of Germany for five months after the Armistice exercised a profound influence upon the driving forces of the German revolution 1918-1919 and the subsequent establishment of the Weimar Republic. At a time when the new United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has been constituted, this fact is of particular interest, suggesting that the present director general of the UNRRA also will make use of an expected world shortage of food supplies after the war to accelerate similar political developments in countries to be democratized. Notes on Allied organizations and a "Hunger Map of Europe" finally illustrate to what extent help for 23 countries had been provided during the Great War and the following reconstruction period. From 1914 to 1929 the grand total of all food and relief delivered amounted to nearly 34,000,000 metric tons, valued at over \$5,234,000,000, one fourth of which, however, went to Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

PAUL UCKER

### The Family in Social Life

*Christianity and the Family.* By Ernest R. Groves. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942, ix + 229 pp., \$2.

Taking family life in a realistic sense, subject as it is to pressure of external forces on all economic levels, the author of the Rauschenbusch Lectures given in the Spring of 1941 at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, now published under the title "Christianity and the Family," sees clearly the problem faced in sustaining the family as a social institution. Much has been published subjectively but very little inspiration has come from earlier insistence by others upon moral ideals without economic means to realize them. This technique has always left behind a sense of futility. It does not do to rest content with abstract Christian experience which merely nets, as the author says, a "satisfaction and a sense of success" which comes "from dwelling upon far-away ideals."

Modern families, he decides, are better equipped to survive because of "a unity imposed by the pressure of external necessity" and hence are "better prepared to emphasize the spiritual aspects of domestic association."

By virtue of that fact the modern family "offers greater opportunities for the educational influence of Christianity." The author examines the contributions the family can make to Christian living, to developing personality in its individual members and training them to be co-operative with others and ready to get about in society outside, armed for the struggle against totalitarianism. It covers also the responsibilities of Christian ministers as counselors in personal problems. Above all it makes an exceptional contribution to thinking for the clergy for whose benefits the lec-

tures were given, by emphasizing that "Christianity for its own welfare needs to encourage a balance between inner and outer values in the motives of social life."

PRESTON KING SHELDON

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